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Introduction 
 
This work is the result of a research project on Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's philosophy 
of mathematics and the role of Erhard Weigel in its development. Erhard Weigel (1625 – 
1699) was Leibniz's teacher of mathematics during Leibniz's early years. He started his 
academic career as an astronomer, studying at the University of Leipzig at the time of 
Leibniz's birth and began teaching mathematics in Jena in 1653. His studies however 
included a much wider range of topics than the ones strictly related to his profession, from 
the philosophy of nature to metaphysics, ethics and law. While Leibniz is widely known 
as one of the most brilliant minds of the 17th century, Weigel is little known, even among 
scholars: it is universally acknowledged that in 1663 the young Leibniz spent a semester 
at the University of Jena under Weigel's guidance, but this fact is not considered 
particularly relevant with regards to the development of Leibniz's mathematics, mostly 
because a significant turning point on this subject happens in the following years, during 
Leibniz's stay in Paris. Even more, in Weigel's writings is not contained at first glance 
any decisive reference on topics close to Leibniz's philosophy of mathematics, such as 
the foundation of the infinitesimal calculus. 
However, the publication of Leibniz's writings in recent years shed some light on the 
relationship with Weigel, highlighting Leibniz's interest in Weigel's works until the end 
of his life. Lately, some major studies on this topic began to emerge, but a complete 
account of Weigel's influence is still missing. 
In this work, through a reconstruction that goes beyond Weigel's generally accepted 
influence before Leibniz's Parisian stay, I will argue that some major achievements of 
Leibniz's philosophy of mathematics were conceived thanks to a constant reference to his 
former teacher. The ambiguity of the term 'philosophy of mathematics' expresses in an 
appropriate way the wide range of topics in which this exchange of ideas proved to be 
effective:  from the metaphysical foundation of arithmetics and geometry to the use of 
mathematics in a metaphysical description of the world. The final outcome of this 
research will be showing that Leibniz arrived in Paris with the precise purpose of 
developing in mathematical terms some universal principles, such as the principle of 
contradiction and the principle by which the whole is greater than its part, endorsed thanks 
to Weigel's decisive influence between 1663 and 1671. The superior mathematical 
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knowledge achieved in Paris will change Leibniz's original research project dramatically, 
but another exchange with Weigel around 1679 will renew his interest in the foundational 
approach on mathematics so much, that from that moment on, Weigel will become a 
constant reference for Leibniz in this topic, exemplified by the adoption of Weigel's 
mathematical notation at the end of Leibniz's life. 
Weigel's influence then could be ideally divided in two waves of reception, represented 
respectively by the first and the second part of the present work. The first part does not 
deal directly with Leibniz’s foundational approach in mathematics, but with the adoption 
of those principles that at a later time will be used for this specific purpose. This adoption 
happens between 1663 and 1671 and entails Leibniz’s involvement with Jena’s cultural 
movement that saw in Weigel one of its most important figure. In this context, Weigel's 
metaphysical interpretation of Hobbes' philosophy, together with his syncretistic efforts 
in combining it with some ideas taken from Aristotle and the Scholastics, will constitute 
the ideal background in which Leibniz's philosophy of nature emerges. Leibniz's idea of 
primary matter and its role in the conciliation between Aristotle and the moderns, his 
growing interest in Hobbes' conatus, and his derivative knowledge of Galilei, Boyle and 
many others will be explained by highlighting Weigel's importance. After a general 
premise on Leibniz's correspondence of those years, the analysis of the dissertations 
developed by academics under Weigel's guidance will reveal how Weigel's influence on 
Leibniz was not limited to the semester spent in Jena in 1663, because Leibniz's 
Hypothesis physica nova, written around 1671, could be seen as an ideal development of 
those dissertations. Conjecturing then a progressive adoption of Weigel's ideas that saw 
its peak in 1671, a reasonable explanation of how Leibniz adopted some principles taken 
from Scholastics, while openly criticizing them, could be given. These principles will 
constitute at a later time the essence of Leibniz's foundation of mathematics. Moreover, 
although abandoning many of the physical theories developed before Paris, Leibniz will 
re-elaborate some reflections on the geometry of space taken from those years, 
introducing them in the wider context of his foundational attempts. 
The second part deals with Leibniz's further development of those principles endorsed 
before Paris in a coherent account that allows the definition of mathematical objects, such 
as numbers. Aside from the topic of Weigel's influence, it could be seen also as a tentative 
explanation of Leibniz's claim of deriving the whole of mathematics from the principle 
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of contradiction. Since the role of the principle of contradiction in Leibniz is often 
underestimated, in the first chapter is presented a general premise on Leibniz's use of it 
in many heterogeneous topics, such as modal logic, the demonstration of God's existence, 
the theory of perception and, naturally, the foundation of mathematics. By highlighting 
the importance of this principle, in the following chapter I will show its connection with 
the principle by which the whole is greater than its part, relying mostly on Leibniz's 
explanation of the foundation of mathematics given in his last works on this subject. 
These universal principles will in turn be connected with Leibniz's concept of 
homogeneity, founded on the distinction between quality and quantity. This is I believe 
the most important concept related to Leibniz's philosophy of mathematics and it will be 
associated with Weigel's decisive influence, making the hypothesis of interpreting 
Leibniz's efforts as the re-elaboration of Weigel's intuitions a reasonable conjecture. 
Having achieved a better insight on the fundamental concepts involved, in the last 
chapter of the second part I will finally introduce Weigel's influence from an historical 
point of view. Homogeneity, the difference between quality and quantity and the idea that 
motion has a precise role in geometry, which Leibniz seems to possess already before his 
mathematical studies in Paris, will be once again connected to the cultural movement born 
in Jena in those years. The definition of number given by Weigel in his Idea matheseos 
universae will reveal a close resemblance with the one given by Leibniz, since both are 
based on the same idea of homogeneity and on the comparison of line segments by means 
of ratios and proportions. Leibniz's renewed interest for these topics in 1679, related also 
to the development of his Analysis situs, correspond in fact to his first letter to Weigel. 
From that moment on, during the second wave of reception, Leibniz will extensively read 
Weigel's works akin to his project of founding mathematics, from the works already read 
in the early years to the newer ones, like Weigel's 1693 Philosophia mathematica. This 
work is particularly relevant with regards to Weigel's influence, because it introduces the 
mathematical symbols for 'greater' and 'less' that will be later adopted by Leibniz as an 
homage to Weigel's achievements, but with the precise purpose of extending them to the 
mathematics of the infinite. Finally, I will also show that the Initia rerum 
mathematicarum metaphysica, Leibniz's 1714 work originally taken as the best example 
of his mature theory, was conceived by him in the context of Weigel's school in Jena, 
even if his former teacher had already passed away at that time. 
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The third part of the present work is relatively independent from the topics sketched 
above, because it revolves around the introduction of mathematical concepts in the 
metaphysical explanation of reality, exemplified by Weigel's and Leibniz's development 
of binary arithmetics. It is conceived as a new insight on the problem of determining the 
possible influence of Weigel on Leibniz's dyadic. This subject is debated since the 
beginning of the 20th century, often with scarce results, depended mostly on an inaccurate 
knowledge of Weigel's works and on Leibniz's hesitation in openly admitting his debt to 
Weigel. The reconstruction of Leibniz's discovery of binary arithmetics will show instead 
how it was developed from the very beginning thanks to a peculiar composition of 
mathematical achievements and metaphysical concepts that suggest a connection with 
Weigel's interest in the Pythagorean tradition. Leibniz takes from Weigel not only the 
idea of counting using a different base from that of the base ten model, but also the idea 
of connecting this mathematical outcome with the metaphysical distinction between unity 
and nothingness. The expression of the whole world through these two concepts will 
stress some major problems on the composition of the continuum that in the end will 
dissuade Leibniz from connecting binary arithmetics to the other parts of his philosophy, 
despite his claims about its usefulness and its metaphysical relevance. Even more, this 
final outcome reveals Leibniz's theological concerns in associating God and numbers, 
offering a possible explanation of his carefulness in debating about Weigel with his 
correspondents. 
In conclusion, the research in all these fields will reveal Leibniz's huge debt to Weigel 
and his tradition. However, it will be also clear that, as much as in some specific topics 
there is indeed a stunning resemblance between the two, Leibniz's novelty consists in his 
innovative combination of Weigel's principles and general ideas, with a rational strictness 
that was unknown to his contemporaries. Leibniz's unprecedented rationalism turned the 
convoluted ideas and daring claims of his former teacher in one of the most advanced 
mathematical theories of the 17th century. 
From a methodological point of view, the present work focuses, as much as possible, 
on new insights or relatively new insights on Leibniz's philosophy, resorting to traditional 
and widely known interpretations only when needed in the context of Weigel's reception.  
Being this a study on the influence of an author over another one, I relied extensively on 
quotes from Weigel’s and Leibniz’s works, presented in their original language, in order 
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to show the adoption of specific terms or constructions. Some of the writings analysed 
are unpublished or particularly difficult to find, meaning that their exposition in the 
original form is also needed for a fair confrontation on the subject. Since many of the 
dissertations or works examined are not correctly numbered in their original editions, I 
have given, when needed, a contextual reference based on their chapter divisions, or other 
internal criteria. 
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PART I: Philosophy of Nature and the Adoption of Universal 
Principles 
 
1.1 General Remarks on the Purpose of This Part  
 
The secondary literature on Leibniz’s early years agree in principle on the intricacies 
posed by his position: identifying distinctive influences on his philosophy has proven to 
be challenging, due to the large amount of authors quoted and read during the first ten 
years of his production. Evidently, some major influences can indeed be traced, 
Scholastics or modern and ancient atomists to name a few1, but what we gain by this, as 
major ideas emerge in Leibniz’s writings, is lost when the uniformity of these positions 
does not allow the conferment of original accounts to specific authors. Perhaps Thomas 
Hobbes is one of the few authors that can be genuinely listed among Leibniz’s direct 
influences without effort, not only because he is openly quoted from the start, but also 
because his theories were so unique and recent that no manual or specimen would have 
successfully adopted them. Yet, I will soon show that even Hobbes' reception depended 
ultimately on a version of his philosophy mutuated by a cultural tradition that was 
adopting and modifying his works for their purposes. The very difference between newer 
and older theories then seems at stake here: during the early years, Leibniz’s knowledge 
seems very derivative and manuals adopted by him are often responsible for this lack of 
focus on a single author. If we turn then to the history of ideas, moving from the impact 
of specific authors to the transmission of precise concepts, a study on the young Leibniz 
becomes even more challenging, if only because a philosopher’s position is by no means 
a collection of previous statements on the same matter, combined in order to produce a 
new interpretation. 
Knowing these difficulties, presenting Weigel as a major influence on Leibniz’s 
rationalism in these years seems somehow misleading, even more if, as it will be argued 
                                                          
1 There are of course too many works that deal with Leibniz’s reception of Hobbes, Democritus, Gassendi, 
Alsted, Bisterfeld and the scholars. For more information on the young Leibniz’s influences related to the 
topic of this section see Mercer (2002a, 27-49), who openly recognize Weigel’s influence, much like Piro 
(1990) already did. A relatively new collection of essays on this topic can be found in Kulsted (ed. 2009), 
whereas a systematic historical approach can be found in Antognazza (2009). Much less are instead the 
writings on Leibniz’s early atomism, for example Wilson (1994) Arthur (2003) and Mormino (2012, 111-
142).  
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in this section, the key factor that determines it is the adoption of universal principles, 
especially the principle of contradiction. The adoption of this principle is in fact quite 
common among the Scholastics: Thomas Aquinas adopted it himself and distinctive 
traces of its use can be found in Boethius, determining its presence in Suárez and several 
other authors of this tradition2. However, the fact that Leibniz read about this principle in 
these authors, perhaps even before his first contact with Weigel’s works, does not 
necessarily mean that he had found it suitable for its emerging philosophy. This 
hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the fact that Leibniz was not always akin to 
Scholasticism, due to his adoption of the new physics, as the famous quote on his difficult 
choice between the old and the new vision of the world shows3. From these premises, an 
apparent inconsistency follows: after years of fascination for the new ideas and a severe 
judgment on the terminological confusion of the Scholastics on the matter of what will 
be later called theodicy4, in the 1672’s Confessio philosophi Leibniz abruptly adopts a 
Scholastic principle, the principle of contradiction, to solve the same problems. 
Consequently, a comprehensive study on the development of this principle seems 
necessary: it is true that Leibniz already turned to some of the Scholastics’ ideas before 
the Confessio philosophi, but a naïve adoption of this principle was almost impossible for 
a man extremely aware of the great innovation that was taking place in the philosophy of 
nature, such as Leibniz. What I believe is often underestimated is the impact of the new 
physics: adopting, refuting, maintaining or changing the old theories was surely a matter 
that had to be analysed depending on the specific subject, such as the problem of 
individuation or modality, but it is hard to deny that the urgency of the debate depended 
ultimately on the fact that in other and more relevant topics of that time the old theories 
were severely criticised. These criticisms, bearing a whole new interpretation of the world 
destined to affect more than few philosophers, are perhaps more important than the 
                                                          
2 The genesis and development of this concept will be examined in the last chapter of the present part. 
3 I’m referring here to the famous quote in Leibniz’s 1697 letter to Thomas Burnett: “La plus part de mes 
sentimens ont esté enfin arrestés apres une deliberation de 20 ans. Car j’ay commencé bien jeune à mediter: 
et je n’avois pas encor 15 ans quand je me promenois des journées entieres dans un bois pour prendre parti 
entre Aristote et Democrite. Cependant j’ay changé et rechangé sur des nouvelles lumiéres. Et ce n’est que 
depuis environ 12 ans que je me trouve satisfait, et que je suis arrivé à des demostrations sur ces matieres 
qui n’en paroissent point capables. Cependant de la maniere que je m’y prends, ces demostrations peuvent 
estre sensibles comme celles des nombres quoyque le sujet passe l’imagination” (AA I-14, 224). I believe 
however that there was never a time when Leibniz had modern ideas completely deprived of scholastics’ 
influences, so much that the famous episode could be seen more like a rhetorical tool used by Leibniz to 
impress his correspondent. 
4 For more information on the topic of predetermination see Mormino (2005 and 2009). 
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account of a specific teacher or manual for a perceptive mind such that of Leibniz, who 
will later contribute himself to the scientific revolution. For these reasons, the use of 
contradiction by Leibniz can’t be seen as a mere return to Scholastics, if only because it 
should be consistent with his entire philosophy at that time. 
It is in this line of thought that Weigel’s influence becomes relevant: rather than 
emphasising his impact to the detriment of other authors, something that even the young 
Leibniz wouldn’t probably admit, I will argue that his main contribution was teaching a 
critical-aware approach to some major ideas taken from the Scholastics, such as the 
principle of contradiction, and others taken from the moderns, especially Hobbes. The 
purpose of this section is hence showing how the first wave of Weigel’s reception has to 
be considered on one hand, as if Weigel was only one among several authors that 
contributed to Leibniz’s formation and, on the other hand, as if he played an important 
role in altering some fundamental Scholastic ideas, making them suitable for a new 
interpretation in the light of modern physics. A small contribution in the eyes of the young 
Leibniz can be considered an important achievement, turning instead to the whole 
development of Leibniz’s philosophy, since it affects the very core of his rationalism in 
the following years, as it will be shown. 
At first, this purpose may appear far from that of studying Leibniz’s philosophy of 
mathematics, but it will hint instead to a very strong consistency between physics, 
geometry, logic and even law in Leibniz’s early years. So much that, as an outcome of 
this research, it will show that Leibniz’s very first purpose was also solving a problem on 
the ground of physics, rather than one pertaining only the so-called traditional and 
metaphysical philosophy. This consequence seems obvious on a general basis, but 
proving it on the assumption of a relation between physics, mathematics and the principle 
of contradiction becomes challenging. The result is a possible line of thought that 
connects Leibniz’s general attitude during these years to his later remarks on the 
possibility of founding the whole of mathematics on the principle of contradiction5. What 
is even more relevant in fact is that the reinstatement of the principle of contradiction is 
only the most prominent result of Weigel’s influence, bringing along a distinctive set of 
                                                          
5 The reference is to the famous letter to Clarke, dated 1715: “Le grand fondement des Mathématiques, est 
le principe de la contradiction, ou de l’identité, c’est-à-dire, qu’une énonciation ne sauroit être vraie et 
fausse en même tems; et qu’ainsi A est A, et ne sauroit être non A. Et ce seul Principe suffit pour démonter 
toute l’Arithmétique et toute la Géométrie, c’est-à-dire, tous les Principes Mathématiques” (GP VII, 355). 
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ideas and problems that Leibniz showed to be aware of at an early stage, but that he 
decided to develop and face during a much longer period of time than that of their early 
adoption.  
This entire section will be focused on explaining how these general ideas are connected 
to Weigel’s specific influence. Through the analysis of Leibniz’s correspondence 
between 1663 and 1671, in the next chapter I will show not only that a connection with 
Weigel is possible, but also how it developed in time.  
In the following chapters, starting from the philosophy of nature, I will examine how 
Weigel’s school influenced Leibniz on the topics of motion, primary matter, 
quantification and geometry. Starting from the analysis of the Disputatio metaphysica de 
principio individui's corollaries, I will deal with the physical problem of the penetratio 
dimensionum, a perfect example of the incompatibility between the qualitative approach 
of the Aristotelian physics and the quantitative approach of the new one. In this context, 
avoiding contradiction was considered the primary requisite of a well-grounded theory, 
explaining Leibniz’s efforts, who at first reintroduces the impossibility of penetration in 
a new fashion taken from the new physics and then finally adopts the principle of 
contradiction as an ontological tool developed to reunite the opposing theses. 
Having sketched the context in which a connection between physics and logic is 
possible, through an in-depth analysis of Weigel’s Analysis aristotelica ex Euclide 
restituta and other writings belonging to Weigel's school we will be able to determine the 
extent of Weigel’s influence: the exact same conclusions proposed by Weigel, i.e. 
Aristotelian key concepts saved from the severe criticism towards Scholastics, are 
contained in what we established as the final stage of this period, that is Leibniz’s 
Hypothesis physica nova and his coeval writings. Having achieved new insights on this 
topic, it will be possible to follow Leibniz’s progressive adoption of various principles, 
especially in logic and geometry of space, between 1663 and 1672. In the last chapter of 
this part, the outcome of this research will be that at the beginning of the Parisian period 
Leibniz was well aware of the connections between his metaphysics and mathematics, so 
much that his mathematical studies in Paris, from that time on, will be focused on topics 
that he could have already decided to develop at an earlier stage.  The final conclusion to 
this part will allow me to explain in the following one in what sense from a philosophical 
point of view Leibniz’s ontological use of logical laws affects his idea of space in 
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geometry and arithmetics: through the analysis of apparently unrelated topics we witness 
the birth of Leibniz’s concept of homogeneity, a key element of his philosophy of 
mathematics. 
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1.2 Weigel’s School and its Pivotal Role on the Young Leibniz’s Philosophy: A Study on 
the 1663–1671 Correspondence 
 
The Weigel-Schule and its objectives In order to show the importance of the principle of 
contradiction and its connection with the philosophy of nature, a thorough study on the 
time of its adoption in Leibniz seems at least legit. By no means Weigel played a 
secondary role in the process of adopting this concept, tainted otherwise by decisive, yet 
elusive, Scholastics’ influences, but some preliminary distinctions should be pointed out. 
First of all, we should refrain from emphasising the importance of contradiction in 
Leibniz’s early years in the light of its decisive influence at a later stage: by doing so, we 
would ignore the relevance of the context in which this principle arose and, consequently, 
we wouldn’t be able to explain for what reason it seems related to so many topics in 
Leibniz’s philosophy. On the contrary, Weigel constitutes a decisive influence especially 
because the principle of contradiction is only one among those topics in which Leibniz 
seems close to his views. Nevertheless, all the other topics involved are precisely the ones 
that will be connected to the principle in Leibniz’s production after the 1670s, meaning 
that there is a way through Weigel to retrace this common background. Considering this 
a mere coincidence would be far too unwise: it is as if a general analysis on the 
fundamental principles in Leibniz could be retraced in Weigel’s works, following a more 
specific path. In the Analysis aristotelica ex Euclide restituta the reference to the principle 
of contradiction per se is of course present, but the references to the connection between 
identity and contradiction, the importance of the reductio ad absurdum in the light of 
syllogistic, the use of contradiction in the definition of modal concepts, the foundation of 
mathematics on the principle by which the whole is greater than its part, a constant 
reference to the Euclidean background and a possible connection between mathematics 
and a kind of ars combinatoria are also present. All these topics are the ones that in the 
following chapters will allow a coherent reconstruction of the relationship between the 
principle of contradiction and Leibniz’s analysis situs. 
However, referring to Weigel’s Analysis aristotelica only would not be sufficient for 
understanding the dynamics behind Leibniz’s reception: my main aim for this part would 
be that of showing how important traces of Weigel’s influence could be found from the 
Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui to the Hypothesis physica nova and then 
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maintained to a certain extent even later, regardless the evident changes in Leibniz’s 
philosophy. What I’m suggesting here is that Weigel’s influence, much like the topic of 
contradiction, should be seen in the light of a progressive adoption, i.e. something that 
evolves in time and adapts to Leibniz’s newer views, rather than something that obeys to 
the simple law of reading once, evaluating and then discarding or adopting. Leibniz in 
fact extensively read Weigel throughout his life and there are times and topics in which 
Leibniz is openly against Weigel’s views, but there is no denying that the evolution of 
Leibniz’s philosophy led him to the revaluation of his early reception of Weigel’s ideas, 
introduced however in a different context. The difference between the first and the second 
wave of reception then is the broader background in which the former is integrated: during 
the first wave, Weigel’s ideas are undoubtedly present in other authors, but it was he the 
one who played a pivotal role for Leibniz, because in Weigel these ideas are present 
altogether and they are presented in an appropriate way, different from that of naïve 
Scholastics and ready for the new physics. 
This is what I will argue as far as the purely theoretical confrontation between the two 
authors goes, but founding the importance of Weigel’s influence only on an ideal 
connection would be an utter mistake in the context of Leibniz’s early years, because 
similar theories presented by different authors are alternately adopted and discarded by 
him, so much that connections in such a way could be ideally found for any author. 
Thankfully, Weigel’s influence possesses two unique and relevant features that sets it 
apart: (1) priority in space and time and (2) being the result of a school of thought that 
shared common interests and topics, founded by Weigel himself. 
The priority in space and time, although it will be proved once more by the analysis of 
Leibniz’s correspondence, is a truth universally acknowledge: no one questions the fact 
that Leibniz spent time in Jena with Weigel in 16636. I believe however that the 
importance of this aspect is often underestimated. The various reconstructions of 
Leibniz’s early years indulge often on the idea of a young genius, driven by an insatiable 
curiosity fostered by the goal of mastering the entire knowledge of his times. Even if this 
description is undoubtedly true, it suggests that the variety of authors chosen by Leibniz 
rests ultimately on a peculiar trait of his character, giving to these choices a degree of 
freedom and awareness that is hard to prove without resorting to mere conjectures. In this 
                                                          
6 See for example Moll (1973, 33). 
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interpretation, the various influences stand on the same ground and Leibniz’s wit, 
corroborated by the correspondences with his works, is responsible for the inclination 
towards a specific author. However, if it is possible to prove instead that many of these 
authors are somehow connected to Weigel’s influence, his presence next to Leibniz since 
1663 would gain a much more profound meaning: we could argue then that Weigel 
introduced some of these authors to Leibniz and that Leibniz developed his own position 
from there, aiming to achieve cultural relevance in the specific context in which he lived. 
I believe that this hypothesis is much more reasonable for a young and talented student 
in need of acknowledgment. By identifying a connection between Weigel and other 
authors, I do not mean that Weigel could be hidden behind all these authors as the true 
reference for Leibniz, which would be against the true purpose of a serious study on 
Leibniz’s sources. Rather, I argue that talking about Hobbes, Descartes, Gassendi, 
Jungius and Aristotle in a certain way is the result of a cultural environment that Weigel 
himself contributed to create. 
In this regard, the idea of a Weigelian school or milieu helps us in understanding the 
development of Leibniz’s philosophy. The main characters of this cultural influence were 
Weigel himself, together with many of his students7, like Samuel Pufendorf, Friedrich 
Nitzsch and a young Johann Christoph Sturm, but also people close to Weigel, like Johann 
Andreas Bose, Abdias Trew or Hermann Conring. Not to mention the syncretistic 
approach that Leibniz already learned from Jakob Thomasius and Johann Adam 
Scherzer8. The multiple goals of this cultural program that stretched from Jena and 
Leipzig’s areas were as follows: 
 
                                                          
7 A list of Weigel’s students and their enrolment in the University of Jena is found in Herbst (2016, 345-
365). 
8 Scherzer and Weigel were very different in their approach to syncretism: Schrezer introduced Jewish 
theology and the Kabbalah in his idea of clarifying the confused state of the seventeenth century philosophy, 
tending towards a mysticism that was unknown to Weigel. Weigel’s syncretism was much more inclined 
towards rationalism and, consequently, it gained quickly Leibniz’s favour. Although often confusing, 
Weigel’s works never abandon the idea of a precise and rational exposition of a connection between all 
aspects of human knowledge. Testament to this idea is for example the conclusion of Weigel’s Disputatio 
statica de aestimatione gravium: “Astrologicae vanitates, quales sunt erectorum thematum judicia, 
praedicationes rerum futurarum & c. Matheseos partem non faciunt” (Weigel-Scheidlin 1665, Corollaria, 
6). This is the reason why I do not believe in a priority of Scherzer over Weigel, but that does not mean that 
they were not sharing the same goals in their cultural programs. On the connection between Italian 
renaissance, present in Scherzer, and the Jesuits’ revaluation of Kabbalah see for example Altmann (1987, 
173). On the common interests shared by Scherzer and Weigel see Mercer (2002b, 239). 
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- Reconciling the new physics endorsed by men such as Gassendi, Hobbes and 
Descartes with some intuitions belonging to the older physics, by highlighting that 
a proper interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy would reject some of the 
Scholastics’ ideas that were clearly against the newer philosophers. 
 
- Achieving a rational theory of morality and jurisprudence by extending the 
universal principles used in metaphysics and mathematics to these fields, thus 
reconciling the excellent but somehow dangerous ideas developed by Hobbes to 
those of authors such as Grotius. 
 
- Adopting Euclid and Aristotle as paradigmatic examples of rational proofing, both 
in mathematics and logic, giving birth to a logic based on the idea of mathematical 
combination and a syllogistic that strives for unification in the fashion of the 
Euclidean method. 
 
- Founding a society of German cultured men able to compete with the other 
European academies of sciences.  
 
Analysing the influence of this program is in my opinion the key to understand the 
problem of Leibniz’s progressive adoption of universal principles in an ever changing 
background such that of his early years. This problem, although being present throughout 
the whole history of Weigel and Leibniz’s relationship, is of course particularly relevant 
in the transition between the Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui and the 
Hypothesis physica nova. If we accept however the existence of such program, we can 
clearly see for example that the young Leibniz’s initial adhesion to atomism and its 
rejection in the following years is not necessarily inconsistent with a constant Weigelian 
influence: in this syncretistic background, both positions were accepted and used. 
Although rejecting a purely atomistic view for example, we will show that Weigel 
compares, in an Aristotelian context, the combinatorial ability of a universal logical 
language inspired by Hobbes to the collisions between atoms described by Democritus. 
In the letter to Thomasius dated April 1669, Leibniz will state in the same fashion: “Mihi 
enim neque vacuum neque plenum necessarium esse, utroque modo rerum natura 
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explicari posse videtur”9. The bold claims of Weigel and other authors close to him show 
that they were already past any possible concern regarding theological matters, although 
aiming ultimately for the complete reconciliation10. 
The basis for this reconciliatory project is a peculiar interpretation of Aristotle’s 
Apodeixis as a tool applicable in all sorts of fields11. Talking about jurisprudence then 
was not that different from talking about logic, metaphysics, morality or mathematics, 
since the method and the structure of the universal principles adopted was one and the 
same. I will argue then that Leibniz’s philosophical shift is the realisation of a research 
project endorsed by him in the light of Weigel’s syncretistic school, on the ground of 
physics, ethics and logic. From Leibniz’s initial reception in 1663 it will reach its peak in 
the famous letter to Thomasius dated April 1669, with the Hypothesis physica nova of the 
following years as the most prominent outcome of this reception, cherished by Weigel 
himself.  In order to do so, I will turn now to the analysis of Leibniz’s correspondence in 
those years. 
 
From Leibniz’s Perspective The very first letter of the critical edition of Leibniz’s 
philosophical correspondence contains also the first reference to Weigel. It is a letter to 
Thomasius dated September 1663, meaning that at that time Leibniz already discussed 
his Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui in June. He was enrolled for the 
summer semester at Weigel’s University of Jena, but he was about to come back to 
Leipzig the next month. In this letter we read: 
 
Unus mihi Dominus Pufendorfius notus est, qui tamen sua elementa 
jurisprudentia[e] ex Weigelii nostri Ethica Euclidea manuscripta dicitur fere 
tota efformasse (AA II-1, 5). 
 
                                                          
9 AA (II-1, 25). 
10 An approach that was different from that of Leibniz, much more concerned about the reception of his 
theological ideas in the society of his time. This is the reason why, from one side, Weigel’s influence will 
be denied by Leibniz in the following years and, from the other side, the tension between the ideas 
belonging to the Weigelian school and the traditional ones, opposed to any form of syncretism, will lead to 
Leibniz’s original solution concerning theodicy. 
11 See Thomas Behme’s introduction in Pufendorf (2009, IX). 
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This reference is extremely relevant for several reasons. I won’t overinterpret this 
“Weigelii nostri”, but both the best and the worst-case scenario would lead to interesting 
results. It could be a mere geographical reference, although as we saw such references 
shouldn’t be underestimated: between 1647 and 1650 in fact, Weigel studied at the 
University of Leipzig and obtained the qualification there with a dissertation entitled 
Dissertatio Metaphysica Prior (De Existentia) und Posterior (De Modo Existentiae, qui 
dicitur Duratio). Only in 1653 he will start his career as a professor in Jena. This means 
that even if Leibniz here is implying with Thomasius only a common geographical 
background, that background is still the one that gave birth to Weigel’s philosophy.  
Giving more importance to Leibniz’s words instead would be possible by outlying that 
Leibniz and Thomasius here seem accustomed to a Weigelian reference: the Euclidean 
ethics mentioned could probably be the one contained in the Analysis aristotelica ex 
Euclide restituta. This book, published in 1658, is the most important work needed to 
retrace Weigel’s influence on Leibniz’s adoption of universal and physical principles. As 
we already sketched, it contains many ideas consistent with the cultural program 
previously mentioned. The crucial point here is understanding if Leibniz was influenced 
by this book only after his arrival in Jena or before that, already in his Disputatio 
metaphysica. I believe that the latter interpretation is the most reasonable12: not only in 
the Disputatio metaphysica, as it will be shown in the next chapters, we find concepts 
possibly taken from Weigel’s Analysis, but also the fact that Weigel studied in Leipzig 
suggests that Thomasius’circle itself could have introduced Leibniz to this work. This 
should not sound surprising, if we think for example that around 1669, Thomasius’ own 
son, Christian Thomasius, although studying in Leipzig and not in Jena was greatly 
influenced by Pufendorf, Weigel’s closest disciple13. 
If Leibniz’s early adoption of Weigel’s work is plausible, then we could think that the 
semester spent in Jena was favoured by Leibniz with the precise purpose of studying 
under Weigel. This interpretation is supported by the fact that by the time of the 1663 
letter to Thomasius, Leibniz joined in Jena an academic society, the Societas 
quaerentium, led by Weigel himself and composed by students and teachers, with the 
                                                          
12 For a different account on the same topic see Piro (2005, 85). Weigel’s supposed platonism, related to 
the topic of identifying his influence before Jena, will be discussed in the following chapters. 
13 See the Institutiones Iurisprudentiae Divinae Libri III in Quibus Fundamenta Iuris Naturalis Secundum 
Hypotheses Illustris Pufendorffii Perspicue Demonstrantur (Thomasius 1994). 
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purpose of studying and comparing works taken both from the old and new tradition14. 
Even more, it is not surprising that Weigel was the president of this society: by the time 
of its foundation, Weigel had already been director of the Philosophischen Fakultät in 
1656 and dean of the whole university the following year. Weigel’s institutional prestige 
and reputation is important in understanding his role in the cultural movement born in 
Jena, because it suggests that he had not a secondary part in its development. At the same 
time, the publication of his controversial Analysis in 1658 lead to a conflict with his 
university. Only in 1675 Weigel will be elected once again dean of the university and 
regain the favour of his community. It follows that, by the time of Leibniz’s studies in 
Jena, Weigel was indeed an important cultural figure, but at the same time, he was not at 
the peak of his career, meaning that Leibniz’s choice was not driven only by Weigel’s 
prestige and it involved a degree of risk. 
Weigel’s institutional relevance was complemented by his theoretical influence: it is 
Leibniz himself that in the letter to Thomasius previously quoted establishes not only a 
connection between Weigel and Pufendorf, but also Weigel’s direct influence on his 
pupil’s Elementorum iurisprudentiae universalis libri duo. This idea of a complete 
dependence of Pufendorf’s work was further developed by Leibniz in the following years, 
since he is credited to be one of the first men who recognized how the new appendix to 
this book, published in 1669, was probably written by Weigel and not by Pufendorf15. As 
Leibniz recalls in the Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain: 
 
Feu M. Erhard Weigel Mathematicien de Jena en Thuringe inventa 
ingenieusement des figures, qui representoient des choses morales. Et lors 
que feu M. Samuel de Puffendorf, qui estoit son disciple, publia ses Elemens 
de la Jurisprudence Universelle assés conformes aux pensées de M. 
Weigelius, on y adjouta dans l'Edition de Jena la Sphere morale de ce 
Mathematicien (AA VI-6, 385). 
 
                                                          
14 This affiliation is already documented in Aiton (1985, 32) and in every other book concerning Leibniz’s 
life, for example Antognazza (2009, 59).  
15 The appendix is indeed a precise description of Weigel’s moral sphere, plus there is also a quote from 
Weigel’s 1652 Dissertatio Metaphysica Prior (De Existentia) und Posterior (De Modo Existentiae, qui 
dicitur Duratio) written during his stay in Leipzig (Pufendorf 1669, 516). 
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Since the Elementorum iurisprudentiae universalis libri duo is the work in which 
Pufendorf is concerned the most with the project of reconciling Hobbes’ theories with 
those of Grotius and other philosophers, it suggests that both Weigel and Pufendorf were 
behind Leibniz’s ever growing interest in Hobbes’ philosophy and in his project of 
harmonizing it with Aristotle16. If the Elementorum’s appendix was really written by 
Weigel as Leibniz believed, it also shows that Weigel was active in the field of law and 
ethics in 1669, which is consistent with our purpose of showing that Weigel’s influence 
shouldn’t be restricted to Leibniz’s 1663 semester in Jena, but it caused its most profound 
consequences around the time of the 1669 letter to Thomasius and the following years. 
On a side note, by analysing these writings we would already find a peculiar 
contamination between universal principles taken from logic, their application in law and 
ethics and their description through mathematical models that rested on the exactness of 
the Euclidean method. 
Moving on from Leibniz’s 1663 letter, between 1664 and 1667 we witness few direct 
references to Weigel in Leibniz’s correspondence. This does not mean however that 
Weigel was not present in Leibniz’s mind: he is quoted, again about law and ethics, in the 
XV quaestio of the 1664 Specimen quaestionum philosophicarum ex iure collectarum, in 
the 1666 De casibus perplexis and in the 1667 Nova Methodus17. Above all, he also is 
present in the form of his disciple Johann Christoph Sturm in the Dissertatio de arte 
combinatoria. Again, it is Leibniz himself, in an important passage of his Essais de 
Théodicée, that suggests a very close relationship between the young Sturm’s works and 
Weigel’s, like he did with Pufendorf: 
 
Feu M. Sturmius, Mathematicien célèbre à Altorf, étant en Hollande dans sa 
jeunesse, y fit imprimer un petit livre sous le titre d' Euclides catholicus, où 
il tâcha de donner des règles exactes et générales dans des matières non 
                                                          
16 For example, the fact that in the same 1663 letter to Thomasius Hobbes is exstensively quoted just before 
the reference to Weigel and Pufendorf, is not a mere coincidence: “Demum vivus undique aut Hobbes aut 
Hobbesianus elucet. Cum enim utilitatem aequi matrem habeat, igitur prout illi velificabitur jus omne, stabit 
cadetque: cum cuilibet principum absolutum det imperium, sola suspicio principi ad supplicia jus dabit: 
demum quia a civili lege omnis justitia propullulat, necessario obligatio omnis ac foederum servandorum 
necessitas ruet inter civitates. Haec in Hobbesio saepe reprehendentem V.E. audivi. Quare cepit me 
quaedam de Hobbesio a V.E. quod ejus pace fiat, sciscitandi cupiditas, quis ille, an adhuc superstes, an 
Antagonistam na[c]tus, an habuerit, qui in jure naturae illustrando paria fecerint, meliora aut aequalia, si 
subtilitatem spectes” (AA II-1, 5). 
17 A reconstruction of these quotes if found in Moll (1978, 65-67). 
19 
 
mathématiques, encouragé à cela par feu M. Erhard Weigel, qui avoit été son 
précepteur. Dans ce livre, il transfère aux semblables ce qu'Euclide avoit dit 
des égaux (GP VI, 245). 
 
Since Leibniz here is prising Sturm’s early works, he is probably referring to his 1660 
Aristoteles Mathematicus and his 1661 Universalia euclidea, both known by Leibniz at 
the time of his Dissertatio de arte combinatoria. In these works, there are many 
interesting passages about Aristotle’s syllogistic and about Euclid’s influence that will be 
very useful once we will deal with the problem of the foundation of mathematics and the 
analysis situs. 
Around 1668, encouraged by his achievements in those years, the Weigelian project 
of reconciling the old and the new became a priority for Leibniz, especially on the ground 
of physics. This interpretation is consistent with Leibniz’s private thoughts on this matter, 
but also with his ambitions in the society of that time. His mind was set on this project, 
as a letter to Thomasius dated September 1668 shows: 
 
Satis ostendit Raey in clave philosophiae naturalis, tenebras Aristotelis a 
scholastico fumo esse, Aristotelem ipsum Galilaeo, Bacono, Gassendo, 
Hobbesio, Cartesio, Digbaeo mire conformari. Quid enim aliud Aristoteli 
materia prima est, quam iners moles sine motu, et per consequens, si omnia 
plena sunt, sine figura? (AA II-1, 18). 
 
Here we find all the elements that constitute Weigel’s cultural influence: the distinction 
between the real Aristotle and his calculatedly-perverted version given by the Scholastics, 
the importance of the new philosophers, like Galileo, Gassendi, Hobbes and Descartes 
and a focus on the physical problem of motion and matter. Leibniz quotes Johannes de 
Raey, a philosopher that with his Clavis philosophiae naturalis, seu introductio ad 
naturae contemplationem Aristotelico-Cartesiana, as the title suggests, had a similar 
project in mind. We will soon see that once again it is Leibniz himself that points towards 
a priority of Weigel’s influence over Raey’s18. 
                                                          
18 However, this does not mean that Leibniz could not have found in de Raey similar ideas on the universal 
principles that supported Weigel’s influence: “Aristoteles i.poster. Anal. cap. 10. Axiomata vocat, quae non 
tantum per sese vera esse, sed vera etiam videri debent. Quod cave ne ita intelligas, quasi necessum sit id 
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Meanwhile in 1668, Leibniz was also concerned with the cultural relevance of his 
efforts. As it is widely known, he wanted to gain the favour of Peter Lambeck for the 
foundation of his biannual review Nucleus Librarius Semestralis, modelled after the 
Journal des Sçavans19. This idea was consistent with the aspirations of the cultural 
environment based in Jena, set on competing with the rest of Europe. Testament to his 
commitment to the syncretistic cause, the 1668 letter to Lambeck shows some interesting 
information on Leibniz’s sources: 
 
Nam etsi nullus sit in mundo motus prorsus rectus, erunt tamen 
demonstarationes Galilaei verissimae, et etsi nemo hactenus lineam 
Quadratricem accurate duxerit, nihil hoc officiet demonstrationibus de ea 
Procli, Pappi et Clavii. Similiter, etsi servi nulli sint […] ex jure naturali est 
ab ICtis Romanis maximam partem absolute demonstratum […]. Idem sensit 
Ioach. Hopperus, sensit Hugo Grotius, sentit et Herm. Conringius, cujus de 
instituto nostro literas habemus; quos tamen nonnulli sibi ad contemnendam 
Romanam Iurisprudentiam falso duces putant (AA I-1, 14). 
 
Once again, law becomes one of the main topics in which Aristotle’s Apodeixis is 
displayed, but the comparison with Galilei is also important per se, because it shows that 
the new interpretation in the light of Euclid was perhaps supported by his works and those 
of Proclus and Clavius. This reference is relevant for our purposes because it outlines that 
the Euclid read in the Weigelian school was the one harmonized with his most 
metaphysical and foundational interpretations. 
                                                          
omne, quod communis notion seu axioma est, ita ab omnibus ac singulis percipi, ut a nemine ignorari, vel 
negari possit. Quanquam enim cunctis obvium sit, totum esse majus sua parte, factum infectum fieri non 
posse, similiaque, quibus nullae praeconceptae repugnant opiniones, sed quae vel quotidianis sensuum 
experimentis confirmantur, vel saepe nobis occurrunt ac perpenduntur; id tamen locum non habet in quam 
plurimis aliis, quae non minus quam ista per se nota sunt atque pro communibus notionibus haberi debent. 
Ut enim oculus non videt quae praesentia illi non sunt, ita mens nostra innumeras nescit communes 
notiones, de quibus cogitandi nulla datur occasio, cujusmodi sunt pleraque eorum quae sensus fugiunt, nec 
non quam plurima Geometrarum principia” (Raey 1654, 37). On de Raey and physics see Ruestow (2012, 
61), but also Mercer (2002a, 107). 
19 See Antognazza (2009, 97). Leibniz was supported by Boineburg: “Is est Godofredus Gulielmus 
Leibnütius Iuris Doctor, juvenis et labori assuetus, et qui profecto interioribus ac amoenioribus literis, 
adeoque omni eruditioni quaquaversum exporrigit se, philosophiae et scientiis pene omnibus magna 
felicitate et animi contentione incubuerit exemplo plane raro et perinsigni” (AA I-1, 8). 
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Despite the fact that Thomasius was not completely convinced by Leibniz’s ideas20, in 
1669 he witnessed Leibniz’s most ambitious desire to turn these inclinations in an actual 
theory. In the famous letter dated April 1669, among the by now well-known distinctions 
between Aristotle, Scholastics and the newer philosophers, a new category is introduced, 
that is the one composed by those who tried to achieve this reconciliation, in which 
obviously Leibniz puts himself in. This passage, which is worth quoting in its entirety, 
reads: 
 
Neque vero vereor, ut, quae dixi hactenus, ex Raeo descripta, aut hujus 
auctoritatem me sequi amplius putes. Dudum talia a me cogitata sunt, 
antequam de Raeo vel audivi. Legi Raeum quidem, sed ita, ut nunc eorum, 
quae disserit, vix recorder. Neque vero Raeus conciliatorum inter Aristotelem 
et recentiores primus solusque est. Primus Scaliger mihi viam stravisse 
videtur; nostris temporibus Kenelmus Digbaeus et ejus assecla Thomas 
Anglus, ille in libro de animae immortalitate, hic in institutionibus 
peripateticis, idem longe ante Raeum ex professo egere. Nec abludunt tum 
Abdias Trew, tum inprimis Erhardus Weigelius (AA II-1, 28-29). 
 
Erhard Weigel then is both one of the most important and one of the closest ‘ancestors’ 
of Leibniz, concerning the topic of reconciling Aristotle. Knowing that Weigel introduced 
Leibniz to these topics back in 1663 we can now safely say that Weigel’s influence lasted 
for several years, making the hypothesis of a progressive adoption a reasonable 
assumption. Moreover, as it happened with Pufendorf and Sturm, the priority of Weigel’s 
influence is also confirmed by the reference to de Raey and Leibniz’s claim that he was 
into these kind of thoughts even before he read de Raey’s works. However, the difference 
between 1663 and 1669 is that now Leibniz actually read de Raey, and many more: he 
was now ready for his own solution to this long-standing problem, symbolized in part by 
the Hypothesis physica nova. In order to understand how this work should be seen in the 
light of Weigel’s cultural influence we will turn now to some references in Weigel’s 
writings of those years and in Leibniz’s correspondence between 1670 and 1672. 
 
                                                          
20 See for example his letter dated October 1668 (AA II-1, 21). 
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From Weigel’s Perspective By analysing Leibniz’s correspondence and his works, we 
can safely assume that Weigel had a role in his attempt to save some principles of 
Aristotle’s philosophy and that this attempt was a pressing priority in 1669. However, if 
we depend only on Leibniz’s quotes, ignoring the fact that he spent time in Jena in the 
Societas quaerentium, we could still believe that Weigel’s influence has to be treated in 
the same way of any other author that Leibniz read during those years. A look at Weigel’s 
coeval works will help us in understanding that the context in which this influence arises 
was much closer to Leibniz than many others were. 
As I already pointed out, the Analysis aristotelica ex Euclide restituta is indeed a very 
important work on this topic, but the fact that it was published in 1658 could lead to the 
assumption that between 1669 and 1671 his importance was already fading in Jena. On 
the contrary, 1669 marks the start of one of the most important and prolific period of 
Weigel’s philosophy: from that year on, he will publish in Jena many dissertations under 
his tutoring and many original works, like the Idea matheseos universae (1669), the 
Tetractys summum tum arithmeticae tum philosophiae discursivae compendium, artis 
mangnae sciendi genuina radix (1673), and the Universi corporis Pansophici caput 
summum (1673), among others. Above all, he also republished the Analysis aristotelica 
in 1671, under the name Idea totius encyclopaediae mathematico-philosophicae, meaning 
that the topics of this book were still debated. Since these years are also crucial for 
Leibniz’s Hypothesis physica nova, could it be that this work, and Leibniz philosophy in 
general, developed in this dynamic cultural context in which Weigel was so active? Once 
again, Leibniz’s correspondence proves itself to be very useful on this matter, as the letter 
to Hermann Conring dated April 1670 shows:  
 
Audio et Cl. V. Erhardum Weigelium, libello de aestimatione mox prodituro, 
plurima ex jure nostro, quae ad quantitates gradusque voluntatis, scientiae, 
diligentiae, malitiae, poenae, damni, certitudinis, praesumtionis, 
probabilitatis, aliorumque, quorum in re morali crebra mentio est, 
delibaturum (AA, II-1, p. 70). 
 
Giving the variety of topics outlined by Leibniz and the specific language used, the 
reference is probably to Weigel’s Universi corporis pansophici caput summum, except 
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that this work was published three years after this letter, meaning that Leibniz was aware 
of its existence during the time of its draft. It surely shows that Leibniz was in contact 
with Weigel’s milieu in those years, but not only that, because in the Universi corporis 
pansophici Leibniz’s Theoria motus concreti is quoted by Weigel, as he refers to the 
“Bullulae, quales Orbis eruditi Senatui Anglicano tum Gallico nuper exhibuit 
honoratissimus meus Leibnizius, sagacissimi vir ingenii, in Theoria motus”21. It shows 
that Weigel was also aware of the political and cultural intent behind Leibniz’s 
Hypothesis, besides praising its content, as he will remark once more in another work 
published in 167422. If we combine these data, i.e. the fact that the Hypothesis was known 
and prised by Weigel and the fact that the same work in which it is quoted was known by 
Leibniz three years before its publication, during the draft of the Hypothesis, we could 
suppose a common intent and a reasonable confrontation. 
This idea is supported by Leibniz’s correspondence between 1669 and 1672, as it 
shows that the contacts with the Weigelian circle were intensifying. Both in 1669 and in 
1670 for example, Leibniz will write to Johann Andreas Bose, historian and scholar in 
Jena close to Weigel, asking him to greet his former teacher23. This reference is important 
in the light of the previous letter to Conring, because it suggests that Bose, Weigel and 
Conring were related, as other references show24. It seems natural then that Leibniz was 
speaking freely about Weigel to Conring and, above all, that in the following years 
Conring will become one of the best suited correspondent for Leibniz, in order to discuss 
about topics very close to Weigel’s philosophy, such as the universal principles, logical 
reasoning and the modal demonstration of God’s existence25. About the use of the 
principle of contradiction in modal logic, the first letter to Bose shows another important 
                                                          
21 Weigel (1673c, 39). The same reference can be found in Moll (1982, 60). 
22 The very last sentence of Weigel’s Corollaria in his 1674 Pendulum ex tetracy deductum...sistit is: 
“Speciosa est hypothesis Leibnüziana, quae bullulis pleraque Phaenomena Corporum salvare docet” 
(Weigel 1674, Corollaria, 8). 
23 “Nunc tamen, cum ad Amplmos Viros Strauchium et Weigelium vestros, scribendi mihi causa aut occasio 
esset, Te insalutatum praeterire piaculo proximum duxi” (AA I-1, 77) and “P.S. AmplUM Weigelium, si 
qua occasio detur, meis verbis salutari etiam atque etiam rogo” (AA I-1, 93). 
24 Unfortunately for Bose, but luckily for our purpose, the best way to show the relation between Bose, 
Weigel and Coring is probably by pointing out that Weigel and Conring wrote together in 1674 two elegies 
in the oratio funebris for Bose’s death, the Frommer Christen Heimfahrt aus dem Thränen-Thal 
dieser Welt in das himmlische Vaterland […] daselbst (Weigel-Conring 1674). On Weigel and Conring see 
Dreitzel (1983, 157) and in general Stolleis (1983). 
25 See for example a letter dated 1678 (AA II-1, 578), consistent with Leibniz’s renewed interest in 
Weigelian ideas and with Weigel’s second wave of reception. On the principle of contradiction and its 
connection with identity see the letter dated March 1678 (AA II-1, 602). 
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reference, since Weigel is quoted together with Johann Strauch: Weigel and Strauch were 
in fact teachers of Magnus Wedderkopf and, as it will be shown, Leibniz’s important 
letter to him, dated 167126, contains one of the most relevant hints in order to prove that 
Leibniz was influenced by Weigel in the adoption of the principle of contradiction. 
About Leibniz’s Hypothesis instead, the most important reference is Leibniz’s second 
attempt to gain Peter Lambeck’s favour. In a letter dated August 1671, Leibniz writes:  
 
Addam potius nonnulla, de aliis quibusdam curis meis quibus Iuris studium 
interstinguo, suetus mutatione laborum uti pro quiete. Ac inprimis rerum 
mathematicarum ac naturalium perquisitione delector valde, tum quod 
deprehendi non raro incognita hactenus, generi tamen humano profutura 
solent. Ea fini novis libris experimentisque inviglio, cum egregiis passim 
viris, in Italia RR. PP. Kirchero et Lana, in Germania Gerickio, Conringio, 
Reinh. Blumio, Ludolpho, Strauchio, Thomasio, Weigelio [...], commercium 
literarum colo, a quorum plerisque literas nec exiguas nec raras, subinde 
accipio. Excogitavi quin etiam Hypothesin quandam physicam novam, quae 
ex unico quodam universali motu in globo nostro supposito, nec Thyconicis 
nec Copernicus aspernando pleraque naturae phaenimena singulari 
simplicitate repetit (AA I-1, 62-63). 
 
Conring, Strauch, Thomasius and Weigel then are here quoted as German representatives 
of a tradition that helped in the draft of the Hypothesis physica nova. Given the connection 
with the revaluation of Hobbes’ philosophy that will be shown, this influence is consistent 
with Leibniz’s interest in his De corpore.  
It is widely known however, that the Hypothesis was also influenced by Leibniz’s 
notes on Huygens’ theory appeared in 1669 on the Philosophical Transactions27. Whether 
Weigel suggested Huygens’ works to Leibniz or not is hard to determine28, but what we 
                                                          
26 AA (II-1, 117-118). 
27 AA (VI-2, 157). 
28 It is nevertheless possible, given the fact that Weigel invested some efforts on the topic of the center of 
gravity between 1663 and 1665 and in the study of pendula. Huygens is quoted by Weigel in his Pendulum 
ex tetracy deductum...sistit: "pro quo maximas Inventori, sive is Hugenius fuerit, alias etiam de se solida 
Philosophia tam bene meritus, sive alius in societatem Inventionis aut applicationis admissus, habemus 
gratias" (Weigel 1674, Definit. VI, Cap II). 
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know for sure is that Weigel admired Huygens, so much that he will visit him in Holland 
at the end of his life and speak with him about their common disciple29. It is also known 
that Huygens offered to Leibniz a much better mathematical and physical knowledge at 
a later time, but Leibniz’s eagerness does not justify the fact that starting from his stay in 
Paris the relationship with Weigel fades in a scarce number of references, until we witness 
Leibniz’s renewed interest around 1679: something probably happened between the two, 
so much that Leibniz’s attitude in his correspondence about Weigel after 1671 changes 
significantly, showing a coolness and carefulness never seen before.   
These then are only some of the references that prove how, between 1669 and 1671, 
Leibniz was deeply involved in his cultural background, in which Weigel played a 
primary role. Many more could be shown30, but I believe these are sufficient in order to 
                                                          
29 In a letter dated February 1691 Leibniz will talk to Huygens about Weigel for the first time: "Je seray 
bien aise de voir un jour ce qu'on a imprimé en France de la part de l'Academie Royale, sur tout ce qu'il y 
a de vous. Je me souviens d'avoir aussi remarqué autres fois des voyes de demonstrer la regle de l'equilibre 
differentes de celle d'Archimede. Mons. Römer me parla aussi d'une sienne, et un Professeur de Jena 
nommé Weigelius en a aussi donné. Mais j'ay sur tout envie de voir un jour vôtre maniere, sçachant que 
vous avés coustume de donner quelque chose d'elegant" (Huygens 1891, X, 15-16). Few months later, 
Huygens letter to Leibniz annouces Weigel's arrival: "Avant hier me vint voir icy le Sr. Weigelius, 
professeur à Jena, qui m'entretint de ses grands desseins pour l'avancement des sciences et qui paroit 
extremement satisfait de certaines demonstrations qu'il pretend avoir de l'existence de Dieu et de la 
Providence. Je l'iray voir à la Haye, où il dit avoir un coussin rempli de ressorts et autres curiositez qu'il 
veut me montrer. Il dit qu'il a l'honneur de vous connoitre, depuis le temps que vous estudiez en 
mathematiques sous luy. J'aimerois bien mieux voir icy son disciple" (Huygens 1891, X, 141-142). At the 
end of his life then, Weigel was still concerned with the project of creating a German academy of sciences. 
The strange inventions reported by Huygens are typical of Weigel's character, very interested in the creation 
of new machineries. The demonstration of God's existence quoted instead is the same about which Leibniz 
will be interested after his Parisian stay.  
30 I will offer here some examples. The reason why in these letters Weigel is not quoted as many times as 
one would imagine is that the references to his works were widely known by Leibniz’s correspondents. On 
the contrary, when Leibniz had to write to people outside the Weigelian circle, he often used his name. For 
example, a part from this second attempt to gain Peter Lambeck’s favour, he writes to Johann Leyser in 
1671 about his projects. Leyser’s answer is interesting, as we read: “De Tuis tractatibus afferas quosdam 
velim aut mittas, et quid praeterea in animo habeas significes. Si posses ab E. Obtinere harmoniam 
religionis, aut Academiarum et scholarum Reformationem Universalem et uniformem, multum mereberis 
de bono publico. Quicquid ego alibi hac in parte potero, nullus intermittam. Weigelii opuscula hic sunt 
admodum rara, ut et Beckeri” (AA I-1, 159). Once again Leibniz’s syncretistic approach is connected here 
with that of Weigel. Even more, the letter shows that Leibniz suggested Weigel’s works to Leyser, but 
given the lack of availability reported by Leyser, it also shows that Leibniz’s access to Weigel’s writings 
depended on a privileged position. About Leibniz’s interest in Leyser see Laerke (2009, 161). There are 
then many other references to the newer philosophers and the syncretists, like the 1670 letter to Spener 
related to the preface of the 1553 book of Nizolius, which contains Thomasius’1669 letter: “Addidi 
epistolam ad doctissimum quemdam virum aliquando a me scriptam de Aristotele recentioribus (id est 
Gassendo, Chartesio, Hobbio, Digbio aliisque id genus philosophiae restauratoribus) reconciliabili. Qui 
Syncretismus mihi et rectior theologico et tutior videtur” (AA II-1, 56). Leibniz will write again to Spener 
about Weigel in a 1700 letter, renewing his early desire for a new academy of sciences based on the model 
of his former teacher, already passed away at that time: “es ist aber nicht wohl anders als durch eine guthe 
erziehung dazu zu gelangen. Daher zuwündschen, daß des seel. Herrn Weigelii, Herrn Franckens, und ander 
wohlgesinneten Leute vorhaben und vorschläge vollzogen auch wo nothig verbeßert, und so gefaßet werden 
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argue that Leibniz’s activity intensifies in these years, thanks also to Boineburg’s efforts. 
However, the Weigel-Schule was active even before Leibniz’s relationship with 
Boineburg and the way in which he writes to his correspondents that were active around 
Jena suggests a confrontation that had its roots many years before. In this regard then, 
understanding from Weigel’s perspective what was so special about Leibniz’s 
Hypothesis, worth many appreciations, could help us in understanding at the same time 
what was the common background between this work and Weigel’s.  
If this reconstruction of Leibniz’s correspondence between 1663 and 1671 is by no 
means complete, since many other threads could be followed, many other equally 
important authors could be examined, it was useful nonetheless for the specific purpose 
of this work, because it outlines three important facts: there is a connection between 
Weigel and Leibniz’s Hypothesis in physics, a connection between Pufendorf and Weigel 
in Leibniz’s ethical efforts and a connection between Weigel and Sturm in Leibniz’s 
logic. Following Leibniz himself then, who in the Specimen quaestionum quotes the 
Weigelian classification of the sciences in natural, moral and notional31, in the next 
chapters I will argue that during these years Weigel’s importance intensifies as much as 
Leibniz’s contacts with his school and his efforts on these topics. What I want to show is 
that universal principles, particularly the principle of contradiction and the definition of 
necessity, were debated in Weigel’s school in every field above-mentioned. 
I will now analyse Weigel’s influence starting from physics, reserving the notional-
logical analysis for the next part of the present work. 
 
 
                                                          
mögen, daß man zugleich den nuzbaren Zweck und der Leute, so in der Welt etwas zusagen, beifall erhalte 
ohne welchen alle guthe absehen nicht als wündsche zu bleiben pflegen” (AA I-18, 704). The reference to 
Spener is important because in another letter (December 1670, AA II-1, 115) Leibniz connects Grotius to 
Hobbes and Euclid, praising his demonstrative method. Inside the cultural circle of Jena instead, Leibniz’s 
correspondence with Friedrich Nitzsch is also worth remembering. In Nitzsch’s letter dated December 1670 
there is again a connection between Weigel and Sturm (AA II-1, 118) and an interesting debate on a problem 
regarding optics. Leibniz’s conclusion will be that “A Weigelio fortasse et structuram discere possumus” 
(AA II-1, 143), meaning that a confrontation with Weigel looked feasible to Leibniz in 1671. Another 
important connection is that with Daniel Crafft, examined by Moll (1982). 
31 Wegiel takes this classification from the Stoics, as a quote from one of the dissertations written under his 
supervision, the Theses philosophico-mathematicae, shows: “Stoica Philosophiae distinctio in naturalem, 
moralem & notionalem totam quidem Philosophiam non exhaurit, non tamen penitus est improbanda” 
(Weigel-Vinhold 1671, 2). The tension between this general distinction and Weigel’s need of organizing 
the human knowledge following the general principles of his philosophy was giving birth in those years to 
the Universi corporis Pansophici caput summum. 
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1.3 Physical Necessity, Matter and Geometry 
 
Starting Point and Development of Leibniz’s Physics In the secondary literature, the 
Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui’s corollaria are often taken as the best 
example showing the starting point of Leibniz’s philosophy. Since some of these 
corollaries were already traced back to Weigel, I will start as well by analysing the first 
five: 
 
I. Materia habet de se actum Entitativum. 
II. Non omnino improbabile est materiam et quantitatem esse realiter idem. 
III. Essentiae rerum sunt sicut numeri. 
IV. Essentiae rerum non sunt aeternae nisi ut sunt in DEO. 
V. Possibilis est penetratio dimensionum (AA VI-1, 18). 
 
Usually, the third and the fourth corollaries are the ones associated with Weigel, since the 
very same expression used by Leibniz in the third one could be found in Weigel’s Analysis 
aristotelica and in many other writings, but I will reserve my analysis of this sentences 
for the next chapters, since they are better suited for explaining Weigel’s influence on the 
adoption of universal principles in metaphysics. What I would like to point out in this 
chapter regarding physics instead is that, if there were some kind of influence on Leibniz 
at this point, that should be also associated with the first two corollaries. The first one 
simply ascribes to matter its own existence, while the second one associates matter with 
quantity32. They hint then to a revaluation of the general concept of matter that later in 
those years will be associated with the corresponding revaluation of the Aristotelian 
concept of primary matter, inserted however in a context consistent with the new physics. 
I will show that this syncretistic operation was possible thanks to a reflection on the 
concept of quantity and its relation to the concept of matter that has its roots in Weigel’s 
writings. 
However, the idea of an early influence of Weigel on Leibniz, before his stay in Jena, 
is somehow discredited by the fifth corollary: allowing the possibility for the penetration 
                                                          
32 Di Bella (2005a, 30) argues that we also find in these corollaries a tension between a particularist claim, 
a holistic view and a combinatorial view. He recognises that the first two corollaries contain echoes of those 
developments in Scholastics aiming at a reconciliation with the new science. 
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of dimensions is in fact a statement apparently against Weigel’s philosophy, as in some 
of his writings the opposite idea is maintained33. My conjecture, compatible with the idea 
of a progressive adoption, is that at that time Weigel’s influence was indeed present, but 
only because Leibniz already read the Analysis aristotelica, without any decisive and 
direct contact with the Weigelian milieu. This distinction explains in my opinion some 
inconsistencies among Leibniz’s early works and the peculiar syncretistic solution that he 
will follow in the end. I will show that in Jena Leibniz could have learned, thanks to 
Hobbes' influence mutuated by Weigel, a new way of reconciling Gassendi's possibility 
for the penetration of dimensions with the opposite solution. 
Any statement concerning the penetration of dimensions should be seen as related to 
physics, because the debate at that time revolved around whether or not accepting the 
principle by which the possibility of penetration is denied as a property that should inhere 
to a body. This topic was very important for the natural philosophers of the 17th century34: 
in a mechanical world where everything is described by means of bodies interacting with 
each other through collisions, accepting or rejecting the idea that the existence of 
dimensions prevents the penetration of a body into another one could have led to a 
completely different opinion regarding the structure of reality, the existence of void and 
the way in which one could apply the mathematical model to physics. 
Cartesians and Scholastics were following this principle, because they needed it in 
order to justify the very existence of their bodies, thus explaining how they could be 
pushed and pulled by means of external forces, or how they couldn’t be described through 
an atomistic account. The Cartesians for example, defining a body using only extension, 
were not allowed to admit any other principle that inhered to them, except extension itself. 
Without allowing void or atoms, this principle was extremely important because, 
although the bodies’ different hardness could have been explained by other means, 
absolute hardness was not explainable otherwise. The explanation of the possibility of a 
coherent interaction between bodies then was based on an argument taken from simple 
reasoning: if two bodies were to penetrate, that would have led to the superposition of 
two or more dimensions, exploiting the mechanism and leading to infinite regress35. 
                                                          
33 Another corollary of Weigel’s Disputatio statica de aestimatione gravium reads: “Penetrationem 
corporum dari, absurdum est, non item dimensionum” (Weigel-Scheidlin 1665, Corollaria 4). 
34 For an in-depth analysis of this problem see Mormino (2012, 143-165). 
35 Arguing for a complete homogeneity between corporeal substance, extension and quantity, Descartes is 
openly against Gassendi: "Sintque etiam nonnulli adeo subtiles, ut substantiam corporis ab ejusdem 
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While Scholastics shared the same principle, but for a slightly different reason given 
their qualitative approach to physics, atomists instead were not following it, because the 
importance of dimensions was clearly related to a geometrically bound account for reality 
that they were not forced into adopting. Absolute hardness was given to atoms by an 
intrinsic propriety, antitypy, so that the penetration of dimensions was conceivable, 
despite the fact that bodies still retained their impenetrability, thanks to the antitypy of 
their constituent atoms. While in the Cartesian fashion extension as the fundamental 
property of a body grants the absolute homogeneity between reality and geometry, a body 
in the atomistic fashion could indeed be cut, for example, by a geometric shape without 
generating contradictions, because that division would stand only on a hypothetical 
ground. 
Given these premises, we can clearly understand why Weigel favoured the principle 
and why some interpreters have reduced Weigel to Descartes: if his aim was reconciling 
the old and the new, Descartes’ philosophy was better suited for this task, at least on the 
ground of physics. It shared with Aristotle’s physics some principles, like the negation of 
the void, that were easily adaptable: the penetration of dimension was one of those. 
Moreover, grounding a property like impenetrability on a purely geometrical account 
opened the possibility for a geometrical description of the world that was ontologically 
relevant, rather than the mere outcome of a hypothetical model applied to the actual 
world. This last consequence could have been particularly cherished by Weigel, because 
apparently it granted that homogeneity between the world and the human mind on which 
his mathesis universalis was based. I will show however that, despite his conciliating 
claims, Weigel’s physics was far from being completely identified in that of Descartes, 
because it was conceived in the light of Hobbes’ philosophy of nature. 
In any case, allowing the possibility of the dimensions’ penetration, Leibniz’s 
Disputatio was undoubtedly influenced on this specific topic by Gassendi’s atomism36, 
                                                          
quantitate, atque ipsam quantitatem ab extensionem distinguant" (Descartes 1963, VIII, 42). The possibility 
of such distinction in fact allows the penetration of dimensions. 
36 Gassendi openly argues against the negation of penetrations’ dimension in the second book of his 
Syntagma Philosophicum’s physics: “Excipiendum est nihil esse corporeum, nihil, quale solent 
Substantiam, Accidensve intelligere; at esse tamen aliquid, quale Locum, seu mavis Spatium, Intervallum 
[…] Dimensionem intelligere licet” (Gassendi 1964, 184). It is clear then that the refutation dimensions’ 
penetration is connected with the refutation of void’s existence: if we admit something that could be filled 
and yet it is conceivable through a spatial description, then we are already admitting the penetration of 
dimensions. 
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but Gassendi was by no means akin to syncretism, as his aversion to Scholastics is widely 
known37. At first glance then it seems that Leibniz is lost in the enigma of his early 
atomism38: accepting the penetration of dimensions while admitting antitypy is consistent 
with his atomism, but at the same time it is not consistent with the most popular 
syncretistic way of reconciling Aristotle with the new physics. The idea of a naïve 
revaluation of Scholastics is not sufficient in order to argue that Leibniz changed his mind 
after 1663. Given Leibniz’s claims in the 1669 letter to Thomasius, this opposition indeed 
grounds Leibniz’s many statements against Scholastics, but it also shows that there must 
be another way by which he harmonised Aristotle with the new physics. This way is best 
summarized by a passage from Thomasius’ letter: “Materia prima est ipsa massa, in qua 
nihil aliud quam extensio et ἀντιτυπία, seu impenetrabilitas; extensionem a spatio habet, 
quod replet”39. What we find here is the use of a concept (primary matter) taken from 
Aristotle and the use of both the atomists’ antitypy and the Cartesians’ extension. Even 
more, the superposition between space and extension recalls an important passage from 
Hobbes’ De corpore: “Corpus est quicquid non dependens a nostra cogitatione cum spatii 
parte aliqua coincidit vel coextenditur”40. In other words, the fact that Leibniz allowed 
antitypy and atoms was not excluding other fundamental concepts, like primary matter, 
extension or space from a feasible physical model. Rather, they were deprived of their 
foundational role while preserved as intrinsic properties of one body. Explaining the 
peculiar way in which bodies intrinsically maintain these properties and its consequences 
is the purpose of this chapter. 
The first step in this direction is questioning the absolute incompatibility between 
atomism and the principle that negates the penetration of dimensions. Even by a purely 
theoretical analysis of this problem in fact, it is reasonable to argue that the absolute 
incompatibility is valid only for the Cartesians’ side: the impossibility of dimensions’ 
penetration is necessary in a world where nothing else should account for impenetrability, 
while in the atomistic account it is indeed unnecessary, yet conceivable and possible. One 
                                                          
37 In the Exercitationes Paradoxicae Adversus Aristoteleos for example we read: “Verumtamen, ut liquido 
constat, excogitata illa non sunt a viris Aristoteleis: qui Aristotele contenti nihil aliud venantur in Scholis, 
quam suas illas frivolas, inutilesque modalitates” (Gassendi 1959, 67). 
38 This is how Arthur (2003, 183) describes the difficulty in understanding Leibniz’s apparently incoherent 
shifts of his early years. 
39 AA (II-1, 26). 
40 Hobbes (1999, 83). 
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cold then imagine an atom having antitypy as a property insofar as extension.  This less 
travelled way was the one endorsed by some of Aristotle’s commentators, like John 
Philoponus41 or Hasdrai Crescas42, as they attribute extension and the impossibility of 
dimensional penetration to bodies characterized by antitypy. Conceiving bodies in this 
fashion represents a coherent alternative to the opposition between Scholastics and 
atomists, because the two properties are still assumed individually, yet they happen to be 
co-existent in the same body at the same time. 
Was this hypothesis available to Leibniz between 1663 and 1671? In my opinion, a 
connection could be found by revaluating the importance of Francis Bacon on Leibniz’s 
early philosophy. There is no need to prove that an actual influence happened, since 
Leibniz had always been glad to share its importance in his early years43, but it has always 
been interpreted like a generic contribution to Leibniz’s scientific method that I find 
unconvincing if taken alone. However, in Bacon’s Novum Organum we read: 
 
Motus Primus sit Motus Antitypiae materiae, quae inest in singulis 
portionibus ejus; per quem plane annihilari non vult: ita ut nullum incendium, 
nullum pondus aut depressio, nulla violentia, nulla denique aetas aut 
diuturnitas temporis possit redigere aliquam vel minimam portionem 
materiae in nihilum; quin illa et sit aliquid, et loci aliquid occupet, et se (in 
qualicunque necessitate ponatur) vel formam mutando vel locum liberet, vel 
(si non detur copia) ut est subsistat; neque unquam res eo deveniat, ut aut nihil 
sit, aut nullibi. Quem Motum Schola (quae semper fere et denominat et definit 
res potius per effectus et incommoda quam per causas interiores) vel denotat 
per illud axioma, quod Duo corpora non possint esse in uno loco; vel vocat 
motum Ne fiat penetratio dimensionum. Neque hujus motus exempla proponi 
consentaneum est: inest enim omni corpori (Bacon 2004, II-XLVIII, 1). 
 
                                                          
41 Philoponus is quoted by Weigel in his Analysis aristotelica (Weigel 1658, 190)  
42 In his essay, Mormino (2012, 151n) quotes for example Philoponus (1888, 567). 
43 See for example the famous letter to Foucher, dated 1675: “Bacon et Gassendi me sont tombé les premiers 
entre les mains, leur style familier et aisé estoit plus conforme à un homme qui veut tout lire; il est vray que 
j’ay jetté souvent les yeux sur Galilée et des Cartes; mais comme je ne suis Geometre que dépuis peu, 
j’estois bien tost rebuté de leur maniere d’écrire, qui avoit besoin d’une forte meditation” (AA II-1, 389). 
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Bacon basically identifies antitypy with the Scholastics’ negation of the penetratio 
dimensionum. His awareness in doing so sway us from interpreting this as a simple 
mistake: he is perfectly conscious of the difference between the two accounts, since 
atomists’ antitypy is accurately interpreted through causas interiores. While the 
Scholastics reasoning is faulty, yet he identifies their principle with antitypy. This 
tension44 is the same found between Leibniz’s 1663 Disputatio and his 1669 letter to 
Thomasius. It suggests a way to interpret Leibniz’s readmission of extension as a property 
related to primary matter, without sacrificing his aversion for Scholastics or arguing for 
a naïve adhesion to Descartes’ physics that never happened. The principle against 
penetration and extension in fact are two separate things, the former being a property of 
the latter, but the superposition between antitypy and this principle suggests the co-
existence of antitypy and extension. 
Leibniz’s conception of bodies during these years then is similar to what I would call 
a layered model, because antitypy, matter, extension and space pertain altogether to a 
single body at the same time, but they are on the other hand conceivably distinct and 
operationally different. This conception then is clearly taken from Hobbes, but, since 
Hobbes was not admitting antitypy, it gives rise to some interesting questions: how are 
these properties connected between themselves? Is there a priority of a property over 
another? Is for example antitypy prior to extension in the definition of primary matter? 
Having now sketched the problem, in the next section I will at last introduce Weigel’s 
influence, in order to explain Leibniz’s adoption of Hobbes’ vision, his idea of primary 
matter and the role of extension in its definition. 
 
Tendency and Experimentalism in the Study of Gravity Between 1663 and 1669 Leibniz’s 
considerations on physics led him to the revaluation of Aristotle’s primary matter. 
                                                          
44 Bacon argues that the Scholastics' negation of dimensions' penetration could be useful on paper in a study 
on collisions, but it is not sufficient, accepting their theory as a whole, for a complete explanation on motion, 
especially given that hardness conceived in such a way justifies the beginning of motion, but not the fact 
that it lasts in time: "Similiter, sit natura inquisita Motus Missilium, veluti spiculorum, sagittarum, 
globulorum, per aërem. Hunc motum Schola (more suo) valde negligenter expedit; satis habens, si eum 
nomine motus violenti a naturali (quem vocant) distinguat; et quod ad primam percussionem sive 
impulsionem attinet, per illud, (quod duo corpora non possint esse in uno loco, ne fiat penetratio 
dimensionum,) sibi satisfaciat; et de processu continuato istius motus nihil curet" (Bacon 2004, II-XL, 3-
4). In order to explain the continuation of motion for a projectile, a choice must be made between the idea 
that it is the air, moving itself around the object like water against the hull of a boat, that moves the 
projectile, or the idea that the projectile's parts are moving away from the impact. Scholastics ignore 
completely this issue, yet Bacon here is still tryng to reconcile their thesis with a quantitative approach. 
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However, as I showed in the previous chapter, those years are also the ones in which he 
came into contact and intensified his relationship with the Weigelian school. Having 
joined the Societas quaerentium in Jena, we also know that Leibniz read there some 
contemporary authors, although we don’t know exactly their names. There is a way 
nonetheless by which we could better understand what was Jena’s cultural advancement, 
and that is the analysis of the dissertations published in those years under Weigel’s 
tutoring. In regard to physics, I will now analyse three of them: the Exercitatio 
Philosophica De Quantitate Motus Gravium by Georg Samuel Dörffel, the Disputatio 
Statica De Aestimatione Gravium by Johann Andreas Scheidlin and the Theses 
Philosophico-Mathematicae by Christian Andreas Vinhold. I believe that these works, 
especially those written by Dörffel and Scheidlin, are extremely important documentary 
evidence of what was Leibniz’s knowledge in physics before Paris. Dörffel, astronomer 
whose acquaintance with Leibniz is documented45, enrolled at the University of Jena in 
1662, but his Exercitatio was published in 1663, the same year in which Leibniz enrolled. 
Scheidlin’s Disputatio was published in 1665, but his enrolment in Jena is dated May 
1663, just two months before Leibniz’s enrolment. Since Vinhold’s Theses Philosophico-
Mathematicae were published in 167146, these writing cover the same period of time of 
Weigel’s influence on Leibniz. It is also important to remind that very often in those years 
and contexts these dissertations were written with the help of the supervisor or, in some 
cases, by the supervisor alone. This is the case for example for another dissertation written 
under Weigel that Leibniz himself considered as the genuine work of his former teacher47. 
Despite the problem of identifying the true author of these dissertations, their affinity with 
Weigel’s philosophy is indisputable, as suggested by the authors’ constant reference to 
Weigel’s works. They show a very advanced approach to the status quaestionis of early 
modern physics that was nowhere near the scholastico fumo of other traditional 
universities. 
                                                          
45 In the margin of a December 1670 letter to Leibniz written by Friedrich Nitzsch, the previously quoted 
scholar interested in optics, we find Leibniz’s note: “Lentes Titelii quomodo fabricatae, quid praestent. 
Ott.Roberval. Dorffel” (AA II-1, 117). 
46 The information about the enrolment of these students is found in Herbst (2016, 345-365). For Dörffel 
see also Pfitzner (1996, 119). 
47 In the 1679 letter to Weigel and its reply (AA II-1, 745), both Leibniz and Weigel refer to De supputatione 
multitudinis a nullitate per unitates finitas in infinitum collineantis ad deum as a work written by Weigel 
himself, although it is the defense of Caspar Büssing, enrolled at the University of Jena in 1677 (Herbst 
2016, 347). 
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Dörffel and Scheidlin’s dissertations, as their titles suggest, focus more on the problem 
of defining gravity. Both display the same development: at first a general definition is 
given, then the various accounts on gravity are analysed and in the end a solution is 
suggested. By displaying the various theories then, these works offered to Leibniz a 
starting point for his reflections on physics. After a brief preface on the different branches 
in which science is divided, Scheidlin’s Disputatio begins with a basic definition of a 
heavy body: “Gravia dicimus corpora, quae sua natura deorsum tendunt”48. At first 
glance, judging by this idea of an intrinsic tendency downwards and by the subsequent 
reference to a point “ad quod gravia sublunaria naturaliter tendunt”49, it appears as if 
Scheidlin is still influenced by the Aristotelean and Scholastic background. However, this 
definition is used on the topic of determining the centre of gravity and it refers only to an 
aspect of the entire topic: Scheidlin considers the idea of determining the centre for three 
different entities, i.e. shape, gravity and another entity that he calls tendentia (tendency). 
Each of these have their own definition of centre50, suggesting a distinction between the 
purely geometrical centre, determined between objects defined through extension and the 
centre of bodies determined in the actual world, where their description cannot be based 
on extension alone, thus needing also the concept of tendentia previously introduced. The 
result is summarised by a corollary of Vinhold’s Theses Philosophico-Mathematicae: 
“Centrum gravitates, centrum figurae & centrum tendentiae licet sint distinctissima, 
possunt tamen penitus coincidere”51. In the Disputatio Statica then there is already a 
distinction similar to that of Leibniz, where some proprieties of physical bodies cannot 
be described by extension alone, yet they happen to be in the same place. Going back to 
the first definition of a heavy body then, the reference to the earth as the field of action 
for bodies conceived through tendency should not be mistaken as a claim that supports 
the old physics. Given the fact that it is related to the specific topic of gravity in fact, it 
only states that every object seen on earth seems to show this intimate tendency, but the 
reason and origin of this tendency is yet to be determined. For now, Scheidlin is still 
                                                          
48 Weigel-Scheidlin (1665, Sectio Prima). 
49 Ibid. 
50 The passage reads: “Figura, Gravitatis & Tendentia, nobis considerande veniunt”. After that, Scheidlin 
defines every centre: “Centrum figura seu magnitudinis est istud punctum, quod respectu extensionis est 
medium […] Centrum gravitatis est istud punctum, vel intra vel extra figuram ita situm […] Centrum 
tendentiae est illud in globo terraquaëreo punctum, ad quod gravia sublunaria naturaliter tendunt” (Ibid.). 
51 Weigel-Vinhold (1671, 84). 
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dealing with phenomena as they appear and his reasoning will indeed develop in a 
different way from that of tradition. He starts by extending the concept of gravity to any 
object that belongs to earth52 and, in doing so, references to the scientific background of 
Weigel’s school emerge. 
The first author mentioned is of course Weigel: he proved that the atmosphere 
possesses weight. This proof shows that air is subject to gravity inasmuch as any other 
object, rejecting the theory that ascribed to air a qualitatively different and opposite 
property, i.e.  lightness (levitas), conceived not as a relational property that expresses the 
lesser weight between different objects, but as the positive property of opposing that 
gravity that inheres intrinsically to a body. This passage is clearly against Aristotle’s 
definition of levitas that pertains air and fire in De caelo. Scheidlin exemplifies the 
contradiction contained in this positive concept through the image of a vase filled with 
air, arguing that many experiments have already proved how this situation cannot be 
successfully explained through the levitas-gravitas model. The evidences here 
mentioned53 are the ones taken from Gaspar Schott’s important works, containing all sorts 
of experiments developed in those years. In the passage of Schott’s Magia universalis 
naturae et artis quoted by Scheidlin are found many authors often mentioned in the 
writings of the Weigelian school, such as Marin Mersenne, Galileo Galilei, Giovanni 
Battista Riccioli and, above all, Otto von Guericke. The passage from Schott’s Magia 
quoted by Scheidlin reads:  
 
Sed omnibus hisce praxibus aëris gravitatcm pondere deprehendendi, nulla 
est certior, & luculentior, adde etiam & ingeniosior, quam illa quam fuse 
descripsimus in fine Mechanicae nostrae citata in Experimento novo 
Magdeburgiсо, excogitara a Viro Amplissimo Ottone Gericke, 
Magdeburgensis Urbis Consule, & faurore meo singulari. In aliis enim 
omnibus ponderatur aër non in suo statu narurali, sed violento constitutus, 
nimirum aut vehementer compressus, aut vehementer rarefactus; in hoc vero 
                                                          
52 “Omnes Globi terraquaërei partes graves sunt” (Weigel-Scheidlin 1665, Sectio Prima, Observatio). The 
use of the word “terraquaërei” instead of “terraquei” hints at the argument explained in the following 
passage. 
53 Ibid. 
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aêr in statu suo naturali constitutus ad libram examinatur (Schott 1658, III, 
324). 
 
In the passage above, the idea of a superiority of Guericke’s experiment based on a sort 
of esthetical criteria by which air is presented in his natural state is rather interesting: it 
suggests that the best experiment is the one that mimics in the most accurate way the ideal 
situation in which a body is influenced as little as possible by external disturbances. 
The fact that Schott favours Guericke’s experiment is obvious, since his 1657 
Mechanica hydraulico-pneumaica contains the first description of Guericke’s famous air 
pump54 and even the fact that the Weigelian school knew these experiments do not sound 
surprising, since Schott studied in Leipzig and Jena. Nonetheless, explaining the attitude 
of Weigel and his pupils towards experimentalism is important, because it displays their 
scientific method and their philosophical premises. 
Another author quoted by Scheidlin in fact is Robert Boyle, famous for his experiments 
on the air pump and for his confrontation with Hobbes55, besides being mentioned by 
Leibniz in the Confessio naturae contra atheistas56.  These references suggest that 
Weigel’s school could have endorsed pure experimentalism and it certainly explains their 
unresolved attitude towards the existence of void, shared with Leibniz in those years and 
based on the fact that experiments were not completely proving its existence or its 
refutation. They also show that Leibniz’s knowledge about these topics in those years was 
probably very derivative and tied to Weigel’s background57. It is no coincidence then that, 
as a result of this influence, in Leibniz’s 1671 letter to Duke Johann Friedrich, Guericke 
is quoted just before Leibniz’s mention of his Hypothesis physica nova, or the fact that 
Leibniz corresponded with Guericke on his experiments between 1671 and 167258. 
These new discoveries then were indeed debated, but the hypothesis of a school based 
on pure experimentalism is not acceptable in its entirety, due to Weigel’s idea of a perfect 
                                                          
54 See Schott (1657). On the importance of experiments in early modern physics see Dear (1995). 
55 An account of their confrontation is found in Shapin (1985). 
56 AA (VI-1, 490). It is very likely then that Leibniz was introduced to Boyle’s advancements by Weigel. 
57 In the letter to Thomasius dated April 1669 for example we read: “Pro vacuo pugnant Gilbertus, 
Gassendus, Gerickius; pro pleno, Cartesius, Digbaeus, Thomas Anglus, Clerk in libro de plenitudine mundi. 
Pro possibilitate utriusque Thomas Hobbes, et Robertus Boylius” (AA II-1, 25). In a letter to Oldenburg 
dated 1671 then, Leibniz refers again to Guericke and his experiments: “Ingeniosissimi Gerickii 
Magdeburgenses Meditationes atque experimenta his nundinis in publico expectamus” (AA II-1, 146). 
58 AA (II-1, 173, 257). 
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correspondence between data gathered through experiments and their explanation by 
means of propositions, syllogisms and the rational relationship between them. Echoes of 
this Aristotelean and Euclidean heritage are found in Scheidlin, where he states that 
“Veritas autem data propositionis non experimentis solum confirmari, sed & rationibus, 
quod a Mathematicis dudum factum est, demonstrari potest”59. Compatible with this idea, 
Weigel’s Analysis aristotelica thoroughly explains the relationship between data and 
reasoning. In the very first chapter of this work, while the definition of a general 
demonstration is founded on syllogisms, so that “Est autem Demonstrare (ut universim 
dicamus) uti penes omnes Mathematicos, ita cumprimis penes Euclidem nihil aliud, quam 
rerum propositarum certitudinem necessariam e certis principiis tanquam suis causis a 
parte rei necessariis indubitatio cognoscendam syllogisitce deducere”60, a scientific and 
demonstrative proposition exhibits also a correspondence with a material aspect that 
inheres to objects a parte rei: 
 
Verum autem cum Aristotele nostro dico Syllogismum non tantum formaliter 
& notionaliter, sed praeprimis hic materialiter, eum, cujus omnes termini, tam 
simplices quam complexi, praecisa etiam mentis operatione aut notionali 
suppositione, in rerum natura revera cohaerent, ut unum ab altero, sicut 
dicitur, dependeat, sive mutua illa cohaesio & dependentia sit necessaria, qui 
syllogismus dicitur scientificus & demonstrativus (Weigel 1658, 23). 
 
The scientific syllogism entails then a correspondence between nature and universal 
reasoning, but also between the notional and logical constructions of our Mind among 
themselves, in a way that resembles that of Leibniz’s 1677 Dialogus61. It is not an 
unexpected outcome, since the combinatory logic proposed by Weigel was conceived for 
an implementation in the actual world. It follows that observation must be complemented 
with logical reasoning: a well-founded theory does not depend completely on gathering 
data through elaborate experiments. 
The connection between Weigel’s method and Guericke could explain Leibniz’s 
dissatisfaction over Gericke’s corporeal version of the World Soul. This hypothesis is 
                                                          
59 Weigel-Scheidlin (1665, Sectio Secunda, Propositio I). 
60 Weigel (1658, 23). 
61 AA (VI-4, 24). 
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considered faulty, despite the usefulness of experiments: “Und ob mein Hochg. H. gleich 
mit einem schöhnen experiment solche virtutes mundanas beweiset, so sind sie doch 
damit nicht ercläret, denn es eben so tunckel bleibt, wohehr sowohl in globo illo ex 
mineralibus composito, als in mundo solche virtutes entstehen”62. No beautiful 
experiment could prove itself useful, if the theories developed contain something obscure. 
Leibniz’s reasoning here was sometimes associated with his emerging need of a 
metaphysical explanation of phenomena that was not compatible with a purely corporeal 
World Soul63, but the fact that he once again criticise Scholastics just before the passage 
above quoted advocate against a naïve revaluation of traditional metaphysics. I believe 
that Weigel’s reference explains in a reasonable way this balance between rational 
reasoning and aversion for tradition. Rather interesting in this regard is the fact that in 
Scheidlin’s Disputatio Aristotle is quoted among the ones who have proposed 
experiments in order to prove that air is subject to gravity, just before Scheidlin’s mention 
of Galilei64. It is a contradictory outcome given the origin of the problem in Aristotle’s 
De caelo, because the end result of this section of the Disputatio is that “nullam levitatem 
naturaliter inesse corporibus”65, which is in any case against a qualitative approach to 
physics. While openly against some passages of his works, Aristotle’s association with 
the modern philosophy of nature and his separation from the Scholastics’ background was 
a necessary step towards Weigel’s revaluation of his works on logic and, consequently, 
towards the aversion for any obscure reasoning. 
                                                          
62 AA (II-1, 239-240). 
63 Mercer (2002a, 278-279) argued that this passage could be interpreted in this way. Closer to Mercer’s 
idea is this passage from Leibniz’s Confessio naturae contra atheistas: “Ac principio philosophis, 
Democriti et Epicuri resuscitatoribus, quos Robertus de Boyle corpuscolares non inepte appellat, ut Galileo, 
Bacono, Gassendo, Cartesio, Hobbesio, Digbaeo facile condescendo assensus sum, in reddendis 
corporalium Phaenomenorum rationibus neque ad Deum, neque aliam quamcunque rem, formamque aut 
qualitatem incorporalem sine necessitate confugiendum esse […] omnia quoad ejus fieri possit, ex natura 
corporis, primisque ejus qualitatibus: Magnitudine, Figura et Motu deducenda esse. Sed quid si 
demonstrem, ne harum quidem primarum qualitatum originem in natura corporis reperiri posse? Tum vero 
fatebuntur, ut spero, naturalistae nostri, corpora sibi non sufficere nec sine principio incorporeo subsistere 
posse” (AA VI-1. 480-490). No one denies Leibniz’s need for such principle. The focus however couldn’t 
be on the existence of this principle, but on the way in which it is connected with the principles of a 
mechanical account of the world. In this regard, even if these mechanical principles are not self-sufficient 
they are still considered useful and relevant, as suggested by the Theoria motus abstracti. It seems then that 
the principle suggested is nothing more than God conceived as the prime mover, closer to Leibniz’s 
reflection in the following years. 
64 “Laudatus Vir Nobilissimus Dn. Otto Gerike, Patricius & Reip. Magdeburgensis Consul gravissimus, 
quaeque a Rev. & Excellentiss. Schotto peculiari libro in lucem emissa. Aliorum Auctorum experimenta 
idem Schottus […] congessit, inter quos non praetereundus I. Aristoteles”. Weigel-Scheidlin (1665, Sectio 
Secunda, Propositio I). 
65 Ibid. 
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Moving on from the topic of experimentalism, another reference in Scheidlin’s work 
which cannot and must not go unnoticed is that of Galileo Galilei, because Jena’s cultural 
ambience was greatly influenced by his works. He is quoted in every work above 
mentioned and, as a result of his relevance, he is the only one to whom is dedicated an 
entire section of Dörffel’s Exercitatio Philosophica De Quantitate Motus Gravium. In the 
Observatio II is found in fact an exposition of Gaileo’s famous rule for falling bodies by 
which the distance increases as the square of the time. Although Gassendi’s Epistola De 
Motu impresso a Motore translato, quoted by Dörffel, is certainly responsible for the 
initial reception of Galileo in Jena’s circle, the references to Galileo’s Dialogo sopra i 
due massimi sistemi del mondo, to Giovanni Riccioli and Niccolò Cabeo and the specific 
language adopted by Dörffel suggest an increasing interest that cannot be explained 
resorting to derivative sources alone66. The importance of Galileo in Jena’s circle will be 
decisive in the third part of the present work, because it explains once again the 
relationship between Leibniz’s writings around 1671 and his 1679 letter to Weigel. 
Specifically, the 1672 Accessio ad Arithmeticam Infinitorum, written for Jean Gallois and 
quoted by Leibniz in his letter to Weigel, exhibits some reflections on Galileo’s infinite 
number67 that I believe are fundamental in order to understand the development of binary 
arithmetics between Weigel and Leibniz. 
                                                          
66 Dörffel exemplifies Galileo’s rule: “Spacia trasmissa esse inter se ut Quadrata Temporum, id quod 
commodious per exemplum declarabo. Sit e.g. lapis, qui tempore 1. minuti horarii descendat ex altitudine 
100. passuum : Jam in alio tempore v.g. 3. min. idem lapis juxta hanc proportionem descendet per spacium 
(non 300. sed) 900. passuum. Namq; ut se habet 1. (Quadratus numerus prioris Temporis, se 1. min) ad 9. 
(h.e. quadratum alterius temporis, sc. 3. min. Tertria enim 9. constituunt) ; Ita etiam 100. (Sc. passus spacii, 
quod priori Tempori respondet) sese habent ad 900. (passus, quos lapis ille altero tempore 3. min cadendo 
absolvet). Alias haec proportion, in respect ad tempora aequalia continua ejusdem motus, aliter enunciator, 
dum motus talis fieri dicitur secundum numeros impares ab unitate, vel juxta Progressionem continuam 
per impares ab unitate” (Weigel-Dörffel 1663, Observatio II). The specific expression “impares ab unitate” 
could be taken from Gassendi’s letter, where he paraphrases: “Caeterum, duo quaedam praemittenda sunt, 
quae inter alia bene multa magno Galileo debentur. Unum; corpus suopte decidens motu ea ratione 
accelerari, ut temporibus aequalibus maiora semper spatia pervadat, iuxta proportionem, quam habent 
numeri impares inter se, initio sumpto ab unitate” (Gassendi 1964, 440), but also from Galileo’s Latin 
translation of his Dialogo, entitled Systema cosmicum: "Demonstrat, accelerationem motus recti gravium 
fieri secundum numeros impares ab unitate, hoc est, signatis quibuscunque & quantiscunque placucrit 
temporibus aeqpuibus, si in primo tempore mobile quietem relinquens transierit  tale spatium, exempli 
causa unius ulnae, in secundo tempore transibit tres ulnas, in tertio quinque, in quarto septem,& ita 
consequenter, secundum numeros impares succedentes, quod in universum idem est ac si dicamus, quod 
spatia transmissa a mobili quietem relinquente, habeant inter sese proportionem duplicatam illius quam 
habent tempora, quibus ista spatia dimensi sumus : vel si mavis, quod spatia transmissa, sint inter se, sicuti 
quadrata temporum". (Galilei 1640, 163). 
67 AA (II-1, 348). 
40 
 
Focusing on physics instead and having examined these authors quoted both by 
Scheidlin and Dörffel, we can clearly see that Weigel’s school knew the new physics in 
its entirety. The definition of Weigel’s tendentia as something that intrinsically pertains 
a body considered not only in its extensional description then could be amended avoiding 
the interpretation of the word “tendency” as the legacy of a qualitatively described 
physics. In Dörffel’s Exercitatio is found the best physical explanation of the concept of 
tendency. He divides motion in three different constituents or modes: motion conceived 
as impetus, motion conceived as something that acquires a different direction and motion 
conceived strictly speaking as the act of changing location continuously. Through the first 
definition we can understand what was the real aim of Weigel’s school: 
 
I. Impetus sive Motio i.e. conatus ille exeundi loco suo. Specialiter in 
Gravibus appellatur Gravitatio, Tendentia naturalis, vel etiam Gravitas, & 
comparative potius Pondus. Habet enim hic Modus gradus suos aestimativos, 
neq; indivisibili consistit (Weigel-Dörffel 1663, §2). 
 
The word tendency associated with the word conatus then suggests the adoption of the 
concept of tendency described by Descartes in the second law of his Principia68. If I 
believe that this reference is correct in regard to the adoption of the term, I think however 
that the first definition of motion given by Dörffel entails, from the point of view of the 
explanation of phenomena, Hobbes’ conatus rather than Descartes'. I’m arguing here that 
Weigel and his followers were including Hobbes in their syncretistic projects not as a 
mere name in the list of the new philosophers that needed an interpretation through 
Aristotle, but as the main character of these reconciliatory efforts. Natural tendency in 
fact is the exemplification on the topic of gravity of the general definition of impetus, i.e. 
Hobbes’ conatus. This interpretation is suggested by no other than Leibniz: in his 1689 
Phoranomus, recalling his early years, he effectively describes and connects many topics 
of the present chapter: 
 
                                                          
68 "Unamquamque partem materiae, seorsim spectatam, non tendere unquamut secundum ullas lineas 
obliquas pergat moveri, sed tantum modo secundum rectas" (Descartes 1963, VIII, 55). Descartes' use of 
tendency involves always a reference to the idea of moving throughadirection or space, thus it is closer to 
the usual meaning of the word.  
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Cum igitur solam imaginationis jurisdictionem in rebus materialibus adhuc 
agnoscerem, in ea eram sententiam nullam in corporibus inertiam naturalem 
intelligi posse, et in vacuo aut campo libero corpus quiescens quantulicunque 
alterius velocitatem accipere debere […] Ego igitur nihil aliud concipiendo in 
materia quam extensionem et impenetrabilitatem, vel uno verbo impletionem 
spatii, et in motu nihil aliud intelligendo quam mutatione spatii, videbam 
corpus motum ab eodem quiescente singulis momentis eo saltem differre 
quod corpus in motu positum semper habet conatum quondam, seu (ut verbo 
Erhardi Weigelii insignis in Saxonia Mathematici utar) tendentiam, hoc est 
initium pergendi (PHO, 788-790). 
 
In Leibniz’s reconstruction of his early years then, not only the important identification 
between Hobbes’ conatus and Weigel’s tendentia, but also his indecision on the existence 
of void, his superposition between antitypy and extension and his strictly mechanistic 
account for bodies encourage us in hypothesizing Weigel’s school behind Leibniz’s 
Hypothesis physica nova69. This is in my opinion a decisive turning point in the 
interpretation of Weigel’s impact on Leibniz: an interpretation that were to insist only on 
Weigel’s Platonism and Aristotelianism, considering his philosophy as a simple 
expression of some kind of German Neoplatonism would completely miss the point of 
his syncretism. 
Several evidences of this connection between Hobbes and Weigel are spread among 
Leibniz, Weigel and his disciples’ writings. First of all, as Leibniz suggested, tendency is 
not a concept used only by Weigel’s scholars. Weigel himself uses it in the Corporis 
pansophici pantologia, a section of his Universi corporis Pansophici caput summum 
published independently in 1673: “Motus spectatus in se dici potest Vel primus, ut (1) 
Conatus, Nisus, Motio, quae est tendentia aliquorum, licet nulla fiat progressio […] Vel 
secundus diciturque (3) Promotio, quae est de loco in locum progressio”70. There is a 
distinction here between conatus happened in an instant and the actual progression of a 
body in a certain direction that is impossible to ascribe completely to an interpretation of 
tendency based on Descartes. The definition of tendency described here then becomes all 
                                                          
69 Leibniz’s Hypothesis is in fact mentioned in the omitted passage of the previous quote: “quemadmodum 
pluribus in libello exposui, quod juvenis edideram” (PHO, 788). 
70 Weigel (1673c, 120). 
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the more important, reminding that in the previous chapter I showed how Leibniz refers 
to the draft of Weigel’s Universi corporis Pansophici three years before its actual 
publication, in the same year of the Hypothesis’ draft. Moreover, Leibniz’s 1683 notes on 
this work display that he perceived this passage as one of the most important in Weigel’s 
physics71, feeling the need of going back to his roots before venturing in a new directions. 
Weigel's tendency then influenced Leibniz two times: at first during Leibniz's early years 
it presented Hobbes' conatus as the fundamental principle for a precise explanation of 
physics, while later, once Leibniz attained a new vision on physics, it was reintroduced 
in the new context by Leibniz himself, adapting its meaning to his aim. Leibniz in fact 
uses for example the word tendentia in the definition of primitive forces as internal 
tendencies72. The background is completely different, but the word remained and it was 
adopted by Leibniz with the same meaning in mind. 
Since Leibniz in the Phoranomus describes the consequence of the action of tendency 
as a beginning in direction (initium pergendi), it shows that Weigel did not possess a 
misconceived version of Hobbes’ conatus, regardless his intention of harmonizing it with 
Aristotle. Maintaining Aristotle was not a task that needed in his mind a denial of that 
modern physics based on the study of collisions between bodies. The consequences of 
this attempt are shown in Dörffel’s Exercitatio. I have already pointed out that its chapter 
on this topic begins dividing motion in three aspects or modes. If the first one is tendency 
as it was described before, the second one is the one called dispositio motus, which is no 
other than direction obtained by the impact of a body into another one73. By combining 
momentum and direction Dörffel explains the principles of his Phoronomia74, so that 
tendency is truly conceived as something that happens in an instant. In doing so however, 
Weigel’s school follows Hobbes rather than Leibniz, as the passage on the definition of 
                                                          
71 Leibniz’s notes on this passage are as follows: “Actio naturalis infinita Dei, finita actio communis dicitur 
Motus: actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia estque illocalis ut tempus physicum id est fluxus 
durativus in rebus durantibus; vel localis Motus. Motus vel primus, ut conatus nisus motio” (AA VI-4, 
1197). 
72 GP (II, 275). A reconstruction of Leibniz's use of tendency, without however its foundation in Weigel, is 
found in a paper written by Rutherford in Goldenbaum (2008, 255). 
73 “Dispositio motus, quae est directio Mobilis certum terminum […] Dependet autem determinatio ista in 
motu impresso primo a nuda superficie Corporis moventis & implentis, postmodum manente eodem 
impetus communicato pro diverso resistentis opposite diversimode potest variari” (Weigel-Dörffel 1663, 
§2). 
74 “Certum est vel ex primis Phoronomiae principiis, Mobile quodcunq. dum movendo in obvium aliud 
corpus resistens impingit, quanto vehementiorem tunc edit impulsum, tanto majorem impetum, tanto etiam 
celeriorem motum habere” (Weigel-Dörffel 1663, Observatio II, §1) 
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motion that negates its nature as an indivisible showed75. Leibniz’s solution in his Theoria 
motus abstracti is unique then and it is the result of the efforts of a young talented student, 
made to impress the cultural circle in which he belonged. 
The third mode of motion in Dörffel’s Exercitatio introduces instead Aristotle’s 
concept of a motion that happens through contraries: “Motus stricte dictus sive Promotio 
sive Latio, actualis nimirum & continua loci permutatio, dum Mobile per spatium tractum 
aiquem longitudinarium continuo tempore describit. Quo spectat, quam Aristoteles tradit 
[…] explicatio, quod sit […] mutatio contrarietatis, quando secundum locum accidit”76. 
In this third definition of motion Dörffel quotes the fourth chapter of the first book of 
Aristotle’s De Generatione et Corruptione. Much like, as Aristotle argues, a man who 
was musical becomes unmusical, yet remains a man77, so a body, moving through space, 
remains that body, even if some accidents turn in their opposites. Aristotle’s alteration, 
which is not generation or corruption, is reintroduced as a sort of principle of identity in 
space during motion. It is as if this Aristotelian concept is taken because it explains in an 
accessible way what we actually see when we look at a body moving, but the precise 
explanation of the event is entrusted to the decomposition in conatus, direction and 
collisions. Aside from maintaining the identity of a body with itself then, the concept of 
alteration in a subject has no other use, so that motion explained through contrariety does 
not hinder the definition of motion taken from the new physics. 
                                                          
75 This important passage of Hobbes’ De corpore in fact rules out indivisibles: “Primo definiemus Conatum 
esse motum per spatium et tempus minus quam quod datur, id est, determinatur sive expositione vel numero 
assignatur, id est, per punctum et in instant. Ad cujus definitionis explcationem meminisse oportet per 
punctum non intelligi id quod quantitatem nullam habet sive quod nulla ratione potest divide (nihil enim 
est ejusmodi in rerum natura), sed id cujus quantitas non consideratur, hoc est, cujus neque quantitas neque 
pars ulla inter demonstrandum computatur, ita ut punctum non habeatur pro indivisibili, sed pro indiviso, 
sicut etiam instans sumendum est pro tempore indiviso, non pro indivisibili” (Hobbes 1999, 155). It’s clear 
however that Leibniz’s solution was in some way suggested by Hobbes himself by pointing out this possible 
outcome. 
76 Weigel-Dörffel (1663, §2). 
77 The passage quoted from Aristotle’s De Generatione et Corruptione reads: “If, however, in such cases, 
any property (being one of a pair of contraries) persists, in the thing that has come-to-be, the same as it was 
in the thing which has passed-away – if, e.g., when water comes-to-be out of air, both are transparent or 
cold – the second thing, into which the first changes, must not be a property of this. Otherwise the change 
will be alteration. Suppose, e.g., that the musical man passed-away and an unmusical man came-to-be, and 
that the man persists as something identical. Now, if musicalness (and unmusicalness) had not been in itself 
a property of the man, these changes would have been a coming-to-be of unmusicalness and a passing-
away of musicalness; but in fact a property of the persistent thing. (Hence these are properties of the man, 
and of musical man and unmusical man, there is a passing-away and a coming-to-be.) Consequently such 
changes are alteration” (Aristotle 1984, 14-15, 319b24-319b32). 
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As a result in fact, just after defining the third way in which motion is conceived, we 
find the true meaning of the word “natural” used in the expression “natural tendency” 
about bodies subject to gravity, which we have found in both Dörffel and Scheidlin: “Sic 
gravia, quando remotis solummodo abstaculis locum mutant, motum per Lineam 
directionis, quantum permittitur, excercent, & ille motus specialiter vocatur Naturalis”78. 
Therefore, Natural motion regarding bodies subject to gravity is tendency considered in 
a body without any other external forces preventing it to move in a straight line. It is 
indeed very different from something that pertains intrinsically one body, being closer to 
a study on inertia, rather than a qualitatively described motion. Having explained 
Weigel’s school advancements in the philosophy of nature, I will show now their 
metaphysical premises and their relation with the concept of a physical body. 
 
Physical Necessity in Weigel’s School Dörffel’s Exercitatio addresses the problem of 
describing motion in an ideal situation, in order to obtain Galileo’s rules of free fall. 
Scheidlin’s Disputatio instead, faces the problem of weight from a different perspective, 
because it doesn’t start with general rules, but leaves the origin of tendency in bodies as 
a matter that needs to be determined at a later time. By doing so, Scheidlin moves ahead 
from the topic of air’s weight and describes the different theories used to account for the 
origin of tendency. His reasoning then is not as clear as Dörffel’s, because he tends to 
present the different theories as if they stand on the same ground, but it is nonetheless 
useful, because it gives us the possibility of understanding the position of Weigel’s school 
in the contemporary debate. The problem is presented as follows: is gravity a principle 
that inheres things that possess weight, or is it the consequence of an attraction that has 
its origin at the centre of the earth?79 At first Scheidlin introduces the topic, pointing out 
that phenomena as they appear are not sufficient in order to prove the correctness of a 
theory over another one80. Conclusions deduced by obscure principles cannot be evident, 
                                                          
78 Weigel-Dörffel (1663, §2). 
79 “Gravitatis principium aut in ipsa re gravi, aut in meditullio terrae quaerendum” (Weigel-Scheidlin 1665, 
Sectio Prima). 
80 Later in the same passage Scheidlin exemplifies this by quoting the different accounts of Gassendi and 
Descartes on the origin of light: “In Opticis idem fieri solet, cum enim & illic incertum hucusque sit, quo 
pacto lucis radii se habeant, ut occursu variorum corporum flecti frangique possint, ad hypotheses duas 
Opticarum subtilitatum Magistri descenderunt, quibus quaecunque de luce per experientiam habemus, 
explicare solent: quarum unam Celebrissimus Gassendus hodie recoxit, qui Solem revera aliquas 
substantiolas, quas vocat radios substantiales, emittere statuit : altera ingeniosissimi Renati des Cartes est, 
qui materiale nihil e corpore lucido ad oculos usque manare, sed subtilem, quae continuo intercedit, 
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thus they cannot produce knowledge in its proper meaning. Scheidlin quotes here the 
famous letter to Picot, published in the form of the preface of Descartes’ Principia in 
1647. There81, Descartes argues that, even if we witness bodies with a natural tendency 
towards the centre of the earth, this is not an argument that necessarily favours gravity as 
something that inheres to bodies intrinsically. The passage quoted is relevant for our 
purposes, because in Descartes’ letter it occurs just before another passage on how 
Aristotle was misinterpreted by his followers. In other words, this letter could be one of 
the work that inspired Weigel’s syncretism, even more because at the end of that preface 
we find a classification of sciences similar to that of Weigel. 
The two different accounts on gravity proposed by Scheidlin then are presented with 
Descartes’ reasoning in mind. The first one argues that “in spissitudinis telluris centro 
esse quendam per analogiam sic dictum magnetem, qui, effluviis mediantibus, quaqua 
versum seu sphaerico emissis vique aliqua attractrice praeditis, corpora ad se trahat, 
adliciatque”82. When Scheidlin writes about the attraction caused by the earth as 
something that resembles a magnet, he is not considering a sort of innate or occult quality, 
but a mechanical system that through the interaction of particles draws the objects towards 
the centre of the earth. His reasoning is, to a certain extent, similar to that of Descartes 
and in fact he comes to the same conclusions: an attraction that do not pertain intrinsically 
to objects explains the fact, shown by Weigel in the Exercitatio as he quotes83,  that they 
increase their speed while approaching the centre of earth. The other account instead does 
not even explain the difference in weight between objects. Both these conclusions are 
taken from the fourth part of Descartes’ Principia. Scheidlin in fact argues that weight 
depends also from the shape of a body. If the body is shaped like a porous material, then 
a sort of lighter matter, which he calls “materiae celestis” like Descartes did, will 
permeate the body, making it lighter, while a compact body will approach the earth earlier 
                                                          
materiam ejus vice fungi adserit” (Ibid.). Gassendi was not completely rejected by Weigel’s school and it 
is often quoted. It is true that Descartes is generally favored, but at the same time we can’t find in their 
writings many passages openly against atomism. A corpuscular theory for example is sometimes adopted, 
like in the explanation of gravity.  
81 Descartes (1963, IX, 1-20). 
82 Weigel-Scheidlin (1665, Sectio Prima). 
83 “Quod & peculiari Disputatione de quantitate motus gravium sub Ampliss. atq. Excellentiss. Dn. 
PRAESIDIS moderamine habita clarissime ostensum est” (Ibidem.). Dörffel here is not even mentioned, 
suggesting once again the importance of the teacher over his students in the draft of their dissertations.  
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for the opposite reason84. Even if this argument is taken directly from Descartes, it is 
nonetheless rather confusing, because it is as if Scheidlin wants to combine the idea of a 
magnet at the centre of the earth with Descartes’ reasoning that addressed gravity to the 
action of matter filling the above space previously occupied by the heavy body. Scheidlin 
identifies in fact the celestial matter with the magnet’s effluvia, a thesis that was not 
completely accepted even in Weigel’s school85. The most interesting part of the 
Disputatio however, follows from these premises. If Scheidlin’s reasoning for now was 
proceeding according to a very classical and Cartesian way of understanding phenomena, 
in the following passage he introduces an unexpected turning point which is worth 
reporting in its entirety: 
 
Alii recensitis hanc etiam superaddunt probabilitatem: Si gravitas, inquiunt, 
naturaliter inesset v.g. lapidi, adeoque principium primum motus suum intra 
gremium continerent gravia, tunc semper deorsum moverentur, quia 
proprietates & adfectiones naturales stricte sic dictae omni, soli & semper 
convenient: at corpora gravia remoto omni impedimento non semprer 
deorsum moventur. Si enim DEUS per potentiam suam absolutam totum hoc 
Universi systema, unico relicto gravi, annihilaret, tunc istud grave tantum 
abest ut moveretur deorsum, ut potius indifferens ad omnem motum 
relinqueretur. Hinc, dicunt, sequi probabiliter maxime, corpora gravia non in 
                                                          
84 Descartes writes: “Atque ita gravitas cujulque corporis terreftris non proprie efficitur ab omni materia 
coelesti illud circumfluente, fed praecise tantum ab ea ipsius parte, quae, si corpus istud descendat, in ejus 
locum immediate ascendit, ac proinde quae est illi magnitudine plane aequalis. Sit, exempli caussa, B 
corpus terrestre in medio aëre exsistens, & constans pluribus particulis tertii elementi, quam moles aëris 
ipsi aequalis, ac proinde pauciores vel angustiores habens poros, in quibus materia coelestis contineatur: 
manifestum est, si hoc corpus B versus I descendat, molem aëris ei aequalem in ejus locum ascensuram. Et 
quia in sta mole aëris, plus materiae coelestis quam in eo continetur, manifestum etiam est, in ipsa esse vim 
ad illud deprimendum” (Descartes 1963, VIII, 213-214). Strictly speaking then, one body is not heavier 
because it is less permeated by celestial matter – that would be a theory similar to the levitas theory 
previously described –, but because, being less permeated, the difference with the quantity of celestial 
matter that tends to move away from the centre of the earth and that fills the same volume in the space left 
above by the compact body makes that body heavier.   
85 In Vinhold’s Theses we read: “Magis probabile videtur principium motus gravium esse in psis partibus, 
quam in centro terrae”. At first glance this statement could be misinterpreted as a revaluation of Aristotle’s 
account, but Vinhold’s Theses were written in 1671, around the time of Leibniz’s Theoria motus concreti. 
In this regard, Leibniz’s work represents an advancement in Weigel’s school conception of gravity, because 
its existence is proved referring to moving parts that inhere to a body, while maintaining a purely 
mechanical account.   
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sese habere primum motus principium (Weigel-Scheidlin 1665, Sectio 
Prima). 
 
Some others then use an argument based on pure possibility in order to argue that a 
qualitative account of gravity is incorrect. If in fact gravity is a quality, then it inheres the 
body in every possible situation. However, if this situation were to be that of a space 
where every possible obstacle is removed, where nothing exists except the body, then 
following the law of inertia, thinking of a different direction in which the body moves 
wouldn’t be contradictory, whereas the qualitative approach would force us to choose a 
specific direction. It is obvious here, taking the word “annihilaret” as the most important 
evidence,  that the author mentioned is no other than Hobbes, specifically a section of his 
De corpore that inspired Leibniz as well86. Once again his influence emerges as the most 
important one, even if Scheidlin is not directly suggesting in this chapter the superiority 
of his proof87. I believe however that the definition of tendency previously explained 
favours an interpretation that argues for a priority of Hobbes’ proof: ultimately in fact, 
Hobbes’ proof is the last one presented before the end of the section. These evidences 
suggest in the end that Weigel’s conatus is not that of Descartes, despite the fact that 
Weigel uses it in the same context in which Descartes used it, that is the topic of gravity. 
Weigel's tendency in fact is conceived as something separated from direction, allowing 
the possibility of explaining motion in a way similar to that of Hobbes. 
                                                          
86 In De corpore’s chapter VIII we read: “Quod quiescit, semper quiescere intelligitur, nisi sit aliud aliquod 
corpus praeter ipsum, quo supposito quiescere amplius non possit. Supponamus enim corpus aliquod 
finitum existere et quiescere, ita ut reliquum omne spatium intelligatur vacuum. Si jam corpus illud coeperit 
moveri, movebitur sane per aliquam viam. Quoniam igitur, quicquid in ipso corpore erat, disponebat ipsum 
ad quietem, ratio, quare movetur per hanc viam, est extra ipsum; similiter si per aliam viam quamcunque 
motum esset, ratio quoque motus per illam viam esset extra ipsum. Cum autem suppositum sit extra ipsum 
nihil esse, ratio motus per unam viam eadem esset quae ratio motus per omnem aliam viam; ergo aeque 
motum esset per omnes vias simul, quod est impossibile. Similiter, quod movetur, semper moveri 
intelligitur, nisi aliud sit extra ipsum, propter quod quiescit. Nam si supponamus nihil extra esse, nulla ratio 
erit, quare nunc quiescere debeat potius quam alio tempore; itaque motus ejus in omni simu temporis puncto 
desineret” (Hobbes 1999, 91). Hobbes’ argument is slightly different from that of Scheidlin, but only 
because Hobbes considers the two possibilities (motion and rest), giving an account for both and because 
Scheidlin considers instead a specific motion, the one caused by gravity. Both however use the annihilatio 
in order to consider the possibility of moving, arguing for a conclusion that rests on a hypothetical situation. 
87 After presenting the various accounts, the passage ends with a rather obscure “evidentiae tamen physicae 
tantis per indulgentibus videtur ac si prior de terrae centro sentential plus probabilis, atque altera habeat. 
Edocti meliora sequemur”. If we take for granted that the qualitative approach is discarded, still it does not 
clearly favour Descartes’ or Hobbes’ account. 
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On a side note, it is rather interesting how in Weigel’s works and in the dissertations 
prepared under his guidance many authors are mentioned, many are even celebrated, like 
Descartes, yet one of the most influential of them is almost never mentioned directly. It 
surely shows that Weigel’s impact on Leibniz needs a rethinking starting from a wider 
perspective, plus the very interpretation of Weigel’s philosophy needs to distance itself 
from the easy path that leads to Aristotle, Scholastics and Descartes only. A reasonable 
conjecture on why Hobbes’ influence in Weigel’s writings concerning the philosophy of 
nature could be traced only by analysing the specific terms belonging to his philosophy 
and not through direct quotes is that, while on the subject of law, ethics and politics 
Hobbes’ impact was too big to be hidden or dismissed, its adoption in physics was 
considered too dangerous and needed a superior degree of carefulness. Judging by how 
Weigel was condemned more than one time for his theses during his life, we already know 
that his carefulness was never rewarded. From Leibniz’s perspective, this is perhaps the 
reason why to the departure from Weigel and Hobbes, recalled in the Phoranomus, 
corresponds Leibniz’s increasing carefulness in talking with and about Weigel with his 
correspondents in the following years. 
At this point, having explained the huge debt of Weigel’s school with Hobbes, one 
could argue that if in the end Weigel’s impact resolves into Leibniz’s increasing interest 
in Hobbes, Leibniz’s genius and his culture soon led him to Hobbes’ primary sources, so 
that the introduction of Weigel’s influence becomes unnecessary. However, I believe that 
this interpretation is inaccurate for several reasons: Weigel’s priority in space and time, 
as defined in the previous chapter, should suggest the opposite. Even more, my purpose 
is not that of granting to Weigel an exclusive preference over other authors, but 
explaining, at least for this part of the present work, the aim of Leibniz’s Hypothesis 
physica nova. Leibniz’s solution based upon Hobbes is better explained considering the 
context in which that solution was accepted and required. The crucial point then is rather 
understanding if Weigel’s reception of Hobbes could have influenced Leibniz’s reception 
of the same author. I will argue now that Weigel offered to Leibniz a version of Hobbes’ 
philosophy founded in a heavy metaphysical background that was unknown to Hobbes. 
In a general sense, this outcome is obvious and depends on the fact that Weigel revaluates 
Aristotle and Euclid in an ontological and metaphysical sense far from Hobbes’ 
reasoning, but something relevant could be said also for the topics of the present chapter. 
49 
 
Another wording of the same problem would be that of questioning if the references 
seen in Weigel’s dissertations are based on general metaphysical principles taken from 
Weigel’s Analysis aristotelica ex Euclide restituta. There is indeed a path that leads from 
Scheidlin and Dörffel’s works to the universal principles described in Weigel’s work, 
showing a decisive reinterpretation of Hobbes’ philosophy. If we take for example the 
last passage quoted from Scheidlin’s Disputatio, we can clearly see that Hobbes’ 
annihilatio mundi was reinterpreted as a situation that could be conceived thanks to God’s 
potentia absoluta. Leibniz’s take on God’s potentia absoluta was already debated88, 
because the difference between Leibniz’s solution and that offered in the medieval 
background in which the topic developed, above all in Scotus, leads to a form of 
intellectualism apparently close to that of Scholastics: while in Scotus the absolute power 
of God would be in some way incapacitated, assuming that God’s will should always be 
determined by his intellect, in the post-Ockhamist view, as Piro89 defines it, the opposite 
account was defended. Regarding Leibniz’s philosophy, the result is that even the 
potentia absoluta should be affected by what Leibniz considers as the essence of 
intellectualism or rational reasoning, that is the principle of contradiction. It follows that 
what God could do is always what it is possible to do and, being possibility defined as 
something non-contradictory, what God could do is always non-contradictory. It is a 
decisive restraint to God’s power that implies the problem of determinism faced by 
Leibniz in his Confessio philosophi: counterfactuals are always imagined as coherent 
causal chains where contradiction does not take place, much like free will is denied 
because it would introduce an unexplainable discontinuity between cause and effect. This 
is of course the final outcome of Leibniz’s early years found in the Confessio, whereas a 
genetic approach shows many changes and developments of these ideas before 1672. In 
the next chapter I will argue that the adoption of the principle of contradiction in such a 
way is also the last result of Weigel’s progressive influence, started in 1663 and ended in 
1671, but I believe that the considerations on this topic from a physical point of view are 
essential as well. 
Scheidlin’s combination between annihilation and God’s absolute power shows very 
interesting results: if we do not consider the topic of God’s absolute power per se and we 
                                                          
88 See for example Mondadori (1989). 
89 Piro (2002, 29-30). 
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accept the intellectualist interpretation shared by Weigel’s school and Leibniz, then 
absolute power could be used in physics in order to create deterministically controlled 
alternate hypotheses. In the example of the body subject to gravity, God could remove 
some of the requisites that made that body behave in a certain manner, i.e. the other 
objects in space, preventing a study of its action when it depends only on one conatus, 
but that does not change the fact that (1) the remained body still behaves following the 
exact laws of motion given before God’s annihilation and (2) if the other objects were to 
be reintroduced, they would act in the same way as before, following the same rules.  This 
perspective implies a strong determinism, yet its reasoning is based on contingent 
situations that could be otherwise and not on absolutely necessitated circumstances. 
Philosophy of nature and theology are then connected in such a way that they become 
mutually useful. Schott’s study of air’s behaviour adopted by Weigel’s school is also 
consistent with this approach, since the experiment, following Schott's appreciation, 
recreates a situation in which air is influenced as little as possible by external forces. 
In the third chapter of Weigel’s Analysis aristotelica, entitled On Necessity, is found 
the theoretical foundation of Scheidlin’s argument and of the general idea of using pure 
possibility to infer actual properties. After having introduced absolute necessity, defined 
like in Leibniz and in the Sholastics as that by which the opposite implies a contradiction, 
Weigel introduces another form of necessity, called restricted (restricte) necessity: 
 
Restricte autem & secundum ordinarium naturae cursum quod verum, certum 
& necessarium est effatum scibile, aeternum quidem dici quoq; solet, sed 
saltem concessive quasi per mentis anticipationem. Interim tantam adhuc 
habet necessitatem, ut, nisi per extraordinariam Dei potentiam, quam in 
naturalibus rarissime, & saltem ubi miraculo fuerit opus, experimur, aliter se 
habere non posit (Weigel 1658, 20-21) 
 
Propositions characterised by restricted necessity are necessary indeed, plus they follow 
the regular course of nature, if not thanks to God’s absolute power. Things could be 
different from how they are, but that does not prevent Weigel to attribute them necessity 
in a deterministic fashion. Weigel clearly ascribes this form of necessity to objects 
analysed on the ground of physics: “hoc modo necessaria sunt pleraeque Propositiones 
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Physicae, itemque multae, quae in explixatiori tractatu, quem mathesin mixtam dicimus, 
Philosophiae Naturali debentur”90. The introduction of God’s absolute power then seems 
to be allowed by Weigel for the sole purpose of justifying, in the eyes of Jena’s faculty 
of theology, things such as miracles and other Faith’s dogmas, rather than truly believing 
that God could really have an impact on nature’s course different from that founded on 
logical coherence. The exemplification of God’s action on nature in fact is rather 
revealing and it confirms that, when it is applied as a tool, God’s absolute power is used 
only to hypothesize alternative yet coherent situations: 
 
Ita certe Propositio est: Luna plena in alterutro nodorum constituta, aut a 
propiore nodo secundum longitudinem infra 10. gradus distans, patitur 
eclipsin; quippe secundum ordinarium naturae cursum maxime necessaria 
[…] Absolute tamen & immutabiliter necessaria non est; si enim Deus altius 
eveheret Lunam, aut ad Solem propius admoveret Terram […] tunc licet in 
ipsis nodis consisteret Luna plena, Eclipsin tamen non pateretur (Weigel 
1658, 21). 
 
Physical necessity is different from absolute necessity, because God could still move the 
celestial bodies in order to achieve a different outcome on phenomena like full moon or 
eclipse. Nevertheless, God could change reality only acting upon entities exactly 
determined by their causes: the fact that an eclipse does not occur anymore is still the 
result of the determinate relationship between the celestial bodies involved, even if they 
changed their place thanks to God’s will. Weigel specifies that the truth by which the 
moon is positioned in such a way is something that expresses the natural course of the 
world from its very beginning, suggesting that phenomena should be interpreted as causal 
chains.  
In Weigel’s definition of physical necessity, the use of the term “concessive” related 
to the use of the “anticipatio mentis” is particularly important: restricted necessity applies 
to knowable propositions, i.e. coherently based proposition that could be true or false, but 
sometimes, Weigel argues, they are called necessary in a concessive way, as if our mind 
had mistakenly identified absolute necessity with restricted necessity. The “anticipatio 
                                                          
90 Weigel (1658, 20-21). 
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mentis“ in fact is a negative term taken from Bacon91 that expresses the way in which 
men jump to conclusion from simple observations, without adopting a rigorous method. 
Weigel however is not arguing that some men mistake these truths as necessary truth – 
the context being that of the definition of restricted necessity, just after the definition of 
absolute necessity, suggests that such interpretation would be wrong – rather they are 
mistaking absolute necessity with restricted necessity, as if they were one and the same. 
It is not necessity in itself to be at stake here, but the possibility of specifying the 
difference between determinism and necessitism.  
While the fact that Weigel uses the word concessive is interesting, because the use is 
very similar to Leibniz’s idea of necessity ex hypothesi92, the reference to Bacon is also 
interesting per se, especially concerning physics. It could be that the revaluation of 
Bacon’s superposition between the negation of dimensions’ penetration and antitypy that 
I analysed in the previous section is related in some way to Weigel’s physical necessity. 
As a matter of fact, another section of Weigel’s Anaylisis aristotelica suggests a possible 
connection. In the chapter entitled “De Natura causarum Demonstrativarum & ratione 
causandi”, Weigel tries to define a specific cause, demonstrative cause considered from 
the point of view of the object, comparing it to another cause, called causa emanationis, 
a term usually adopted in theology in order to explain the relationship between Father, 
Son and Creatures. From a theological point of view, the problem was that of explaining 
how the existence of creatures follows directly from the existence of God, without altering 
God's perfection. Weigel argues that the causa emanationis is commonly defined as 
something like an “actu concessivo”93, a concessive act, because the existence of 
creatures is based on God’s existence. Weigel however adds that the causa emanationis 
coincide with a complex cause, because it is based on necessarily related conditions that 
happen to exist at the same time in the same place. In an interesting turning point, 
exemplifying the relationship between emanation and complex cause, Weigel shifts from 
a theological reasoning to a reasoning concerning the philosophy of nature: 
 
Licet enim, quando v.g. Materia dicitur emanandi causa respectu 
magnitudinis, h.e. modi continuitatis aestimativi, puta tripedalitatis, &c. 
                                                          
91 Specifically, in the first book of Bacon's Novum Organum (Bacon 2004, I, 26). 
92 AA (VI-4, 1547). 
93 Weigel (1658, 129). 
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utrumque (causa & causatum) ut simplex quippiam compendii gratia (more 
veterum) dicatur; quoad rem tamen, addito subjecto quod subintelligebatur 
(corpore naturali) complexum quippiam est, quo Corpus naturale cum 
materia, & hac porro cum magnitudine, necessario complicata supponuntur, 
ex quo, tanquam causa complexa, necessario resultat causatum complexum, 
Corpus naturale cum magnitudine quoq. necessario complicatum esse 
(Weigel 1658, 129). 
 
If we consider matter in respect to magnitude alone, we can safely say that matter is the 
causa emanationis of magnitude, being magnitude a mode of matter’s continuity that 
allows its quantification. They are necessarily related, in a way that justifies to some 
extent the use of a single term to address both, even if one is the cause of the other. They 
are however conceptually distinct entities: once we add natural body as a substratum, this 
distinction becomes relevant, because it describes different aspects of the same body. At 
the same time, even if they are distinct entities they are necessarily related, even when 
they inhere to a single body, like fire and heat. This way of describing physical bodies 
has in Weigel its metaphysical outcome, expressed just after the passage above quoted: 
 
Causa demonstrativa […] non certo quodam productionis actu quatenus talis 
causa est, sed nuda saltem simulpositione & socia quadam sed necessario 
concatenata exhibitione, quae, si placet, uno verbo Con-necessitatio dici 
potest, quod haec causa dum ipsa ponitur Con- i.e. secum, esse faciat & a 
parte rei necessitet poni causatum (Weigel 1658, 130). 
 
Weigel’s Con-necessitatio (necessity-with) is the metaphysical tool developed to explain 
the superposition of necessarily related properties in a single natural body. It is both 
“position at the same time” and “necessarily concatenated exhibition” of properties. I 
believe it is quite clear that Weigel’s approach is very similar to that found in Bacon, 
Hobbes and Leibniz. The same superposition of magnitude and matter is found in 
Leibniz’s 1669 letter to Thomasius and it allows the possibility of adopting antitypy. 
Weigel help us in understanding how this is possible: while (1) bodies belong to a physical 
description of the world, thus they are subject to physical necessity and (2) physical 
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necessity is a form of determinism that allows contingency, (3) in the same body there 
are, so to say, con-necessitated properties. Matter, extension and antitypy could be 
conceived independently, yet they happen to necessarily inhere to the same body. Weigel 
however specifies that this explanatory model is valid only a parte rei, because from a 
genetic and metaphysical point of view it would add a form of discontinuity that cannot 
be taken as the final account of reality. Another objective of Weigel’s school then will be 
that of retracing the way that from a supposed metaphysical unity reaches the realm of 
physics and the layered model of defining bodies. 
In conclusion, Weigel’s school at the time of Leibniz’s enrolment in Jena and in the 
following years exhibits a level of complexity and advancement in natural sciences that I 
believe it was often underestimated. Galileo, Schott and Hobbes helped in defining 
Weigel’s concept of tendency, while the reintroduction of Aristotelian and Scholastics 
principles helped in giving birth to the description of natural bodies through physical 
necessity and Con-necessitas. All that is left is understanding how the physical properties 
that pertain one body are connected also from a genetic point of view.  
 
Primary Matter and Geometry of Space Assuming that the 1669 letter to Thomasius 
represents the beginning of the peak of Weigel’s influence on Leibniz, I will start by 
analysing this letter in the light of what I previously showed on physics regarding 
Weigel’s school. It is widely known that in those years Leibniz wanted to harmonise 
Aristotle with the moderns with the objective of unifying a vision of the natural world 
through magnitude, figure and motion with the existence of God as the prime mover. The 
fact that in modern terms a body has no principle of motion in itself was considered by 
Leibniz quite fitting for these purposes for obvious reasons, since God would act in this 
situation as the entity that causes motion. In doing so however, Leibniz makes some 
distinctions among the moderns: it is true that they all adopt the magnitude-figure-motion 
model, but Descartes did that only on paper, because in the process of applying this 
method he added some ideas that were arbitrarily taken for granted, rather than 
necessarily derived from the model endorsed94. This outcome in Leibniz’s early 
                                                          
94 “Cartesianos vero eos tantum appello, qui Cartesii principia sequuntur, ex quo numero magni illi viri 
Verulamius, Gassendus, Hobbius, Digbaeus, Cornelius ab Hoghelande etc. prorsus eximi debent, quos 
vulgus Cartesianis confundit, cum tamen vel Cartesio aequales vel etiam superiores aetate et ingenio fuerint, 
me fateor nihil minus quam Cartesianum esse. Regulam illam omnibus istis philosophiae Restauratoribus 
communem teneo, nihil explicandum in corporibus, nisi per magnitudinem, figuram et motum. In Cartesio 
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philosophy is quite interesting, because Descartes, among the new philosophers, is 
probably the one that resorts the most to the use of God in the foundation of the physical 
world. Leibniz instead clearly favours Hobbes in this regard, but this is consistent with 
the huge impact of Hobbes’ philosophy on Weigel’s physics that was previously shown. 
Two facts support a connection between Weigel, Hobbes and Leibniz: Leibniz’s 
indecision with respect to void, based on the reference to the same authors found in 
Weigel’s school dissertations95, and  his argument against motion as a property that 
inheres to one body. In regard to this last topic we witness the closest resemblance to the 
argument exposed in Scheidlin’s Disputatio: 
 
Et Aristoteles ut dixi pro certo habet corpus nullum in se solo principium 
motus habere, et hoc unico argumento Huic objectioni dupliciter respondes; 
primum, hoc argumentum nihil posse apud Epicurum, qui suis atomis 
largiatur per se motum deorsum. Fateor, apud eum nihil posse hoc 
argumentum, nisi ei praedemonstretur, hoc ipsum absurdum et impossibile 
esse, quod corpus habeat motum a se ipso, quod et jam tum Cicero ni fallor 
in libris de natura Deorum facit, eleganter Epicurum irridens, quod quiddam 
sine causa et ratione in suis Hypothesibus hoc modo introducat. Nam in rerum 
natura nihil esse deorsum, sed quoad nos, neque igitur causam, cur corpus 
aliquod in hanc potius quam illam plagam moveatur. Epicuro igitur neganti 
quicquid movetur ab alio extra se moveri facile occurremus et laborantem 
existentiae Dei certitudinem vindicabimus (AA II-1, 34). 
  
                                                          
ejus methodi tantum propositum amo; nam cum in rem praesentem ventum est, ab illa severitate prorsus 
remisit, et ad Hypotheses quasdam miras ex abrupto delapsus est” (AA II-1, 24-25). 
95 As I already recalled in this passage of Leibniz's letter to Thomasius where the possibility of harmonizing 
Aristotle, the reference to Guericke and Boyle and the idea that for Hobbes and Leibniz the existence of 
void and its negation are both acceptable theories are found: "Quare dicere non vereor plura me probare in 
libris Aristotelis […] quam in meditationibus Cartesii; tantum abest, ut Cartesianus sim. Imo ausim addere 
totos illos octo libros, salva philosophia reformata ferri posse. Qua ratione illis ipso facto occurretur, quae 
tu, Vir clarissime de Aristotele irreconciliabili disputas. Quae Aristoteles enim de materia, forma, 
privatione, natura, loco, infinito, tempore, motu, ratiocinatur, pleraque certa et demonstrata sunt, hoc uno 
fere demto, quae de impossibilitate vacui, et motus in vacuo asserit. Mihi enim neque vacuum neque plenum 
necessarium esse, utroque modo rerum natura explicari posse videtur. Pro vacuo pugnant Gilbertus, 
Gassendus, Gerickius; pro pleno, Cartesius, Digbaeus, Thomas Anglus, Clerk in libro de plenitudine mundi. 
Pro possibilitate utriusque Thomas Hobbes, et Robertus Boylius. Et fateor, difficulter quidem, posse tamen 
sine vacuo rerum rarefactiones explicari". (AA II-1, 25). 
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According to Leibniz, Epicurus admitted atoms that have motion towards a specific 
direction (downwards), making his philosophy unsuitable for the ascension to the prime 
mover. The confutation of this hypothesis rests in Leibniz as much as in Weigel on 
conceiving an alternate situation in which bodies are not subject of any other force, 
arguing that there is no apparent reason why that body should move downwards and not 
in any other direction. As I already noticed, a very similar argument is found in Hobbes’ 
De corpore, but some details of Leibniz’s argument suggest that it was nonetheless 
adopted from Weigel.  Weigel and Leibniz’s version in fact develops in a slightly different 
way: their conclusion is that in the ideal situation the direction of one body’s movement 
is indifferent, while in Hobbes’ version the reason why a specific direction would be 
unacceptable, if not ascribed to the action of an external body, is that admitting this means 
allowing one body to have the possibility in itself to actually move in all directions, which 
is contradictory.  It is the same argument, but one is based on the idea that there is no 
reason for one body to do so, while the other is based on the idea that, if we accept that 
there is a reason, then that body could do so in all directions, all at once and at the same 
time. 
Another similarity with Weigel’s take on the problem is the direction chosen: while in 
Hobbes the argument is presented for any possible direction, both in Leibniz and Weigel’s 
school the bodies analysed move downwards. At first glance, this result does not seem 
particularly relevant, but the common direction could suggest that Epicurus’ atoms and 
bodies characterized by gravity have a common background in Weigel’s school. In this 
regard, Dörffel’s Exercitatio contains an important passage that connects bodies affected 
to gravity to atoms and to the prime mover, ultimate goal of Leibniz’s letter. Dörffel 
argues that regarding the principle of the motion of objects subject to gravity, there are 
two fundamental and opposite theories, i.e. the one that maintains an internal principle 
and the one that maintains an external one. Predictably, Dörffel writes that Peripatetics 
support the first one, adding that this natural tendency was given by God in his role of 
prime mover since the very beginning96. However, he also suggests that the same theory 
                                                          
96 “De ipso Motus hujus Gravium principio quaedam praemittamus notissimum est opinionum bivium, dum 
principium illud vel internum ipsis Corporib. vel externu constituunt Autores. Ex illis primo nominandi 
sunt Peripatetici […] ab immobili Motore, DEO T. O. M. primitus pro radicali proprietate ad finem sibi 
praestitutum concreatam” (Weigel-Dörffel 1663, Sectio III, §3). It is rather interesting that here the first 
theory is ascribed to Peripatetics, without a direct mention of Aristotle or a reference to his works, very 
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is implicitly held by the atomists: “Fovent vero hanc sententiam tacite, qui Epicuraeorum 
veterum, Democriti imprimis, doctrinam (quam interpolavit hodie P. Gassendus) 
sequuntur”97. It is very likely then that once in Jena, the young Leibniz, already following 
Gassendi on atoms as we saw in the Disputatio metaphysica’s corollaries, was 
encouraged by Weigel to separate the usefulness of antitypy from the contradictory thesis 
of an intrinsic tendency, favouring instead Hobbes’ solution. 
If the context of Leibniz’s letter to Thomasius is highly influenced by Jena’s cultural 
background, then a confrontation with Weigel also on the topic of primary matter is 
justified. I already sketched Leibniz's definition of primary matter: it is characterised by 
extension and antitypy. Antitypy is the requisite for motion, because impenetrability 
makes a coherent study of collisions possible, while extension is a property given to 
matter simply because it fills space. There is a distinction in Leibniz then between 
extension attributed to matter and space: space is prior to matter, since matter fills an 
already existing space, and it is the origin of matter's extension, because being extended 
and being in space are one and the same thing98. It follows that from the point of view of 
the object space, extension, impenetrability and matter are in the same place, yet 
conceivably different, but from a genetic perspective space and extension precede matter. 
Matter then, strictly speaking, does not possess extension intrinsically, because extension 
is a consequence of its truly unique property, that is the possibility of filling a space. The 
term “impletionem”, used by Leibniz in his Phoranomus recalling the early years, 
exemplifies in fact the union of the terms extension and impenetrability and it has the 
same meaning of the verb “replet” used in the definition of primary matter given in the 
letter to Thomasius. 
The same idea on matter is expressed by Weigel in his Analysis aristotelica. The 
concept of matter is analysed in the third section, in the chapter entitled De Philosophia 
Mathematica, between the chapter on first philosophy and the one on natural philosophy. 
Interestingly then, primary matter is placed on a middle ground between pure metaphysics 
and physics. In this chapter Weigel describes the first two summa genera, that are space 
and matter. Space is also called intelligible matter, while matter strictly speaking is also 
                                                          
common elsewhere. The author that argues for an external principle of gravity instead will be Descartes. 
Later in the passage it is also relevant Dörffel’s quote of Zabarella’s account.  
97 Ibid. 
98 "Extensum autem esse nihil aliud est, quam esse in spatio" (AA II-1, 36). 
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called sensible matter99. Space is at rest and it is defined as extensiva capacitate, 
capability of extension, while sensible matter is in motion and it is defined as extensiva 
repletione of space100, that is the act of filling space. In order to describe the relation 
between space and sensible matter Weigel adopts the tools previously introduced: from 
the point of view of the object there is a superposition between matter and space, while 
from the genetic point of view both space and sensible matter emanate properties, 
extension and continuity regarding space and discernibility regarding sensible matter, that 
are, so to speak, bound to their very existence101. The outcome of this distinction in 
Weigel bears an important consequence: 
 
Illa [space, intelligible matter] porro pro conceptu suae naturae proprio sibi 
vendicat Capacitatem s. receptivitatem alius absque sui disruptione, quam 
Philosophi dicunt penetrationem dimensionum ; haec [sensible matter] 
Repletivitatem sibi servat propriam, & a receptivitate alius de sua substantia 
absque partium disruptione nimirum quantum abhorret, atque ita 
penetrationem suorum corporum, quantum in se est, non admittit (Weigel 
1658, 186). 
 
The negation of dimensions' penetration found in the Theses philosophico-mathematicae 
of Weigel's school then has to be reinterpreted as a shortened version of a much more 
complex theory: space defined as capacity in fact allows the penetration of dimensions. 
The interesting outcome however is that the explanation of the possibility of penetration 
is not based on a sheer reflection on the nature of geometry, but it is connected with the 
other principle on the ground of physics. If in fact space has to be filled, then allowing 
the penetration of its dimensions is only natural, because the very idea of filling implies 
                                                          
99 "Prius illud (ut ad rem proprius accedamus) Spatium latini dicunt, Aristoteles materiam intelligibilem 
vocat, eo quod mente tantum non sensu percipiatur : posterius hoc Materiam absolute vocant Philosophi, 
sed distinctionis gratia materiam sensibilem dixerunt veteres" (Weigel 1658, 185). 
100 "Illa materia, ceu diximus, immobilis est, & extensiva capacitate nude sic concepta constituitur; haec uti 
dictum, mobilis est, & in extensiva repletione spatii sibi respondentis, si praecise spectetur, consistit" 
(Weigel 1658, 185-186). 
101 "Utraq; materia semper conjunctam sibi habet, aut affectionis s. proprietatis instar ex naturae comunis 
primo conceptu (extensione, continuitate) velut emanare facit divisibilitatem […] sed haec, nempe 
sensibilis, eam accedente formali suae naturae conditione (mobilitate) in discerptibilitatem, s. 
dissociabilitatem commutat, a qua prior illa prorsus aliena est" (Weigel 1658, 186).  
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the penetration. If this possibility was not given, intelligible matter and sensible matter 
would basically coincide. This outcome however does not rule out completely the 
penetration's negation, because that is reintroduced thanks to sensible matter. Weigel's 
Repletivitatem, that is no other than Leibniz's Impletionem, grants this possibility, because 
the act of filling brings coextension. It follows that, even if sensible matter can be 
separated, it happens to be separated at the same time and in the same place for the same 
objects. Even when these object are conceived in space through geometry then, being tied 
to sensible bodies that never penetrate, also their shapes won't ever happen to penetrate. 
There is a difference however between Leibniz and Weigel, because Leibniz feels the 
need of adding antitypy, while antitypy is never mentioned by Weigel. This is probably 
the result of Leibniz's reflection on the inconsistencies of Weigel's argument: the two 
principles, space and sensible matter, are presented in Weigel as if they are already 
determined in such a way, but this is not a feasible explanation for their difference, 
because, if the dimensions' penetration is admitted unlike Descartes, they are both 
described through extension while possessing opposite properties. In other words, we still 
need a principle that states the impossibility of penetration, that is antitypy. Perhaps 
interpreting Weigel's Repletivitatem as antitypy, or as something that has more or less the 
same function, is possible, but in this occasion and in these years Leibniz felt the need of 
adding the term antitypy adopted from Gassendi to effectively stress the difference 
between space and matter. 
The other major difference between space and sensible matter found in Weigel is that 
space is conceived at rest and sensible matter is constantly in motion. Regarding motion 
alone, Weigel is very close to Leibniz's attempt of introducing God as the prime mover: 
intelligible matter is at rest but, Weigel specifies, it is not moving something else while 
being still, otherwise it would be the prime mover. Sensible matter on the other hand is 
constantly in motion, but movement was given to it by something else in motion, forcing 
sensible matter to do the same and transmit motion102. In this line of thought then, the 
exclusion of a function similar to that of the prime mover for both principles prepares for 
God's necessary existence. 
                                                          
102 "Illa [intelligible matter] ut de se immobilis est, ita movere quippiam ipsa non potest (solus enim Deus 
immobilis est motor) […] Haec [sensible matter], ut ipsa mobilis est, ita motu recepto stantes alioquin sui 
partes alias simul movere potest" (Weigel 1658, 186). 
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A part from the role of God, the distinction between motion and rest is interesting in 
itself. Weigel's argument is based on a strong dichotomy between space and sensible 
matter that influences this topic as well: some properties that belong to space will belong 
to a world conceived in stillness, while other properties pertaining sensible matter will be 
conceivable only in motion. As a result, space and stillness involve geometry as a whole, 
i.e. lines, shapes quantity and quality: 
 
Illa [space], si abstracte spectetur, de se indeterminata est, sed certis a parte 
rei semper determinatur formis, mente seorsim conceptibilibus, Linea, 
Superficie, Corpore (puta mathematico) certisque stipatur modis, ut sunt, 
quantitates, v.g. tripedalitas, & qualitates, v.g. curvitas, rectitude, 
parallelism., angularitas, figuratio, congruential quibus in plures species 
dispescitur immobilis haec & orta Substantia (Weigel 1658, 186). 
 
This is the first time in which we witness a distinctive connection between the problems 
faced in physics by Weigel and Leibniz and some fundamental concepts of their analysis 
situs. Quality and quantity are extremely important regarding this topic and I will not fail 
to analyse them in the next part of the present work, but for now some remarks could still 
be made: quality and quantity belongs to a description of a world at rest and they are 
entities conceivable by our minds. Given the fact that Weigel adopts the principle of 
contradiction in a way similar to that of Leibniz, so that conceivability, possibility and 
being non contradictory are one and the same thing, this is the first hint to a possible way 
of reconciling the foundational attitude of Leibniz's analysis situs with his claims on the 
possibility of deriving the whole of mathematics on the principle of contradiction. 
Undoubtedly, quantity and quality belong to a vision of the world that sets itself apart 
from the description that involve real bodies, i.e. hard bodies having the ability of filling 
space. It follows that moving bodies have their own properties, leading us to the very first 
definition of primary matter found in Weigel:  
 
Haec [sensible matter] eodem modo de se indeterminata est (materia prima 
dicta) sed spatio coextensa, preaterquam quod formas illas quasi genericas & 
fundamentales participet, iisque a parte rei nunquam non similiter 
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determinetur, etiam superaddita propriae naturae conditione (mobilitate) 
plures adhuc admittit differentias quasi specificas, quibus in mille formas 
ulteriores abit Substantia mobilis (Weigel 1658, 186-187). 
 
Even if sensible matter shares spatial properties because of its coextension with space, its 
unique characteristic is that of transforming through motion. Primary matter then is no 
other than sensitive matter considered as something undetermined, that is only for its 
property of filling space without taking into account motion. The relationship between 
primary matter and motion is not always clear in Weigel, but there is no denying that its 
definition is the same used by Leibniz: "praecise spectate (materiam primam vocavit 
Aristoteles) […] consistit in extensione repletiva mobili, h.e. in substantiali habentia 
partium extra partes, quibus sibi respondens & aequale spatium replet"103  In this regard, 
intelligible matter and sensitive matter are almost the same, because depriving sensitive 
matter of motion means conceiving it only as a continuum coextended with space. It is 
the ideal starting point of what by means of motion and transformation will be the world 
that we perceive, full of different shapes.  
The same reasoning is present in Leibniz's letter to Thomasius. I will examine now 
some quotes of this letter in order to show the strong resemblance between the Leibniz's 
and Weigel's theory. Leibniz contemplates two distinct aspects in the description of the 
world, that are primary matter conceived without motion and bodies described when 
motion becomes one of its properties. Primary matter fills the world being at rest, meaning 
that the ideal starting point at the beginning of the world is a homogeneous situation: 
 
Haec jam massa continua mundum replens, dum omnes ejus partes quiescunt, 
materia prima est, ex qua omnia per motum fiunt, et in quam per quietem 
resolvuntur. Est enim in ea mera homogeneitas, nulla diversitas nisi per 
motum (AA II-1, 26). 
 
The result is one of the most important ideas that Leibniz took from Weigel: heterogeneity 
founded in homogeneity by means of motion. Ideally, tracing back motion following lines 
and shapes generated from it, we could reach that starting situation in which motion is 
                                                          
103 Weigel (1658, 193). Later in the same passage extension is introduced "uti materia cum spatio coincidit", 
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not inhering bodies and matter is truly considered as a primary and homogenous entity. 
In the same year of Leibniz's letter to Thomasius, Weigel writes in his Idea Matheseos 
Universae: 
 
Materia prima, tanquam subjectum ultimum, in quod omnia materialia, si 
continuo trasformata fuerint, ultimo resolvintur […] Hinc ut illa, nempe 
materia prima, subjectum trasformatorium ultimum est; ita spatium 
subjectum transformatorium ultimum dici potest: ut illa praecise fine forma 
suum sistit actum entitativum; ita spatium praecise fine contento (Vacuum104 
alias dicunt) puram ostendit essentiae suae rationem (Weigel 1669, 41). 
 
Although very similar, Leibniz slightly modifies Weigel's argument: it looks as if Weigel 
conceived in the end a real superposition between space and primary matter, when the 
latter is considered at rest, while Leibniz seems to maintain a distinction, founded 
probably on the addition of antitypy, something that implies a degree of reality sufficient 
in order to maintain the distinction between the two concepts. However, even in Leibniz’s 
writings we find a tension between primary matter constantly in motion and primary 
matter identified with space. For example, in a fragment entitled De materia prima, 
written between 1670 and 1671, Leibniz writes “His ego jam adjungo, materiam primam 
si quiescat esse nihil”, but just after this statement he adds that “Omnia esse plena, quia 
materia prima et spatium idem est”105. 
The view adopted by Leibniz entails also Weigel's difference between a sort of framed 
version of the world geometrically describable in its stillness, and the world in motion 
subject to transformations. As Leibniz specifies in his letter to Thomasius in fact, motion 
sets things apart, while rest grants homogeneity: 
 
Nec obstat, quod generatio fit in instanti, motus est successivus, nam 
generatio non est motus, sed finis motus, jam motus finis est in instanti, nam 
figura aliqua ultimo demum instanti motus producitur seu generatur, uti 
circulus extremo demum momento circumgyrationis producitur. Ex his etiam 
                                                          
104 This is a perfect example of Weigel's syncretism: he is not accepting void here, yet he accepts and adopts 
the similarities between different views. 
105 AA (VI-2, 280). 
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patet, cur forma substantialis consistat in indivisibili, nec recipiat magis aut 
minus. Etsi enim circulus circulo sit major, non tamen est circulus altero 
magis circulus, nam circuli essentia consistit in aequalitate linearum a centro 
ad circumferentiam ductarum, jam aequalitas consistit in indivisibili, nec 
recipit magis aut minus (AA II-1,29). 
 
Only when motion stops, or the world is considered without motion, shapes are generated. 
In explaining this, Leibniz shows that his metaphysics of space resembles that of Weigel, 
because shapes are conceived as qualitatively similar entities – no circle is more or a 
better circle than another one – and quantity is obtained through confrontation. 
Particularly interesting in fact is the connection between substantial forms, indivisibles 
and geometrical figures, because it favours the idea that figures and space can be 
considered as proper substances106. The way in which a substantial form is indivisible is 
the same in which figures possess some of their characteristics. In this regard, Leibniz's 
idea that one figure taken in itself cannot be augmented, yet it retains some intrinsic 
properties, preludes the distinction between quality and quantity. This conception of 
geometry explains some apparently obscure ideas found in Weigel's school, for example 
that "Linea non constituitur ex punctis, neque superficies ex lineis, neque corpus ex 
superficiebus107" or "Etiamsi plura puncta, plures lineas, pluresque superficies conjungas 
; nulla linea, nulla superficies, nullum corpus exinde componetur"108. The relation 
between a point and a line in fact cannot be explained by a mere sum of parts, but needs 
motion in order to gain continuity. Later in 1679 Leibniz will remind the same idea in his 
first letter to Weigel: "quemadmodum spatium ex punctis compositum intelligi non 
potest, ne quidem numero infinitis, ita nec tempus videtur componi ex instantibus"109. 
                                                          
106 "Figuram esse substantiam, aut potius spatium esse substantiam, figuram esse quiddam substantiale, 
probaverim quia omnis scientia sit de substantia, Geometria autem quin scientia sit negari non possit" (AA 
II-1, 30). 
107 Weigel-Vinhold (1671, 53) 
108 Weigel-Scheidlin (1665, Corollaria, I). 
109 AA (II-1, 748). In this regard, Leibniz also adopts Weigel's distinction between continuity emanated 
from intellective matter and discontinuity emanated from sensible matter, turning it in continuity as a 
property of primary matter: "Quantitatem quoque habet materia, sed interminatam, ut vocant Averroistae, 
seu indefinitam, dum enim continua est, in partes secta non est, ergo nec termini in ea actu dantur: extensio 
tamen, seu quantitas in ea datur: non de extrinsecis mundi seu totius massae, sed intrinsecis partium terminis 
loquor" (AA II-1, 26). In the same way, discontinuity follows matter in motion: "Sin vero ab initio continua 
est, necesse est, ut formae oriantur per motum (nam de annihilatione certarum partium ad vacuitates in 
materia procurandas, quia supra naturam est, non loquor) quia a motu divisio, a divisione termini partium, 
a terminis partium figurae earum, a figura formae, ergo a motu formae" (AA II-1,27). 
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However, the fact that there is a distinction between the creation and the development 
of geometrical figures does not mean that there is no connection between the geometrical 
world and the world in motion, because motion allows the creation of different shapes or 
figures, as Leibniz argues against Scholastics110: 
 
Sed si rem cogitemus accuratius, apparebit demonstrare eam ex causis. 
Demonstrat enim figuras ex motu: ex motu puncti fit linea, ex motu lineae 
superficies, ex motu superficiei corpus. Ex motu rectae super recta oritur 
rectilineum. Ex motu rectae circa punctum immotum oritur circulus, etc. 
Constructiones igitur figurarum sunt motus; jam ex constructionibus 
affectiones de figuris demonstrantur. Ergo ex motu, et per consequens a 
priori, et ex causa. Geometria igitur vera scientia est. Ergo non invito 
Aristotele subjectum ejus, nempe spatium, substantia erit. Neque vero adeo 
absurdum est, Geometriam agere de forma substantiali corporum (AA II-1, 
30-31). 
 
This idea of a geometrical creation through motion and it nature a priori is once again 
taken from Weigel's Analysis aristotelica. In this work Weigel makes the classical 
distinction between Natura naturans, God as an absolute, eternal, independent being, and 
Natura naturata, that is everything that depends in some way from God's existence. 
Natura naturata is further divided in order to account for two kind of dependency: a 
logical, a priori dependency and the one instead caused by the physical necessity that I 
examined in the previous section. In the first kind of subordination is found a similar 
approach to that of Leibniz: 
 
[The first kind of Natura naturata] purum & immutabilem, quem a divino 
Numine participavit, in causando semper exercet actum, immediate sub Deo 
consituta, quails est rerum metaphysicarum & geometricarum, Idearum puta, 
Numerorum & Figurarum, quarum ortus, generations & causations simplices 
puro quodam & velut continuato emanationis ab ipso Divino Numine 
                                                          
110 "Et vero tam abjecte de Mathematicis scholastici primum senserunt, omni conatu id agentes, ut ex 
perfectarum scientiarum numero Mathesin excluderent: eo praecipue argumento, quod non semper ex 
causis demonstret" (AA II-1, 30-31) 
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celebrantur actu (Linea formali fluxu puncta : Conus aeterna Trianguli 
conversione : Sphaera perpetua radiorum ex eodem puncto quaquaversum 
infinitorum egressione : Novenarius ternario in se formaliter ducto & c) 
(Weigel 1658, 147).  
 
In this passage, not only the idea of creation through motion in geometry, but the very 
idea that geometry, mathematics in general and metaphysics have a foundation a priori 
in God is defended. Weigel defines them in almost every work as notitiae nobiscum natae, 
suggesting the homogeneity between the human mind and the mind of God, at least 
regarding metaphysics and mathematics. The use of the word "emanation" in Weigel's 
terms suggests also a form of dependency of God from these entities that is very similar 
to what we find in Leibniz. This is one of the most important ideas in fact that Leibniz 
will adopt even when, on the ground of physics, his views will differ greatly from those 
of Weigel. Nevertheless, through physics these ideas concerning mathematics and 
metaphysics were successfully passed down to Leibniz in the early years. 
On a side note, the peculiar way in which substantial forms are considered and applied to 
the definition a priori of geometrical entities and Leibniz's claims against Scholastics 
suggest that arguing for a young Leibniz already in possession of some ideas of his mature 
theory should be carefully considered: it seems that at this point we are far from 
substantial forms as conceived by Leibniz in his mature philosophy. 
In conclusion, in the distinction between situations subject to motion and situations 
subject to rest lies then one of the most important result of Weigel's influence in Leibniz's 
philosophy of mathematics, hence the need of analysing Weigel's influence on his 
philosophy of nature. From his reflections on physics, Leibniz takes the idea of 
transformation as a tool used to connect homogeneity and heterogeneity. If the physical 
outcome is heterogeneity founded in homogeneity by means of motion, the mathematical 
outcome will be homogeneity founded in heterogeneity by means of transformation: the 
possibility of comparing homogeneous entities, like those found in geometry, is the 
starting point of Leibniz's attempts on the foundation of mathematics. 
 
The Final Outcome of Weigel's Influence in Physics At the beginning of this chapter I 
argued that the first two corollaries of Leibniz's Disputatio metaphysica show the first 
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documented influence of Weigel on Leibniz, while the writings around the time of the 
Hypothesis physica nova represent its peak, at least concerning the philosophy of nature. 
Now that many themes present in Leibniz were connected with Weigel and his school, I 
believe that showing this progressive adoption becomes easy. 
Regarding the first two corollaries – "Materia habet de se actum Entitativum" and 
"Non omnino improbabile est materiam et quantitatem esse realiter idem" –, while the 
first one is present in Weigel but it could be argued ideally for any author, since it simple 
states that matter has some form of existence, the second one is closer to Weigel's views. 
Just before the definition of primary matter as extensione repletiva mobili in fact, Weigel 
identifies two universal principles, ideas and numbers, that correspond in natural objects 
to the distinction between form and matter111. If, as I will argue in the next chapter, the 
following corollary on the essence of things as numbers can be easily connected with 
Weigel, then the idea of matter as quantity, shared by Leibniz and Weigel, gains a deeper 
meaning, because it becomes a way of conceiving essences as numbers and allowing their 
combinatorial description. Against Descartes, that as I showed ridiculed all these 
unnecessary differences, there is a precise distinction between quantity in itself, quantity 
ascribed to matter and magnitude. Weigel argues for a metaphysical priority of quantity, 
because things to which quantity is ascribed possess it only as an extrinsic property. It 
does not follow however that quantity is a mere accidental property of things: on the 
contrary, things are imperfect because they do not exhibit quantity in its essence. This 
distinction leads to the metaphysical distinctions found in Weigel: if metaphysics is the 
science of being in itself, arithmetics is the science of beings considered as numbers, 
while geometry is the science of quantity applied to extension, at rest and in motion112. 
The metaphysical reinterpretation of Hobbes' need of differentiating from Descartes, 
allowing a layered model in physics, bears then an important consequence in logic, 
because it allows the relational foundation and description of entities taken as universals 
(universal characteristics), quantified entities (foundation of arithmetics) and entities 
defined through quantification in space (analysis situs). This will be in Leibniz the final 
                                                          
111 "In Ente duo distinguntur principia quasi radicalia, formale unum ex qui resultant Idee ; alterum 
materiale quod comitantur Numeri ; sic Res naturales duobus absolvuntur principiis radicalibus h.e. 
constitutivis, quorum unum Materia dicitur ; alterum Forma vocatur" (Weigel 1658, 193). After the 
definition of primary matter, forms will be described by Weigel as ways by which we could conceive 
secondary qualities in natural bodies. 
112 Weigel (1658, 146). 
67 
 
outcome of that initial reception found in his Disputatio. Later during his early years, 
Leibniz will adopt these distinctions on quantity in one of the Theoria motus abstracti’s 
draft: “Extensio est Quantitas sumta cum positione partium (quo differt a Numero, qui est 
quantitas sine position (seu suppositione existentiae) partium, seu extensio est quantitas 
relata ad sensum; Numerus est quantitas relata ad intellectum)”113. 
With respect to the Hypothesis physica nova, I will add few remarks in order to show 
that this work could be seen as belonging to the same tradition of Weigel's dissertations. 
As I argued, Hobbes' conatus is adopted in the Theoria motus abstracti thanks to Weigel's 
idea of tendency, but at this point Leibniz is already well aware of the origin of this 
concept, favouring the reference to Hobbes. In the Theoria motus concreti however, many 
topics and ideas that we have already found in Weigel's school are present In Leibniz's 
analysis of what he calls "globo nostro Terr-aqu-aéreo114": the need of a foundation that 
begins with homogeneity and derives heterogeneity through motion115, the demonstration 
of air's heaviness and the reference to experimentalists116, the application of Hobbes' 
physics to a model that explains gravity in a mechanical fashion and a reflection on the 
direction of bodies subject to gravity117, the superposition between extension and other 
properties and the idea of filling space118 and many others. 
Consistent with this background is also Leibniz's 1671 Summa hypotheseos physicae 
novae, where the reference to Weigel's school is very clear with respect to Galileo: 
                                                          
113 AA (VI-2, 167). 
114 AA (VI-2, 226). 
115 "Supponatur autem globus terrestris initio fuisse totus homogeneus, atque ita neque tam rarus, ut aer est, 
naeque tam crassus, ut terra est sed […] naturae ad aquam accedentis" (AA VI-2, 224). But also: 
"Supponantur initio Globus Solaris, Globus Terrestris, et spatium intermedium, massa, quod ad Hypothesin 
nostram attinet, quiescente, quam aetherem vocabimus, quantum satis est […] plenum" (AA VI-2, 223). 
116 "Aër nil nisi aqua subtilis est: Aërem enim in eo ab aethere distinguo, quod aër est gravis aether 
circulatione sua causa gravitatis" (AA VI-2, 224). A reference to Boyle is also present: "Ex doctissimi 
Boylii at aliorum observationibus supponamus, aërem esse aqua millies leviorem" (AA VI-2, 233). 
117 "Gravitas oritur ex circulatione aetheris circa terram, in terra, per terram" (AA VI-2, 227). "Cum 
ostensum sit in abstracta motus Theoria, pleraque repercussionum phaenomena non oriri ex liquidis motus 
notionibus, sed habere longe alias ab oeconomia et motu systematis insensibili causas, quemadmodum 
gravitas, attractio […] speciatim vero baculus aquam ideo secum commovet, quia ea ei gravitate sua atque 
intestino motu innititur; quod de aethere dici non potest [...] cum liquida nostra jam tum, etiam remoto 
baculo, sint in perpetuo motu" (AA VI-2, 224). "Contra naturalem gravitatem sursum levatarum" (AA VI-
2, 235). "Cum enim turbet circulationem, expellentur; non sursum […] (superficies sphaericae crescunt in 
duplicata ratione diametrorum, non in eadem cum diametris ratione; ac proinde sectionum quoque in idem 
corpus agentium inaequalitas major evenit) ergo deorsum; id est, descendent" (AA VI-2, 228). 
118 "Triplex constructio est: Geometrica, id est imaginaria, sed exacta; Mechanica, id est realis, sed non 
exacta; et Physica, id est realis et exacta" (AA VI-2, 270). As in Weigel's dissertations tendency is attributed 
to the last division, later in this passage Leibniz connects Physics to the concept of Nisus, term that, as we 
saw, was used in Weigel's Pantologia as a substitute for tendency. As for the idea of filling: "Ut recte docuit 
cum Cartesio Hobbius, eandem molem plus minusve spatii implere non posse" (AA VI-2, 247) 
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Primus de motuum compositionibus digne philosophatus est Galilaeus […] 
Gravitas est conatus corporis alicuius quantum sentiri potest spontaneus 
versus centrum terrae, eum autem ab aetheris Turbantia removere conantis 
pressione oriri […] Si conatus novus esset semper aequalis primo, 
acceleraretur motus in ea ratione, quae est numerorum quadratorum deinceps 
ab unitate, ut demonstartum est a Galilaeo (AA VI-2, 333-349). 
 
As I've shown, the ideas that motion is a composition and gravity is a conatus that let the 
body accelerate following the Galilean rule impares ab unitate were debated extensively 
in Weigel's school, suggesting again Leibniz derivative knowledge in this regard. 
In conclusion, Leibniz's bullae119, introduced in the Hypothesis physica nova, could 
be seen as the perfect realization of Weigel's syncretistic efforts. They are not atoms, 
because they are created through a mechanical process, yet they maintain the structure of 
atoms. They are born from a homogeneous context, yet they explain gravity through a 
mechanical account120. Recalling then the appreciation of Leibniz's Hypothesis found in 
Weigel's Pantologia it does not sound surprising that Leibniz's bullae are conceived in 
Weigel's work as the last form of corporeal bodies, the first one being primary matter121. 
Many of these views will be abandoned by Leibniz, but they were nonetheless 
fundamental for Leibniz's adoption of Weigel's philosophy of mathematics. The idea of 
mathematical homogeneity however is combined in Leibniz's foundational efforts with 
the importance of the principle of contradiction. I will show now how its adoption 
depended also on Weigel and how some connections could be made with his 
advancements in physics. 
                                                          
119 "Hae jam bullae sunt semina rerum, stamina specierum, receptacula aetheris, corporum basis, 
consistentiae causa et fundamentum tantae varietatis, quantam in rebus, tanti impetus, quantum in motibus 
admiramur" (AA VI-2, 223) 
120 As Bussotti (2015, 79) explains, while air is considered as a heavy body, Leibniz still adopts here a 
concept of levitas, applied however to aether. This is not a claim completely against Weigel's tradition, 
because the writings concerning air's heaviness argues against levitas ascribed to this particular element. A 
further act of syncretism, reintroducing the Aristotelian levitas would have been cherished by Weigel as 
well. The fact that this peculiar quality is ascribed to aether is nonetheless interesting: if we combine this 
fact with aether's property of permeating bodies and with the idea of homogeneity that is somehow 
connected to aether, we could argue that this element is in Leibniz's mind very close to his idea of primary 
matter. Although evidences are scarce in order to prove a specific connection, perhaps aether was conceived 
as the first actual and physical entity in motion, coming into being just after that ideal situation in which 
primary matter consists in the simple act of filling space. 
121 Weigel (1673c, 39, 40). 
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1.4 Modal Logic and Existential Coherence 
 
The State of Contradiction Before Leibniz and Weigel's Contribution to Its Adoption In 
my analysis of Leibniz's correspondence between 1663 and 1671 I hypothesized Leibniz's 
estrangement towards Jena's cultural circle after 1671, deriving it from the fact that 
contacts with Weigel's acquaintances begin to soften. It is true that some of them, like 
Conring, will remain, but we do not find many direct references to Weigel. This outcome 
is not surprising and it does not refute the standard interpretation that nowadays ascribes 
to the Parisian stay a turning point in the development of Leibniz's philosophy, mostly 
based on his mathematical studies. Aside from mathematics however, Leibniz's 
development is also evident in almost every other topic, the Confessio philosophi being a 
relevant example on the ground of modal logic and the theological problem of 
predestination. In this work, we find many theories that recall Leibniz's mature writings, 
from the idea of harmony, the problem of evil and reality conceived as series rerum to 
the analysis of hypothetical syllogisms and the problem of individuation. Many of these 
ideas are not completely equivalent to their mature counterparts, e.g. the identity of 
indiscernibles still allows the difference solo numero or the series of things are not 
expressed through possible worlds, but the similarities are undoubtedly more than the 
ones found in Leibniz's earlier writings before Paris. 
While identifying then the Parisian stay with a moment of discontinuity in the 
development of Leibniz's thought is important and reasonable, I believe that 
understanding what kind of concepts were taken from Leibniz's reflection before Paris 
and in which way they survived and adapted to the new background is important as well. 
There is no denying in fact that some fundamental ideas were adopted by Leibniz just 
before Paris. In this regard, his Confessio philosophi becomes extremely relevant, 
because, being a work written at the beginning of Leibniz's stay between 1672 and 1673, 
it could be seen as the ideal bridge between the two periods. More specifically, my aim 
would be that of following the adoption of the three essential ideas that will constitute at 
a later time Leibniz's foundational approach to mathematics: the principle of 
contradiction, the principle by which the whole is always greater than its parts and the 
concept of homogeneity founded in the distinction and combination between quality and 
quantity. 
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As for the last idea, I already highlighted the importance of Weigel's cultural influence 
on the ground of physics. The distinction between motion and rest in the description of 
primary matter could be seen as an important contribution in the adoption of 
homogeneity: if matter is described through quantity and motion, it follows that the world 
conceived at rest possesses different properties from those derived by these two concepts. 
Since the properties of objects considered at rest are connected to geometrical entities that 
are averse from a description based on quantity alone, they could be seen as possessing 
intrinsic qualities that do not follow from quantification or motion. On the other hand, 
quantification could be identified with matter, but its concept is separated from that of 
matter and constitutes a superior metaphysical level that does not derive from physics 
alone. In the next part of the present work I will show that these distinctions have a precise 
correspondence, both in Weigel and in Leibniz, with respect to mathematics. However, 
their adoption is also relevant for the present part, because it represents the perfect 
example of concepts endorsed before Paris but used in a different context and, specifically 
in this case, throughout Leibniz's life. Identifying these references is not simple, because 
the strict distinction between rest and motion is clearly against Leibniz's further 
development of his law of continuity and his idea that rest could be interpreted as a 
specific case of motion, yet we had to ignore the final outcome in the specific topic in 
order to cast some light on Leibniz's early years and identify a relevant consequence for 
his mature theory on a different topic. 
Things are much easier regarding the principle by which the whole is greater than its 
parts: Leibniz clearly adopts it from Hobbes, even if I tried to point out that Hobbes' 
influence should be inserted in a context, such that of Weigel's school, where his ideas 
had a decisive metaphysical development that involved principles taken from other 
philosophers. Leibniz's openly states many times122 that Hobbes recognized the 
importance of the principle of the whole, plus this is the first principle, among these three, 
that is expressly connected from the very beginning of Leibniz's reflections with 
foundational attempts in mathematics. While in the Theoria motus abstracti we find that 
                                                          
122 “Totum esse maius parte, primus demonstravit Hobbius, fundamentum Scientiae de Quantitate. Nihil 
esse sine ratione, ego quod sciam primus demonstravi fundamentum scientiarum de mente et motu” (AA 
VI-2, 48). 
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the whole of geometry could be derived from this principle123, the Confessio philosophi 
expresses the same idea and it extends it to arithmetics: "enim totum esse majus parte, 
Arithmeticae et Geometriae, scientiarum de quantitate, principium est"124. Physics and 
morality instead are founded on the principle of sufficient reason, one of the few 
principles that Leibniz recognises as his genuine discovery.  
About the novelty of Leibniz's position, I believe that the unique development of his 
philosophy of mathematics does not depend on the original adoption of these principles, 
but in how he combined them in order to obtain a completely different theory. Upon 
further inspection, the way in which these principles are connected by Leibniz will reveal 
their hierarchy, suggesting a priority of the principle of contradiction. This principle in 
fact is the only one needed in order to prove a priori the principle by which the whole is 
always greater than its parts. Homogeneity comes at a later time, as a tool developed to 
build from few entities every mathematical object. It is in the development of this 
structured theory that Leibniz emerges as a true and original thinker and probably one of 
the first men that offered a feasible account of a logical foundation of arithmetics, not 
only on paper with bold claims, but developing a concrete method never seen before.  
Given these premises, the adoption of the principle of contradiction becomes a crucial 
topic, but understanding the dynamics behind this process is not as simple as for Hobbes' 
principle of the whole. A simplified approach on this matter would easily dismiss the 
problem by pointing out that, starting from Paris, Leibniz revaluates the principle of 
contradiction, simply because he discovers his usefulness in explaining some problems 
pertaining contingency and the existence of evil in a world created by God. He in fact 
introduces it in the definition of modal concepts, such as possibility, contingency,  
necessity and impossibility: "Necessarium ergo illud vocabo, cuius oppositum implicat 
contradictionem, seu intelligi clare non potest"125. From this definition Leibniz derives 
contingency as something that is not necessary, possibility as something non-
contradictory and impossibility as something that is not possible. The law of contradiction 
then is used as a rule in order to evaluate any possible modal statement. Even more, it 
                                                          
123 “Non facile alioquin in tota Geometria aut phoronomica occurrit: cum ergo caetera omnia pendeant ex 
principio illo, totum esse majus parte, quaeque alia sola additione et subtractione absolvenda Euclides 
praefixit Elementis […]” (AA VI-2, 268). 
124 AA (VI-3, 118). 
125 AA (VI-3, 126). 
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establishes a form of homogeneity between things that are possible in themselves, i.e. that 
follow the principle of contradiction, and the possibility for us to conceive them. 
This definition of modal operators then leads to a consequent revaluation of 
Scholastics, because it is universally acknowledge that the use of the principle of 
contradiction in order to define modal concepts in this way derives mainly from Suárez's 
interpretation of Thomas Aquinas126: the definition of possibility as something non 
contradictory, or necessity as something for which its opposite leads to contradiction in 
fact was very common and universally accepted at the time of Leibniz's Confessio.  
This theory however cannot be ascribed directly to Aristotle, even if Scholastics tried 
to do so in order to benefit his authority,  because he more often conceived modality using 
a statistical account, i.e. believing that necessity is ascribable to any state of affairs that 
is always true, impossibility to any state of affairs that is always false and possibility to 
any state of affairs that is at times true and false127. It follows that Aristotle's approach is 
against any possible connection between the idea of contradiction used in modal logic 
and the same idea used in order to define the universal principles in the foundation of 
mathematics: in a statistical account there is no distinction between something that 
happens to be always true and something that is always true because from its intrinsic 
structure follows that the opposite would be contradictory. Even if it is always true that 
the sun always sets it seems to us that this necessity possesses a degree of certainty that 
is different from that of other statements on purely logical or mathematical entities. Such 
account then does not allow a clear distinction derived from the idea of contingency and 
this outcome reduces the importance of something like mathematical entities that could 
be conceived as necessary, even if the whole world would disappear, placing them instead 
on the same ground of any entity of that world. 
The fact that before Paris Weigel is always connected with Leibniz's revaluation of 
Aristotle in the light of the moderns and with a form of controversy against Scholastics, 
                                                          
126 In Thomas Aquinas' Summa for example, he uses them in order to define God's omnipotence: 
"Relinquitur igitur quod Deus dicatur omnipotens, quia potest omnia possibilia absolute, quod est alter 
modus dicendi possibile. Dicitur autem aliquid possibile vel impossibile absolute, ex habitudine 
terminorum, possibile quidem, quia praedicatum non repugnat subiecto, ut Socratem sedere; impossibile 
vero absolute, quia praedicatum repugnat subiecto, ut homine esse asinum [...] Hoc igitur repugnat rationi 
possibilis absoluti, quod subditur divinae omnipotentiae, quod implicat in se esse et non esse simul [...] 
quaecumque igitur contradictionem non implicant, sub illis possibilibus continentur, respectu quorum 
dicitur Deus omnipotens" (Thomas 1989, 4, 327). 
127 On this topic in Aristotle see Crivelli (2004, 60). For the evolution of the problem of future contingents 
and divine foreknowledge see Craig (1988). 
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plus the fact that in Paris we witness the definitive revaluation of the Scholastics' concept 
of modality, would lead to the conclusion then that in Paris one of the most important 
signs of Leibniz's discontinuity with his past concerns his adoption of modality. However, 
as I will show, Leibniz's adoption of the principle of contradiction in the definition of 
possibility happens before Paris and it is connected with a harsh critic of the Scolastics' 
terminology in this specific matter. From this fact an apparent contradiction emerges: if 
we admit the Scholastics' influence on Leibniz on this topic before Paris we have to deal 
with an image of Leibniz highly influenced by Hobbes and Gassendi, often arguing 
against Scholastics, which is not compatible with a naïve adoption of Scholastic 
principles, while resorting to a later influence during the Parisian period would 
completely ignore the fact that the principle of contradiction was used before that time. 
Ignoring the Scholastics' influence is not possible as well, because the way in which 
Suárez deals with the problem of necessity and the way in which he connects it to 
universal principles in mathematics is too similar to that of Leibniz to be easily dismissed. 
Another possible solution would be that of arguing for an autonomous revaluation of 
the principle before Paris, maintaining a kind of distance from the Scholastics' 
background and at the same time Leibniz's awareness on the origin of the principle from 
that background. This is clearly the most reasonable hypothesis, but it does not follow 
very well from the premises of Leibniz's early years, thus it needs to be thoughtfully 
analysed. The reason of this inconsistency is that for example Gassendi and Hobbes have 
not only a definition of necessity that is not founded on the principle of contradiction but 
also a distinct aversion to that definition used in Schools. In his Syntagma Philosophicum, 
Gassendi is very clear on the definition of necessity: "Necessitatem nihil esse aliud […] 
quam lationem, percussionem, repercussionem materia, hoc est, atomorum, quae materia 
sunt rerum"128. He is distinctly interpreting necessity as a consequence of truths derived 
from physics, dismissing an approach that defines at first the absolute concept of necessity 
in logical terms and then eventually applies it to the physical world. For these reasons, 
Gassendi questions the Scholastics' concept of modality derived from their peculiar 
interpretation of Aristotle's De Interpretatione: if necessity or possibility are modes 
applied to propositions, then there is no sufficient reason in order to restrict the number 
of modes to those traditionally ascribed to modal logic, that are necessity, impossibility, 
                                                          
128 Gassendi (1964, 834). 
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possibility and contingency129. If any possible adverb or even word could be a mode, then 
a definition of necessity based on this distinction, while apparently placed at a higher 
metaphysical level than that of Gassendi, is actually not as effective as resorting to atoms 
and collisions. 
Hobbes draws the same conclusions from different premises. In his De corpore, he 
exhibits a statistical account of modality, close to that of Aristotle, interpreted without 
Scholastics' influences. For examples Hobbes defines impossibility as follows: "Porro 
quod neque est neque fuit neque erit, neque esse potest, nomen tamen habebit, hoc ipsum 
scilicet quod neque est, neque fuit, etc. vel brevius hoc impossibile"130. Later in this work, 
the statistical account is complemented by a theory that connects modality with the 
possibility of predication:  
 
[Propositio] Necessaria est, quando nulla res concipi potest sive fingi ullo 
tempore, cujus nomen sit subjectum, quin ejusdem nomen sit etiam 
praedicatum. Ut Homo est animal necessaria propositio est, quia quocunque 
tempore supponimus rei alicui convenire nomen homo, eidem rei conveniet 
quoque nomen animal. Contingens vero est, quae modo vera, modo falsa esse 
potest ut Omnis corvus est niger; hodie quidem contingere potest, ut sit vera, 
alio tempore, ut sit falsa. Rursus in omni propositione necessaria praedicatum 
vel aequivalet subjecto ut in hac Homo est animal rationale, vel pars 
aequivalentis est ut in hac Homo est animal (Hobbes 1999, 37). 
 
This is by far one of the most relevant differences between Hobbes and Leibniz in logic: 
while the connection between subject and predicate hints at a possible resemblance, the 
statistical account openly negates it. Hobbes' reference to a temporal dimension that 
                                                          
129 "Jam in libris DE INTERPRETATIONE, insignis est prae caeteris insufficientia illius partitionis Modorum, 
ex quibus propositiones Modales appellatae sunt. Illos nempe, ex vulgari etiam Interpretatione, limitat ad 
quatuor, Necessarium, Impossibile, Possibile, Contingens. Quaeso vero qua ratione assignare plures non 
liceat? Si modus est, qui modificat propositionem, hoc est, indicat quomodo praedicatum insit subjecto: an-
non omnia adjectiva pari jure possunt esse modi? Certe ut illa propositio dicitur Modalis, Necessarium est 
hominem esse animal, itemque illa, Contingens est Socratem sedere; ita profecto et istae Modales dicendae 
sunt, Honestum est hominem esse virtutis studiosum; Utile est hominem esse ad laborem impigrum; Justum 
est filium esse Patri obsequentem: Pulchrum est pro patria mori; Bonum est nos hic esse, &c. Quae potior 
enim ratio est, dum serio adverteris? Praetereo non illi solum sumptis adverbialiter, sed adverbiis etiam 
caeteris id muneris convenire, ut modum significationis addant, ac proinde propositiones Modales efficiant" 
(Gassendi 1964, 117). 
130 Hobbes (1999, 22). 
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shows how a man would always be an animal is decisive, because it reveals that he was 
not conceiving a clear distinction between necessary entities and entities that are true for 
any given time. Putting it in Weigel's terms, it is as if even in logic Hobbes allowed that 
peculiar necessity ascribed to physics. In that context, con-necessitas, that is the idea 
shared by Weigel and Hobbes that for some entities if one entity exists then it 
automatically brings together another entity, was the strongest form of necessity. Fire and 
heat in fact are connected in a way that resembles the connection between a proposition 
and its truth – a necessary proposition is a proposition connected with truth for any given 
time –, but this is not a complete account on necessity, because absolute necessity is not 
explainable from these premises. This does not mean however that Hobbes was not a 
necessitist, because his determinism was way stronger than that of the Scholastics. It 
simply means that the deterministic relationship between cause and effect had a stronger 
role than the ideal and logical principles in arguing for the necessity of things. 
This incompleteness in the explanation of necessity could be seen as one of the few 
cases where Scholastics possessed a more advanced theory on the ground of logic, but it 
was possible only by endorsing the principle of contradiction as a truly universal principle 
applicable also to real objects. According to Hobbes this is impossible, because of his 
plusquam nominalis approach: necessity makes sense only in a context made of words 
and propositions, but predicating it about real entities is impossible131. The result is a 
predictable reinterpretation of those principle that were founding Scholastics' modality: 
 
Nomen autem positivum et negativum contradictoria inter se sunt, ita ut 
ejusdem rei nomina ambo esse non possint. Praeterea contradictoriorum 
nominum alterum quidem cujuslibet rei nomen est. Quicquid enim est, vel 
homo est vel non-homo, album vel non album, et sic de caeteris. Quod quidem 
manifestius est, quam ut probari aut explicari amplius debeat. Nam qui hoc 
sic enuntiant Idem non potest esse et non esse, obscure: qui vero sic Quicquid 
est, vel est vel non est, etiam absurde et ridicule loquuntur. Hujus axiomatis 
certitudo, nimirum Duorum nominum contradictoriorum alterum cujuslibet 
rei nomen esse, alterum non esse, principium est et fundamentum omnis 
                                                          
131 "Necessariae itaque propositiones illae sunt quae sempiternae veritatis sunt. Hinc quoque manifestum 
est veritatem non rebus sed orationibus adhaerere, veritates enim aliquae aeternae sunt; semper verum erit 
Si homo, tum animal; ut autem homo, aut animal in aeternum existat necesse non est" (Hobbes 1999, 37). 
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ratiocinationis, id est, omnis Philosophiae; itaque accurate enuntiari debuit, 
ut omnibus per se clara et perspicua esset, sicut revera est, nisi iis qui longos 
de hac re sermones apud Metaphysicos legentes, ubi nihil vulgare dici putant, 
id quod intelligunt, intelligere se nesciunt (Hobbes 1999, 23). 
 
Hobbes here quotes almost directly Suárez's third Disputatio132 and establishes a precise 
distinction between his principle and that found in Schools, even if they share a 
foundational meaning. We could go as far as saying that Hobbes' principle resembles that 
of contradiction, because a choice must be made between a name and its negation, but 
there is nonetheless an important logical difference between saying "if something is a 
name of one entity, then its contradictory is not" and saying "something and its 
contradictory cannot exist at the same time and in the same regard". The former principle, 
the one endorsed by Hobbes, does not take the problem of avoiding coexistence between 
contradictory properties as a basic premise for every possible reasoning. It is a 
consequence of something given, so to say, ex hypothesi, rather than a principle of 
intrinsic coherence. For example, from the fact that one thing could always be named 
"man" it follows that it cannot be named "non-man", but this happens given that one thing 
was named in such a way: since I could conceive otherwise, it means that Hobbes' solution 
is similar to the statistical account found in modality. It shares with the statistical modality 
the problem of defining pure possibility, i.e. something that is possible even if it is always 
false in the actual world, or in this case something that is a name even it is not a name for 
any given thing. In Hobbes' definition of impossibility recalled before in fact, he is forced 
to add "nomen tamen habebit" just after the statistical definition, otherwise we would not 
be allowed to talk about impossible things in the first place. However, sharing Aristotle's 
approach, Hobbes shares also its problems: if "impossible" is an artificial name given to 
something that never happened and won't ever happen, then that name is a name given to 
a mere process happening in our minds. It follows that the only difference between 
impossible things is not in those things but in the different way in which we decided to 
name the same faulty reasoning. This account then does not explain the intuitive idea that 
a contingent impossibility is impossible in a different way than pure contradiction.  
                                                          
132 Suárez (1965, Disp. III, §5). 
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Besides, since Hobbes' principle follows from the existence of the name already given 
independently, it does not provide a form of coherence for the existence of that name. On 
the other hand, the Scholastics' principle is different because it suggests an ontological 
consequence that derives directly from the coming into being of any possible thing: it 
does not need a choice between "man" and "non-man" with respect to one thing, but it 
states that whenever "man", "non-man" and even "thing" come into being, that 
automatically shows that they are coherent entities, because they follow the principle of 
contradiction. We could say that the beginning of Hobbes' principle – Duorum nominum 
contradictoriorum – already implies in Scholastics terms the principle of contradiction, 
otherwise it could have not been even expressed. 
The distinction between these principles is extremely relevant for Leibniz's foundation 
of mathematics, because it shows that, even if Leibniz himself ascribes to Hobbes the 
idea of founding mathematics on the principle by which the whole is greater than its parts, 
that principle needed to be perfected by introducing the principle of contradiction as its 
general premise. This process of reconciling the two principles will last for Leibniz's 
entire life and it is the main reason why Leibniz feels the need of developing foundational 
tools in mathematics. 
Given the significant difference between Gassendi and Hobbes' account on necessity 
and that of Scholastics then, from a genetic point of view it is hard to argue that Leibniz, 
while following the new philosophers almost completely on the ground of physics, was 
totally ignoring them on the ground of modal logic. In Leibniz's Von der Allmacht und 
Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen, written between 1670 and 1671, this 
tension and the impossibility for a naïve revaluation of Scholastics are evident. Leibniz 
starts by criticizing "der Schul-Lehrer Ausflüchte" on the matter of predestination. They 
introduced many different definitions and names in order to account for predetermination 
– Necessitas is among them – but according to Leibniz, without resorting to simple and 
accessible terms those names caused only confusion133. Later on, the criticisms against 
Scholastics continue: "wenn man die Schul-Lehrer de radice possibilitatis wie sie es 
nennen […] fragen wird, wird man so wunderliche und so verwirrte dinge hören, daß man 
Gott danken wird wenn sie aufhören”134. Interestingly enough, Leibniz then ascribes both 
                                                          
133 AA (VI-1, 538). 
134 AA (VI-1, 540). 
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the statistical account of modality135 and the one based on the principle of contradiction 
to Scholastics and men in general. Here, Leibniz gives the first definition of possibility: 
“Ist also möglich was sich deutlich ohne Verwirrung und Wiedersprechen gegen sich 
selbst erklären lasset”136. This definition then, was given by Leibniz in a highly polemical 
context, yet he immediately uses it in order to prove that the proposition: "That which 
God foresees will happen, that is: it is not possible that is not going to happen" contains 
an implicit distinction between something that is only conceivable as happening and 
something that is necessarily happening. The use of contradiction in the definition of 
possibility leads to the identification of the famous sophisma pigrum. 
I will now try to explain this paradoxical tension between Leibniz's criticisms against 
Scholastics and his use of their principle by conjecturing that from a theoretical point of 
view the idea was taken from Schools, but from a genetic and biographical point of view 
it was perhaps adopted from Weigel's cultural background. 
As for the theoretical part, I will follow Suárez, since he is widely known by Leibniz 
and his writings exhibit some of the most interesting insights on this topic. The first 
disputation immediately introduces the topic of universal principles, especially the 
principle of contradiction: "haec scientia [metaphysics] est perfectissima sapientia 
naturalis; ergo considerat de rebus et causis primis et universalissimis, et de primis 
principiis generalissimis, quae Deum ipsum comprehendunt, ut: Quodlibet est vel non 
est"137. Very interesting in this regard is the fact that Suárez quotes Proclus' comment on 
Euclid's Elements on the relationship between metaphysics and mathematics138. It shows 
that the interest towards a metaphysical approach to the Elements was shared by 
Scholastics and Weigel. The difference is that in Weigel's philosophy this topic is so 
important that it affects the very core of his metaphysics, while in Suárez the relationship 
between mathematics and metaphysics, although undoubtedly present, is somehow 
weakened by the fact that the principle of contradiction is indeed one of the first and most 
                                                          
135 Ibid. In this passage, Leibniz establishes a difference between what men do and what they say and think. 
The statistical account of modality is related to what they do, because instead of being connected with pure 
possibility, it needs that something actually happened, in order to judge its modal significance from its 
truth-values.   
136 AA (VI-1, 540). 
137 Suárez (1965, Disp. I, §19, 76). 
138 "Secundum munus praecipuum quod huic scientiae tribuitur, est prima principia confirmare ac defendere 
[...] et Proclus, li. 1 Comment. In Euclid., cap. 4, ubi etiam mathematicis scientiis ait metaphysicam 
suppeditare principia" (Suárez, Disp. I, 4, §15, 160). 
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important principles, but it is also unquestionable, to the point that any possible analysis 
of it had to be abandoned, taking it for granted. This is evident for example in Suárez's 
claims that the principle of contradiction cannot be analysed through final or efficient 
causes, yet it is in this very moment that Suárez connects it with the principle by which 
the whole is greater than its parts: 
 
Nam imprimis, quod attinet ad causam efficientem, haec non habet locum in 
universalissimis principiis constantibus ex terminis communibus Deo et 
creaturis; nam sicut respectu Dei nulla potest dari causa efficiens, ita nec 
respectu illorum principiorum, quae in Deo ipso veritatem habent, ut est illud: 
Quodlibet est, vel non est, et, Impossibile est aliquid de eodem affirmare et 
negare. Atque hinc etiam constat, haec principia non posse per causam 
finalem demonstrari, quia causa finalis est in ordine ad affectionem et 
operationem, et ideo quae abstrahunt ab efficiente, abstrahunt etiam a fine. 
[...] ut, verbi gratia, omne totum esse majus sua parte, verum est, omni 
efficientia seclusa, et sic caeteris (Suárez, Disp. I, 4, §21). 
 
From a foundational point of view Suárez is correct in depriving these principles of a 
connection with an efficient cause, but it seems as if this outcome rules out any further 
analysis. In any case, I believe that this is a very relevant quote, because it suggests a 
possible connection between those two principles that Leibniz tried to reunite at a later 
time. Yet, we do not witness in Suárez the same attention on the reduction of every 
possible analytical statement to contradiction. On the contrary, while Leibniz will not be 
concerned identifying the principle of contradiction with identity, Suárez is careful in 
doing so, proposing instead always a priority of a positive expression over the same 
expression formulated in negative terms139. This outcome affects the principle of 
contradiction as well, so that unlike Leibniz, Suárez cannot easily identify identity and 
contradiction. A possible connection then between the principle of contradiction and the 
                                                          
139 "Omnis autem negatio in priori aliqua affirmatione fundatur; ergo datur aliud principium prius illo, in 
quo fundetur: quale erit, vel hoc, Necesse est idem esse, vel non esse; vel hoc, Unum contradictorium 
necessario aliud destruit" (Suárez, Disp. III, 3, §1). This is the same passage quoted by Hobbes in his De 
corpore. The last definition resembles closely the principle adopted by Hobbes, but it is inserted in a more 
complex and, I would say, refined context. Suárez was undoubtedly more concerned than Hobbes in the 
subtle differences among these principles, while Hobbes saw them as unnecessary and confusing. 
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principle by which the whole is greater than its parts is indeed present, but Leibniz 
unifying approach from an analytical point of view was unparalleled, causing Leibniz's 
focus on the relationship between logic and mathematics. Echoes of Leibniz's 
dissatisfaction towards a foundational approach that does not question the priority of one 
principles over another are found in Leibniz's Demonstratio propositionum primarum, 
written between 1671 and 1672140. 
These Scholastics ideas then, even if in need of some refinement, represented an 
important premise to Leibniz's philosophy of logic, but how they were adopted by him 
while openly despising Schools still needs to be explained. If we accept the idea that 
Leibniz was thinking about adopting the principle of contradiction in modal logic at the 
time of his Von der Allmacht, around 1670 and 1671, then we could safely say that this 
adoption happens at the peak of Weigel's influence, as shown before. It is true that many 
of the ideas that Leibniz could have possibly taken from Weigel and his school are indeed 
very derivative, at times taken from Hobbes, Descartes, Aristotle and more. It should be 
clear by now however, that the very fact that those ideas are present in Weigel is relevant 
with regards to Leibniz's early years. If Leibniz, as proved by his 1669 letter to 
Thomasius, was sharing with Weigel the project of reconciling Aristotle with the new 
philosophers, then any idea found in Weigel was legitimated in taking part to the 
syncretistic project simply by its presence in Weigel's works: it is relatively important 
that these ideas are objectively suitable for a reconciliation, if they were chosen by Weigel 
for a specific purpose. Any syncretistic project implies a degree of discrepancy with the 
original ideas endorsed, as I already pointed out with respect to physics. For example, 
Aristotle's idea of motion through contraries was reinterpreted in a way that was 
compatible with the definitions of motion taken from Hobbes and Descartes, even if their 
similarity is highly implausible. In the same fashion, to Hobbes' conatus was given the 
name tendency, probably taken from Descartes, and it was introduced in a context where 
thinking about God's potentia absoluta was reasonable. 
                                                          
140 "Rationis sunt Propositionis illae ex solis ideis, vel quod idem est definitionibus conjunctis orientes, 
sensui originem non debentes, ac proinde hypotheticae, necessariae. Aeternae, ut Geometricae, 
Arithmeticae, Phoronomicae abstractae omnes: ita totum esse maius parte, Nihil esse sine ratione, Circulos 
esse ut quadrata diametrorum, Numeros impares esse differentias quadratorum, quae omni talia sunt, ut ex 
sola accurata distinctaque expositione, id est definitionibus pendeant. Idem Aristoteles vidit, idem Lullius, 
ambo Viri magni. At sunt qui putant, esse quaedam Axiomata per se nota, haec esse in demonstrando 
definitionibus adjungenda” (AA VI-2, 479-480). 
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The principle of contradiction could have followed the same fate: reintroduced by 
Weigel as a genuine product of Aristotle and Euclid's philosophy, it could have gained in 
this way its freedom from the Scholastics' background. This interpretation would explain 
both Leibniz's aversion for Schools and his use of their principle, but for now it is a mere 
conjecture that needs to be proved. The principle of contradiction is indeed used by 
Weigel in his Analysis aristotelica in the definition of absolute necessity: 
 
Necessarium autem quod h.l. dicitur est vel absolute tale, cujus oppositum 
involvit contradictionem; vel restricte, cujus oppositum non involvit 
contradictionem : Illud praeterquam quod verum, certum & necessarium 
dicatur, aeternitatis primario sortitur denominationem, & Ens aeternum, velut 
quoddam Divini Numinis consectarium, quod divinam veritatem, 
certitudinem & necessitatem ab aeterno consequatur, nec ullo modo mutari 
queat, sicut Deus est immutabilis, dici solet. Et talem veritatem, certitudinem 
& necessitatem habent propositiones demonstrativae, quae in Metaphysicis & 
Logicis […] itemque in Arithemticis & Geometria, disciplinis sane divinis, 
occurrunt (Weigel 1658, 20). 
  
The first thing that I would like to remark is that this passage is found in the chapter 
entitled De Necessitate, just before the definition of that restricted necessity that I defined 
in the previous chapter as a physical necessity. It is relevant per se, because the definition 
of physical necessity involved all sorts of concepts derived from the interpretation of 
Hobbes' physics that Leibniz adopted, meaning that Weigel's syncretistic efforts were 
aiming for a reconciliation between the absolute and logical necessity found in Schools 
and that of the modern philosophy of nature. This account was not found in any of the 
positions previously analysed, if not in Leibniz himself. Furthermore, the foundation of 
necessity on the idea of contradiction is connected in Weigel with metaphysics, logic, 
arithmetics and geometry, that are the very same fields in which Leibniz adopts it. It is 
closer to Leibniz's approach than that of Hobbes, because there the foundation was based 
on the principle of the whole but the idea of contradiction was replaced with a different 
principle, and it is closer than that of Suárez, because there the reductionist approach was 
82 
 
not adopted, given that we still need to prove that the principle of the whole is used also 
by Weigel. 
Another interesting feature of Weigel's definition of absolute necessity is the way in 
which necessary truths are connected with God. There is a logical dependence that 
preludes to one of the most famous traits of Leibniz's philosophy: on one hand, logical 
dependence makes these truths something that even God is forced to respect and, on the 
other hand, it shows that God and men, in this regard, think alike. Being God an infinite 
mind, restricted necessity becomes fundamentally different for men since they cannot 
master the infinite chain of causes that lead to an event, but in absolute necessity there is 
room for arguing a kind of homogeneity between God and men. It is not a coincidence in 
fact that conceivability is based on possibility, interpreted as the lack of contradiction: 
God and men conceive possible entities in the exact same fashion. 
On a general basis then, a connection between Weigel's and Leibniz's account is 
possible, so we could wonder if Leibniz's writings around 1671 suggest this interpretation. 
The first step in this direction however is reconsidering once again Leibniz's 1663 
Disputatio. I already outlined that even the third and fourth corollaries – "Essentiae rerum 
sunt sicut numeri" and "Essentiae rerum non sunt aeternae nisi ut sunt in DEO" – could 
have been adopted by Leibniz following Weigel. Some could argue that conceiving the 
essence of things as numbers is something that does not need any kind of influence in 
order to be imagined by a brilliant mind such that of Leibniz, because it is a tempting 
general premise for a philosopher that firmly believes in the effectiveness of his 
combinatorial approach. However, given the background in which Leibniz was integrated 
that I sketched in the previous chapter, it is worth noting that this idea was extremely 
important for Weigel and his school. Similar arguments or even the exact same words of 
Leibniz's Dissertatio are found in several works that I already analysed. In Weigel's 
Analysis aristotelica to begin with, Leibniz could have found the basis for his corollary: 
"Non immerito Scientia Numerorum h.e. Entium quatenus Numeri sunt, definiri 
solent"141. However, the use of the term "Ens" could be misleading for the reader not 
accustomed with Weigel's philosophy. Weigel in fact uses the word "Ens" in order to talk 
about both material entities and formal entities: "Ex formali vero (quod est Essentia, seu 
                                                          
141 Weigel (1658, 184). 
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id quo Ens est) resultant formae rerum […] quas divinus Plato vocavit Ideas"142. Entities, 
Ideas, Essences and Numbers are for Weigel the same thing, although considered under 
different aspects: "Entities" is the general name used for both the material and the formal 
aspect, "Ideas" and "Essences" constitute the formal part, while "Numbers" constitute the 
material part. The combination of ideas in God could be described as the combination of 
numbers, following a decisive Platonic influence. Recalling the distinction between 
matter and form connected with the distinction between numbers and ideas of the previous 
chapter, we could see that something that resembles Weigel's theory is found in four of 
the seven corollaries of Leibniz's Disputatio. 
Even if this interpretation would be quite remarkable per se, ascribing Leibniz's 
corollaries to Weigel's influence is not necessarily relevant with regards to the adoption 
of contradiction in modal logic. Rather, it should be noted that Leibniz's contact with 
Weigel's school surely intensified the importance of the relationship between essences 
and numbers in the following years: "Rerum Essentias sicut Numeros esse, quod 
Scientissimi Veterum olim monuerunt, hinc clare perspicere licet"143 is a passage found 
in Weigel's Pantologia available to Leibniz around 1670 and "Essentiae vero rerum sint 
sicut numeri"144 is found in Vinhold's 1671 Theses. In the same year, Leibniz's letter to 
Magnus Wedderkopf connects this idea with the concept of pure possibility and its 
intrinsic relation with God: 
 
Quae ergo intellectus divini? harmonia rerum. Quae harmoniae rerum? nihil. 
Per exemplum quod ea ratio est 2 ad 4 quae 4 ad 8, ejus reddi ratio nulla 
potest, ne ex voluntate quidem divina. Pendet hoc ex ipsa Essentia seu Idea 
rerum. Essentiae enim rerum sunt sicut numeri, continentque ipsam Entium 
possibilitatem quam Deus non facit, sed existentiam: cum potius illae ipsae 
possibilitates seu Ideae rerum coincidant cum ipso Deo. Cum autem Deus sit 
mens perfectissima, impossibile est ipsum non affici harmonia perfectissima, 
atque ita ab ipsa rerum idealitate ad optimum necessitari (AA II-1, 186). 
 
                                                          
142 Weigel (1658, 182). 
143 Weigel (1673c, 147). 
144 Weigel-Vinhold (1671, 46). 
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Since at that time, as I previously pointed out, Wedderkopf was studying under Weigel, 
even if we accept that the idea found in Leibniz's Dissertatio was developed 
independently, it is highly improbable that in this letter Leibniz is not referring to Weigel's 
theory. Other than the independent nature of possibilities from God's will and the mutual 
dependence between God and ideas, Leibniz's reference to the ratio between numbers 
suggests once again that he was reinterpreting Weigel's philosophy: as it will be shown 
in the next part of the present work in fact, the ideas of ratio and proportion constitute 
Weigel's most important heritage found in Leibniz's foundation of mathematics. 
While Leibniz original contribution was that of applying these principles to the 
problem of predestination, it is regarding the use of universal principles and their 
relationship with mathematics instead that Weigel becomes extremely important for the 
development of his philosophy. In the Analysis aristotelica the principle of contradiction 
and the principle of the whole are connected in a way that was much closer to that of 
Leibniz than the accounts found in Hobbes or in Suárez. The following passage of 
Weigel's Analysis is worth quoting in its entirety, because it clearly shows that the core 
idea of Leibniz's philosophy of mathematics was developed in the early years thanks to 
the decisive influence of Weigel: 
 
Rationem […] hoc loco dicimus facultatem hominis, residuam imaginis 
divinae scintillulam, aut si secundum exercitium spectanda sit, actum homini 
cogenitum, quo veritates primas, tanquam ultima scientiaru principia 
demonstrativa etiam absque singularium perceptione ex nobis metipsis 
intelligimus & ex iis alia deducimus. Ita si in Metaphysicis, Impossibile esse 
idem simul esse & non esse : Quodlibet esse vel non esse & quae ex 
Metaphysicis una cum praecipuarum rerum demonstrationibus ad Mathesin 
transfiere : Totum esse sua parte majus. Si aequalibus addas aequalia tota 
esse aequalia, & quamplurima alia […] Axiomata vocamus. Sunt igitur 
Axiomata stricte loquendo nihil aliud quam veritates primae […] quae Deus 
ter Opt. Max. in natura quasi fundamenti loco primo statuit & a parte rei (non 
imaginatione hominum) aeterna esse iussit […] Et has ipsas veritates 
intellectus noster singulari Divini Numinis indultu non tantum ex semetipso 
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perfectissime semper novit, sed & primo prout in se sunt directissime 
cognoscit (Weigel 1658, 107-108). 
 
For the first time the principle of contradiction and the principle by which the whole is 
greater than its parts are not only named under the list of universal principles, but also 
explicitly connected, establishing a correspondence between metaphysics and 
mathematics. It is the closest version of the same argument found in Leibniz. 
We can also clearly see that the inspiration for the homogeneity between God and men 
was given by Leibniz in a context highly influenced by Platonism. Weigel's passage above 
quoted in fact significantly ends with a reference to Plato's reminiscence145. Weigel also 
refers to the relationship between the disciple and his teacher and to the fact that the young 
student "primis & nobiscum natis principiis, adeoque puero notissimis, facili via continuo 
progrediuntur"146 would achieve knowledge, a clear allusion to Plato's Meno. The idea of 
possessing universal principles from the moment we were born is found also in Weigel's 
1679 De supputatione and it will highly influence Leibniz in the following years.  
Weigel's approach then could appear confusing because of his need of unifying 
different theories, but I believe that underestimating his importance in the adoption of 
universal principles would lead us to an interpretation that relies on a preconceived idea 
of the history of philosophy, where Leibniz follows directly from Hobbes and Scholastics 
without taking into account the environment in which he lived. The process of identifying 
the direct influences on specific accounts is something that Leibniz did in his early years 
in order to appeal to a wider audience without referring to unknown authors, but it is not 
something that we can do while analysing those years, otherwise some connections and 
distinctions among universal principles would be irremediably lost.  
 
Existential Coherence Between Physics and Law As a final remark for this first part, I 
would like to suggest a possible connection between the principle of contradiction and 
                                                          
145 "Unde fieri contingit ut intellectus, quicquid nudo rationis usu ex iis principiis deductum jam distincte 
perpendit, recordando saltem, seu per nudam Reminiscentiam, admonitione facta se cognoscere sibi plane 
habeat persuasum. Quod ut divino prorsus ingenio perspicacissimus Plato dudum agnovit ita 
demonstrationes Disciplinarum rationalium, puta metaphysicas, arithmeticas, geometricas, & ex parte 
quoque ethicas, ex illis primis veritatibus Euclide methodo conscriptas […] penitius aliquanto inspiciamus, 
sane non adeo absurdam hanc esse de Reminiscentia sententiam re ipsa comperiemus" (Weigel 1658, 108). 
146 Weigel (1658, 104). 
86 
 
Leibniz's philosophy of nature. If the reference to Weigel's influence helped in explaining 
how Leibniz's aversion for Scholastics does not exclude the adoption of their modal 
concepts, a conciliation on the ground of physics is still missing. It is clear that Suárez, 
Weigel and Leibniz's idea of the principle of contradiction is slightly different from its 
expression nowadays, because at times it combines the law of the excluded middle, the 
law of contradiction and the principle of bivalence, but it is from this original union that 
one of the most important consequence emerges: the principle of contradiction has also 
an ontological relevance. Given that every possible entity is a non-contradictory entity, it 
follows that any existent thing, being also possible, is also non-contradictory. It is highly 
improbable that this consequence was not affecting Leibniz's philosophy of nature, but 
how could it be reconciled with Leibniz's anti-scholastic views on physics? A possible 
solution is given by conjecturing that the ontological use of the principle of contradiction 
found in the Confessio was suggested to Leibniz by his reflection on the principle that 
negates the dimensions' penetration. A complete analysis of this problem involves the 
reference to many authors and many passages of Leibniz's writings that would take us far 
from the purpose of this work, specifically related to Weigel. However, I will offer some 
remarks connected to this author and to the concepts analysed in the previous chapters. 
As it was shown, the principle that negates the dimensions' penetration was not fully 
adopted by Leibniz in his early years, but it was reintroduced as a contingent consequence 
of his layered model. Matter fills space, so that at this point the penetration of dimensions 
is already allowed, but it fills it uniformly, so that to every ideal partition of matter 
corresponds an ideal partition of space. Assuming Leibniz and Weigel's determinism, 
there is never a time when the penetration of dimensions happens, if not for the first yet 
homogenous penetration. Given however that a form of penetration is allowed, something 
else was needed in order to grant absolute hardness to bodies colliding in space, that is in 
Leibniz's theory the role of anitypy. Following this interpretation, in 1676 Leibniz was 
still unsure about the possibility for extension alone to account for hardness, as a passage 
of Leibniz's notes on Descartes shows147, but this does not change the fact that, even if in 
a contingent yet deterministic fashion, at the time of the adoption of universal principles 
in 1671 a form of the scholastics' negation of penetration was given to every physical 
body in Leibniz's philosophy of nature. I believe that this is a relevant consequence, 
                                                          
147 AA (VI-3, 215). This passage was already analysed by Mormino (2012, 156) 
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because the Scholastics negation is founded on metaphysical and logical basis that were 
not present in the atomistic idea of antitypy. In this regard in fact, Leibniz clearly follows 
Hobbes, who was able to express a principle of existential coherence without relying to 
antitypy. In Leibniz's Specimen demonstrationum De Natura Rerum Corporearum ex 
phaenomenis, dated 1671, is found in fact a solution very similar to that of Hobbes' De 
corpore148: 
 
Duo corpora in eodem loco esse non posse. 
Idem corpus in pluribus locis esse non posse. 
Idem corpus diversis temporibus inaequalia spatia implere non posse. 
Idem spatium diversis temporibus inaequalia corpora capere non posse. (AA 
VI-2, 308). 
 
These consequences are not against the Scholastics' principle as much as they are not 
against antitypy, but they show a logical structure that is similar to that of the ontological 
version of the principle of contradiction. If existing and being in one place are related, 
adding the principle of contradiction would negate the possibility of being in the same 
place for any other entity. The reasoning would be the following: (1) everything that exists 
is possible, (2) every possible thing is non-contradictory, (3) every non-contradictory 
thing cannot be its negation at the same time and in the same regard, but (4) one body 
exist, thus (5) it cannot be its negation at the same time and in the same regard. Since the 
negation of one body is any other possible entity, all the other bodies included, it will 
follow that two bodies cannot be in the same place, given the existence of one body. In 
the ontological use of the principle of contradiction then there is a logical outcome that 
could be easily retraced in the Scholastics' negation of the dimensions' penetration, 
because in the atomistic account the same result is obtained through a simple quality 
pertaining objects and it does not follow from an intrinsic logical impossibility related to 
the very existence of any given object. 
How much this aspect of the Scholastics' principle influenced Leibniz is hard to 
determine, but it is indisputable that logical and existential coherence were sought by 
Leibniz in many fields where antitypy was not allowed. Remarkable in this regard is the 
                                                          
148 Hobbes (1999, 86). 
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problem of two people possessing the same thing, found in law149. In the fourth question 
of Leibniz's Specimen quaestionum philosophicarum ex iure collectarum the problem is 
solved using an analogy taken from physics: "Unde patet elegans inter possessionem et 
positionem seu situm corporum in loco Analogia. […] Et colligerentur omnia gravia circa 
centrum in unum punctum, si enim duo esse in eodem loco possunt, quidni plura, quidni 
omnia?"150. In this work Leibniz is still influenced by Gassendi, but the problem has a 
distinctive Scholastic origin. A paradigmatic example is the comment on the same topic 
found in the Digest of Justinian. Here we read that "plures eandem rem in solidum 
possidere non possunt. Contra naturam est, ut cum aliquid teneam, tu quoque id tenere 
videaris"151. In his comment to this passage, Denis Godefroy, jurist quoted by Leibniz in 
the Specimen152, will use a familiar concept in order to explain the impossibility of 
possessing the same object:  
 
Duo corpora in uno loco esse non possunt. Corpora se occupare et simul esse, 
natura non permittit. Dimensiones nequeunt se invicem subire. Sic dimensio 
suum locum occupat, ut obstaculo sit, ne quaevis alia dimensio, et quodvis 
aliud corpus, pariter unaque eum ea eundem locum occupare ac replere possit. 
Penetratio dimensionum natura est impossibilis: nam si duarum potest esse 
substantiarum penetratio, et trium et quatuor et infinitarum esse poterit 
(Godefroy 1583, III, §5). 
 
The penetratio dimensionum is connected here with the idea of replere and it was surely 
taken into account by Leibniz. 
It could be then that Pufendorf's influence on Leibniz in law, that is Weigel's influence, 
could have helped Leibniz in recognizing the logical and existential coherence connected 
with the Scolastics' principle found in Godefroy. Following in fact the application of 
Aristotle's Apodeixis and Leibniz's reference to Weigel in the Specimen about the 
distinction between natural, moral and notional truths, the importance of Weigel's 
Analysis aristotelica emerges also in the topic of law. Again, it is the Analysis 
                                                          
149 For a detailed analysis see the introduction found in Artosi (2013). 
150 Artosi (2013, 55). 
151 Godefroy (1583, III, §5). 
152 Artosi (2013, 61). 
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aristotelica's chapter on necessity that casts some light on the matter, because there, just 
after the introduction of absolute necessity and restricted necessity, Weigel propose 
another kind of necessity, called necessity ex impositione:  
 
Necessarium impositivum morale est, quod in genere morum & in vitae 
humanae statu non potest aliter se habere, licet absolute sapius ex arbitrio 
dependeat. Ita necessariae sunt Propositiones demonstrationum Juridicarum, 
quatenus e principiis impositivis tenquam primis, h.e. e statutis hominum & 
legibus positivis qua talibus deducuntur (Weigel 1658, 22). 
 
Although being fundamentally different from absolute necessity, by introducing the 
concept of imposition, Weigel was able to transfer the structure founded on contradiction 
to the necessity applied in law. Even if in this field absolute truth does not follow directly 
and independently from any necessary statement, the common structure grants the 
possibility of giving mathematical explanations that otherwise would be impossible to 
achieve. As Vinhold in his 1671 Theses writes "Doctrina proportionis Arithmeticae & 
Geometricae usum suum habet in Philosophia morali". The extension of the theory of 
proportions to law and ethics resembles Leibniz's way of explaining possibility of ideas 
as numbers found in the letter to Wedderkopf. It is no coincidence either that Leibniz 
writes to Conring in 1670, adopting the method of mathematical proportions153 and 
quoting Euclid and the Digest. Conring will reply by quoting Hobbes and Aristotle's 
"apodicticae artis"154. In this context then, it seems natural that the idea of necessity 
founded in contradiction, thus the idea of possibility as something non-contradictory, was 
associated with the problem of existential coherence, specifically with the problem of the 
dimensions' penetration in law. 
Ultimately, aside from law, the main aim of Weigel's school was reintroducing some 
ideas taken from Aristotle and saving them from the Scholastics' influence. The idea of 
existential coherence connected with the principle on the penetration of dimensions is 
clearly a genuine product of Aristotle's philosophy, especially on physics. In his Physics 
in fact, Aristotle argues that nothing can be inside itself. The reason is that otherwise two 
                                                          
153 "Illic proportio arithmetica, hic geometrica" (AA II-1, 47). 
154 AA (II-1, 53). 
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things would be at the same time and in the same place, violating the principle of 
contradiction155. In Aristotle's philosophy in fact, coming into being is expressly related 
to contradiction: 
 
Change from non-subject to subject, the relation being that of contradiction, 
is coming to be […] Those which take the form of becoming and perishing, 
that is to say those which imply a relation of contradiction, are not motions 
[…] One kind of change, then, being change in a relation of contradiction, 
where a thing has changed from not-being to being it has left not-being. 
Therefore, it will be in being; for everything must either be or not be (Aristotle 
1984, 388-397). 
 
I believe that this is the fundamental idea behind the ontological use of the principle of 
contradiction and, since it is related to Weigel's school, the fact that Leibniz, starting from 
the Confessio, adopts a model of modality that involves ascribing non-contradiction to 
existing entities suggests a possible connection that needs further investigations. While 
openly against the negation of dimensions' penetration then, Leibniz could have learned 
from this principle the need of a coherent premise for every existing object, favouring at 
a later time the ontological use of the principle of contradiction.  
 
Conclusion of the First Part By retracing Weigel's influence between 1663 and 1671, 
Weigel's important contribution to the young Leibniz's philosophy emerges. While 
developing a physical theory that was inspired by the metaphysical reinterpretation of 
Hobbes' philosophy, at the beginning of the Parisian stay Leibniz fully adopted those 
principles that will be fundamental for his foundation of mathematics at a later time: the 
principle of contradiction, the principle by which the whole is greater than its parts and 
the principle of homogeneity. Leibniz will constantly refer to these principles throughout 
is life, so that, even if it is true that strictly speaking these principles cannot be considered 
as pure mathematical knowledge, their influence on the development of Leibniz's 
mathematics becomes relevant. After developing the mathematics of the infinite in Paris 
                                                          
155 "The place cannot be body; for if it were there would be two bodies in the same place […] Nor is it 
possible for a thing to be in itself even accidentally; for two things would be at the same time in the same 
thing" (Aristotle 1984, 354-348). 
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in fact, Leibniz aim will be that of reconciling his new discoveries with these foundational 
principles, adopted from Jena's cultural background. 
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PART II: Contradiction and Homogeneity 
 
2.1 Leibniz’s Idea of Contradiction and Its Development After 1671 
 
After an in-depth analysis of Weigel’s first reception, this part of the present work is 
dedicated to the use of Leibniz's universal principles after 1671. In the next chapter I will 
argue that Leibniz's analysis situs is the final outcome on the ground of geometry of a 
general idea that involves the use of homogeneity in order to define relational properties 
between mathematical objects. Having highlighted the importance of Leibniz's concept 
of homogeneity in mathematics, in the following chapter I will show how this concept 
was developed, from an historical point of view, through Leibniz's constant relationship 
with Weigel. 
Before focusing on Leibniz's foundational approach however, some general remarks 
on Leibniz’s idea of contradiction are needed. This topic is in fact often underestimated 
by the secondary literature: even if a role is usually granted to the principle of 
contradiction throughout Leibniz’s works in very specific contexts, a complete and 
satisfying reconstruction of its adoption and development is still missing. This task is 
obviously worth more than a single introductory chapter, but the lack of a persuasive 
study force us to present at least some remarks on this matter, since our interpretation of 
Leibniz’s rationalism in the light of Weigel is based on the assumption of a stronger 
meaning for this principle than the one usually acknowledged. 
One could in fact ask in what sense the principle of contradiction contributed to 
Leibniz’s rationalism. The easiest answer would be that, being a universal and logical 
principle, it could be considered as the general premise for every possible logical 
assumption. This is obviously true, since the principle affirms that contradictory 
statements cannot both be true in the same regard and at the same time. Applying the 
principle to any possible statement, we can easily infer that violating it would inevitably 
lead to a possible inconsistency in a given theory. Focusing on the domain of logic then, 
the importance of this principle clearly emerges, but at the same time it wouldn’t seem as 
effective as hoped to be: it is indeed a general premise but also nothing more than a 
general premise. If for example a distinctive feature of Leibniz’s rationalism is 
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determinism156, how avoiding contradiction could affect this topic, when some 
possibilities are not determined in this world and yet perfectly conceivable? As I have 
shown, contradiction and conceivability are connected in Leibniz, but the concept of 
possibility founded in the principle of contradiction does not distinguish between pure 
possibility and the possibility of actual entities. It seems as if something should be added 
to offer a convincing account of determinism, even if actual entities are already logically 
determined by the law of contradiction. For these reasons, compossibility and the 
principle of sufficient reason are usually introduced as truly distinctive features of 
Leibniz’s rationalism. Following this interpretation, the principle of contradiction is a 
simple rational premise and this is precisely why its presence in several writings 
belonging to different periods157 is not considered a threat to the nowadays consolidated 
general assumption that Leibniz’s philosophy evolved with significant differences in 
time.  
I believe however that dealing with the problem of contradiction in Leibniz from the 
point of view of a rigid distinction between logic, metaphysics and physics ultimately 
fails to give an adequate representation of Leibniz’s aim. The principle of contradiction 
is in fact often used by Leibniz in contexts that are different from that of logic, or rather, 
that we wouldn’t call logical contexts in our perception158. As a starting point, it is 
possible to list the major achievements of Leibniz’s thought where the principle of 
contradiction plays a fundamental role: 
 
                                                          
156 I’m indebted to Piro (2002) and Mormino (2005a) for this interpretation of Leibniz’s determinism in the 
light of Hobbes. 
157 Even if in the previous chapter I argued for the adoption of the principle of contradiction in modal logic 
around 1671, it does not mean that Leibniz had not used it before that time in different contexts. In 1666 
he already recognised the importance of this principle in his Disputatio arithmetica de complexionibus, 
introducing it as the first logical corollary of the demonstration of God's existence: "Duae sunt propositiones 
primae, una principium omnium theorematum seu propositionum necessarium : Quod est (tale) id est seu 
non est (tale) vel contra ; altera omnium observationum seu propositionum contingentium : Aliquid existit" 
(AA VI-1, 228). Its importance will be stressed by Leibniz until the very end of his life, as the quote of the 
letter to Clarke showed, or as we could witness in the Monadologie: “Nos raisonnements sont fondés sur 
deux grands principes, celui de la contradiction en vertu duquel nous jugeons faux ce qui en enveloppe, et 
vrai ce qui est opposé ou contradictoire au faux” (Monadologie, §31). 
158 The fact that Leibniz’s use of contradiction is unusual for our standards does not necessarily mean that 
it belongs to a sort of pre-logical era where the difference between ontology and pure logic was not 
completely clear. For example, I have shown that the difference between the principle of contradiction and 
the principle of excluded middle was known by Leibniz, making the use of these two principles as one a 
specific choice that was justified by the ontological consequences of the principle applied in physics. 
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- The principle of contradiction is essential in Leibniz’s unique modal 
demonstration of God’s existence, or rather, it is considered by Leibniz the 
key difference that allows the completion of Spinoza and Descartes’ 
demonstration of God’s existence. 
 
- As shown, it is the foundation of Leibniz’s modal logic, since the definitions 
of possibility and necessity depend on it, not only from a logical point of view, 
but also from an ontological prospective. 
 
- It has a major role in Leibniz’s physics, because the early modern notion of 
body poses several challenges about the possibility for different entities to 
occupy the same space. 
 
- It is the only principle in Leibniz's theory of perception that resides in the 
human mind without being derived from senses and it is also the only one that 
grants coherence to our experience. 
 
- It is considered the negative manifestation of the concept of identity. 
 
- From a logical point of view, it identifies the reductio ad absurdum, a 
fundamental tool used by Leibniz to establish a connection between different 
syllogisms and to prove some of his most important demonstrations in 
arithmetics and geometry. 
 
- It is the only principle used in the demonstration that the whole is bigger than 
its part. 
 
- It is the only principle needed for the foundation of arithmetics and geometry. 
 
Given the variety of topics involved, it’s clear that the importance of this principle should 
not be underestimated: its heterogeneous use is at least problematic, because it poses a 
threat to the classical distinctions between God and reality and between reality and 
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mathematical objects in Leibniz's philosophy. However, one could argue that, even 
admitting its presence in every topic listed above, its role is not central as it may seem, 
but a brief analysis of every part of Leibniz’s philosophy involved will be sufficient to 
prove the opposite, or at least to cast some doubts on this interpretation. 
Leibniz’s modal proof of God’s existence is based on the assumption that Descartes 
and Spinoza’s proofs shouldn’t be completely rejected, but rather perfected. The exact 
word used by Leibniz is “defectueuse”159, a word that could be misleading in respect to 
our purpose: it seems as something must be added to a theory that is already well-
grounded. The nature of this completion however entails questioning the possibility of a 
concept, such that of God, in order to prove its necessity. It is clear then why Leibniz calls 
this proof a modal proof, since the concepts of possibility and necessity are taken directly 
from the realm of modal logic. In other words, if the concept of God is conceived as a 
sum of perfections, or rather if every perfection describes an aspect of the concept of God, 
even before taking into account existence, it is required on one hand that this specific 
perfection is possible and on the other hand that it is compossible with every other 
perfection attributed to God. The outcome of Leibniz’s attempt is very peculiar, because 
God is conceived as the only being for which from its possibility follows directly its 
necessary existence. Even if the analysis of this achievement needs an appropriate 
research that would sway us from our specific purpose, what is already clear is that this 
completion is not achieved when the concept of God is already founded: questioning the 
possibility is the first and not the last step in Leibniz’s modal demonstration of God’s 
existence. It follows that, if possibility and necessity are founded using the principle of 
contradiction, as we already mentioned about the Confessio philosophi, hence God must 
follow the principle of contradiction in order for it to be possible and necessary. The only 
way to deny this is to argue that Leibniz’s conception of possibility at the time when he 
developed this proof changed from that of the Confessio, having abandoned the 
foundation on the principle of contradiction, but this hypothesis is not consistent for 
                                                          
159 It’s a word used by Leibniz in a 1686 letter to Simon Foucher: “la demonstration de l’Existence de Dieu, 
inventée par Anselme, et renouvellée par des Cartes est defectueuse. Quicquid ex definitione Entis 
perfectissimi sequitur, id ei attribui potest. Atqui ex definitione entis perfectissimi seu maximi sequitur 
existentia, nam Existentia est ex numero perfectionum, seu ut loquitur Anselmus, majus est existere quam 
non existere. Ergo Ens perfectissimum existit. Respondeo: Ita sane sequitur, modo ponatur id esse 
possibile” (AA II-2, 92-93). Even if in this passage possibility as non-contradiction is not introduced, 
Leibniz extensively uses it in the same letter, mainly to establish a distinction between a definition reelle 
and nominale. 
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example with what we read in an important work written by Leibniz for Henning 
Huthmann in 1678, where Leibniz describes his demonstration as a “fastigium doctrinae 
Modalium”160, where contradiction is openly associated with modal concepts: “aut Ens 
necessarium implicare contradictionem, sive non esse possibile: vel si possibile est, 
conclusio contradictoria de eo fieri non potest”161. 
Moving then to the analysis of the purely modal use of the principle of contradiction, 
I already argued that Leibniz used it in the very definition of possibility and necessity in 
the Confessio: possible is defined as something which is not contradictory, whereas 
necessary is defined as something of which the opposite involves contradiction. It is 
obvious here that the central role of contradiction is not at stake. Rather, the same problem 
that emerged about the proof of God’s existence could concern modality, since we are not 
sure that Leibniz opted to follow the same definitions during the entire evolution of his 
philosophy. Unlike God’s existence, an evolution of Leibniz’s philosophy seems likely 
here to be the case, because Leibniz is often celebrated as the first philosophers 
conceiving modality through possible worlds. This popular interpretation162, although 
recognising that he never expressly states it this way, argues that Leibniz defines modal 
                                                          
160 AA (II-1, 587). 
161 Here the whole argument is in fact a tribute to modality conceived through contradiction, but it is also 
connected to an idea of necessity that is directly derived from geometry, establishing a distinction with the 
simpler proofs of Spinoza and Descartes: “Spinosa ita ratiocinatur post Cartesium. Idem est dicere aliquid 
in rei alicujus natura sive conceptu contineri, ac dicere id ipsum de ea re esse verum (quemadmodum in 
Trianguli conceptu continetur, seu ex essentia ejus sequitur ejus angulos tres esse aequales rectis duobus). 
Atqui existentia necessaria in Dei conceptu eodem modo continetur. Ergo verum est de Deo dicere 
necessariam existentiam in eo esse, seu ipsum existere. Huic ratiocinationi aliisque similibus opponi potest: 
propositiones illas omnes esse conditionales, nam dicere in trianguli natura vel conceptu involvi tres 
angulos aequales duobus rectis; nihil aliud est dicere, quam si existat triangulum, tunc ipsum hanc 
proprietatem habere; ita eodem modo, etsi concedatur de Dei conceptu esse existentiam necessariam, tamen 
inde colligetur tantum, si existat Deus, tunc ipsum hanc proprietatem (necessariae existentiae) habere, sive 
si Deus existat, eum necessario existere. Nostra vero ratiocinatio hanc difficultatem non recipit, sed probat 
aliquid majus, nempe Deum si modo possibilis sit, necessario existere actu” (AA II-1, 591). This passage 
is particularly interesting because it can be seen as a further step in connecting the ontological use of 
contradiction to its use in the foundation of arithmetics that will happen in Leibniz at a later time, through 
Weigel’s influence: existence is for God a quality in the sense sketched by Leibniz in mathematics and not 
a mere propriety arbitrarily added to an object. Here it seems that Leibniz is differentiating God from a 
mathematical concept, but upon further inspection Leibniz does not deny the idea of a quality pertaining 
the object. Rather, he says that this peculiar object from which we should draw our propriety (necessary 
existence) is not “God”, but “God as a possible being”. It really shows that Leibniz was conceiving non-
contradiction as the primary premise of his argument. The connection between contradiction and the modal 
proof of God’s existence is present in many writings, for example in the famous Quod Ens Perfectissimum 
existit, written for Spinoza in 1676 (AA II-1, 428). For a reconstruction of the confrontation between 
Leibniz and Spinoza on this topic see Pasini (2005). Several remarks on the proof can be found in Di Bella 
(2005b), whereas for a contemporary approach to Leibniz’s proof see Griffin (2013, 34-82). 
162 See for example Mondadori (1973), Wilson (2000), Rescher (2013, 1-44) and Mugnai (2013). 
97 
 
operators using possible worlds: possible would be that which is true in at least one world, 
whereas necessary would be that which is true in every possible world, in the same 
fashion of contemporary modal logic. Whether this interpretation is valid or not, we can 
safely assume that the modal definitions through the principle of contradiction are at least 
consistent with Leibniz’s late reflections on modality, because he still openly uses them 
in the Essais de Théodicée. Even more so, since the Théodicée is a work conceived for 
publication and to appeal to a variety of different positions: there is more consistency 
between the use of contradiction and Leibniz’s unpublished writings, like the Confessio 
philosophi, than between them and the use of possible worlds163. A different matter would 
be that of determining if possible worlds overtook contradiction at a foundational level164, 
but its presence and use is sufficient to prove that contradiction still has a central role in 
modal logic and everything else that derives from it in the matter of predestination for a 
period of time that surpasses the fundamental evolution of Leibniz’s philosophy through 
the concept of monad. 
With regards to the central role of the principle of contradiction in Leibniz’s theory of 
perception, it again derives from his adoption in modal logic. More precisely, Leibniz 
refers to the ontological consequences of this endorsement, following an obvious 
conclusion already highlighted about his philosophy of nature: if something exists, it is 
possible, but something that is possible is non-contradictory, thus everything that exists 
is non-contradictory. In the Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, this simple 
conclusion is the basis for every coherent experience. This coherence is possible because 
there is a peculiar correspondence between our mind and the ontological structure of 
                                                          
163 The distinction endorsed in the Confessio is found also in the Essais de Théodicée: "La Verité necessaire 
est celle don’t le contraire est impossible ou implique contradiction. Or cette verité, qui porte que j'ecriray 
demain, n'est point de cette nature, elle n'est donc point necessaire. Mais suppose que Dieu la prevoye, il 
est necessaire qu'elle arrive; c'est à dire la consequence est necessaire, savoir qu'elle existe, puisqu'elle a 
ètè prevue, car Dieu est infeillible: c'est ce qu'on appelle une necessité hypothetique. Mais ce n'est pas de 
cette necessité don’t il s'agit iey: c'est une necessité absolue qu'on demande, pour pouvoir dire qu'une action 
est necessaire, qu'elle n'est point contingente, qu'elle n'est point l'effect d'un choix libre" (GP VI, 123-124). 
164 In my opinion this is not the case: following a contemporary approach, the possible-worlds model would 
ultimately derive its truth from the truth of single propositions in specific worlds, but Leibniz, following an 
intuition that he already had in the Confessio philosophi is not akin to what we would call today a statistical 
definition of modality. Given the important connection between possibility and conceivability that 
highlights the need of an intrinsic logical coherence, Leibniz perhaps would interpret the contemporary 
possible-world model as a statistical-Aristotelian model, only applied to a wider field, i.e. entire worlds. 
On a foundational level, the principle of contradiction as a distinctive propriety of possibility defines instead 
in Leibniz a realm of conceivable things, regardless their presence in one or several worlds. A different 
problem is that of compossibility: here Leibniz’s concept of a whole world and its relations is much more 
effective and similar to the contemporary account. 
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reality165, since the principle of contradiction is the only primitive principle of the human 
mind used to distinguish truth from falsity, as Leibniz writes in the preparatory works for 
the Nouveaux essais: 
 
Mon opinion est donc, qu’on ne doit rien prendre pour principe primitif, si 
non les experiences, et l’axiome de l’identicité, ou (qui est la même chose) le 
principe de la contradiction; qui est primitif, puisqu’autrement il n’y auroit 
point de la difference entre la verité et la fausseté (AA VI-6, 4-5)166. 
 
The fact that every possible experience is a non-contradictory experience of something 
non-contradictory in itself becomes extremely relevant in an indefinitely divisible world, 
such that of Leibniz. In this perspective, an error in our perception derives from the 
impossibility for our mind to master infinity, rather than the occurrence of a real 
contradiction, happened at some point in the relation between the subject and the 
object167. Once again, it seems as if the philosophical context in which this topic is 
displayed depends on the peculiar constitution of the world conceived by Leibniz. 
                                                          
165 An important passage from the 1677 Dialogus shows that, althought Leibniz’s approach could be 
labelled as nominalist, the possibility of the generalization through names is founded on the impossibility 
for the human mind to master infinity, that is on the idea that we perceive as incomplete objects that are 
composed by non-contradictory indefinitely actual parts. In this way, although perception is at fault, the 
possibility of finding truth is grounded by the same rational order: “Sed hoc tamen animadverto, si 
characteres ad ratiocinandum adhiberi possint, in illis aliquem esse situm complexum ordinem, qui rebus 
convenit, si non in singulis vocibus (quamquam et hoc melius foret) saltem in earum conjunctione et flexu, 
et hunc ordinem, variatum quidem in omnibus linguis, quodammodo respondere […] etsi characteres sint 
arbitrarii, eorum tamen usus et connexio habet quiddam, quod non est arbitrarium” (AA VI-4, 24). 
166 Here we find again the use of the principle as a substitute for identity. Moreover, there are several reasons 
to believe that the Quelques remarques and the Nouveaux essais were developed by Leibniz with Weigel 
and, in general, the reinstatement of scholastics’ ideas in mind: in AA (VI-6, 5), just after this quote, Leibniz 
refers to Euclid, together with Apollonius and Proclus, as the perfect example of how we should develop 
our theory based on principles and axioms. In AA (VI-6, 9) we read how Leibniz conceives the 
reinstatement of scholastics’ ideas as a work of interpretation of the same ideas in a different context, with 
an interesting parallelism between Leibniz’s work and that of the Italian Accademia della Crusca, a society 
born in Florence in 1583 in order to preserve the purity of the Italian language. 
167 It is Leibniz’s take on the Cartesian problem of confused knowledge. In the Meditationes de Cognitione, 
Veritate et Ideis we read that knowledge is “Confusa, cum scilicet non possum notas ad rem ab 
aliisdiscernendam sufficientes separatim enumerare, licet res illa tales notas atque requisita revera habeat, 
in quae notio ejus resolvi possit: ita colores, odores, sapores…ideao nec caeco explicare possumus, quid sit 
rubrum, nec aliis declarare talia possumus, nisi eos in rem praesentem ducendo, atque ut idem videant" (AA 
VI-4A, 587). Here we find again the difference between a definition reelle and nominale. The real definition 
is the one the infers the possibility, i.e. non-contradiction, of one thing and again it is considered by Leibniz 
a distinctive feature of his nominalism that saves us from Hobbes’ position (AA VI-4A, 589). The problem 
of a defective knowledge has to be found then in our impossibility of describing a single object with a finite 
set of propriety, rather than a defectiveness of the object in itself. The very same ideas are expressed in the 
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Being the specific purpose of this part, the central importance of contradiction in the 
aspects of logic and mathematics previously listed will be explained in the next chapter, 
but the outcome of our research will show again a consistency with other aspects of 
Leibniz’s thought: here, a peculiar concept of unity arises from Leibniz’s reflections on 
logical coherence. The concept of a non-contradictory unity then leads the way from logic 
and mathematics to physics, as previously shown.  
If the remarks in all these fields are valid, we can clearly see that there is only one last 
possible objection against a serious consideration of the principle of contradiction and it 
is again related to the evolution of Leibniz’s philosophy in time: it could be indeed true 
that everything reported in the above list is affirmed by Leibniz at a certain point, but this 
doesn’t necessarily mean that every aspect exposed should be taken at the same time. 
Given the renowned instability of Leibniz’s position in time, it could be that some of the 
aspect listed are not always valid and compossible, even more if we consider the famous 
turning point in Leibniz’s physics happened at the end of the seventeenth century. The 
evolution in the consideration of the principle however follows in Leibniz a very natural 
flow: its definitive adoption in modal logic happens around 1671, then, having considered 
also its ontological consequences, it was only natural to question the coherence of that 
peculiar object called God, thus we witness the development of his proof at the end of the 
1670s168. In the 1680s contradiction is applied to the problem of confused knowledge and 
in the 1700s, although Leibniz turned to the concept of monad, everything contradiction-
related, from modality, to ontology, theory of perception and God’s existence remains 
unscathed by the great change, all of this while in logic and mathematics contradiction 
steadily becomes more and more important at a foundational level, culminating with 
Leibniz's claims in his 1715 letter to Clarke. We could say then that the topic of 
contradiction is a case of continuity in an extremely dynamic context. This is precisely 
why its study is important and challenging at the same time: it means that every change 
happened in Leibniz’s philosophy should be consistent with the principles derived from 
                                                          
Nouveaux essais (AA VI-6, 86, 376, 379-80). On the topic of confused knowledge different interpretations 
are those of Wilson (1999) and Puryear (2005). 
168 We are taking Huthmann’s 1678 letter as a final word on Leibniz’s proof of God’s existence, but from 
that time on this achievement is maintained and celebrated by Leibniz: “Car il faut bien que s’il y a une 
réalité dans les essences ou possibilités, ou bien dans les vérités éternelles, cette réalité soit fondée en 
quelque chose d’existant et d’actuel ; et par conséquent dans l’existence de l’Être nécessaire, dans lequel 
l’essence renferme l’existence, ou dans lequel il suffit d’être possible pour être actuel (§ 184-189, 335)” 
(Monadologie, §44). 
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that of contradiction, at least on a general basis. This consequence becomes quite 
problematic, considering the interpretations generally accepted nowadays, because the 
adherence to the principle of contradiction puts several important constraints to the 
evolution of Leibniz’s thought: if we take for example the evolution in physics and the 
reinstatement of substantial forms, it is indeed true that this change in Leibniz’s theory 
lead to a departure from the mechanists’ belief that everything in the world can be 
described using the concept of body and its movement in space, but at the same time the 
results of this departure, being conceivable and real, must follow the same non-
contradictory rule followed by bodies and other concepts involved in the modern physics. 
If this is the common consistent background and, on a side note, if this is also the reason 
why Descartes’ important mistake has been found by Leibniz using the very same 
concepts used by Descartes and not conceiving a radically different approach169, then by 
no means the reintroduction of substantial forms should be interpreted as a way to escape 
from the law of contradiction, reintroducing free will or other unexplainable causes that 
are not coherent with Leibniz’s determinism. Rather, interpretations that focus on 
Leibniz’s peculiar determinism, or I would say metaphysical mechanism170, will be easier 
to explain in the light of his constant use of contradiction.    
This outcome is connected with another renown interpretation challenged by the 
revaluation of contradiction, that is the one that recognise a fundamental ontological 
distinction between real unity and phenomenal unity. There is no denying that this 
important distinction arises in Leibniz’s philosophy171, even more so at a later stage, but 
the real focus should be on what is the criteria used for establishing it. We already briefly 
sketched how the principle of contradiction is considered by Leibniz another side of 
identity and unity and, in this specific case, it would be useful to understand the relation 
between this kind of unity, a non-contradictory unity, and the real and phenomenal 
unities. Specifically, are both real unities and phenomenal unities non-contradictory 
                                                          
169 In other words, Leibniz still uses the modern conception of bodies and their relations, studied through 
the laws of collision to achieve insights on his new theory. 
170 If it is true that for Leibniz nothing in the world is contradictory, then from the refutation of atoms as 
real beings does not follow the refutation of determinism or the refutation of a mechanical way to describe 
the world. Our impossibility of understanding it completely derives from our impossibility to master 
infinity, but the power of names is that of reuniting groups of infinite and yet coherent parts in finite and 
coherent relations. This is the reason why Leibniz still believes in the project of an ars combinatoria, at 
least on paper, even after abandoning the atomistic model. 
171 I’m obviously referring here to the Discours de métaphysique and the other writings of that time. 
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unities? As for the latter, it seems that this is the case: I already conjectured that on the 
ground of physics the reason why Leibniz adopts contradiction is to preserve some 
qualities that pertain to atoms and other conceptions of bodies, without sacrificing the 
possibility of indefinitely divisible entities. We are all familiar however with Leibniz’s 
later assumption that real unities are also the only true unities. After this important 
discovery, in several writings Leibniz is inclined to say that the phenomenal unity is, 
consequently, a false unity, thus establishing a difference between the world as we see it 
and his metaphysics, in a platonic fashion. Following the same path then, one could argue 
that the ontological validity of contradiction is maintained only at a phenomenal unity 
level, because it is the level that originally adopted contradiction when this was in 
Leibniz’s mind the one and only world. The real unity would be then a peculiar kind of 
entity, saved from the principles and rules that were valid before this important change in 
Leibniz’s philosophy. This interpretation could be refuted, pointing out that the 
connection between contradiction and phenomenal unity is not the same that exists 
between extension and the phenomenal world: extension is responsible for the fact that 
every possible phenomenal unity can be divided in two or more phenomenal unities and 
there is no denying that every unity involved is also a non-contradictory unity, but it does 
not follow from these premises that there can’t be non-contradictory unities that are not 
bounded to the concept of extension. This is consistent with what I argued in the previous 
part: while logical coherence may have been adopted for physical entities because of a 
property pertaining to extension, that is the negation of dimensions' penetration, it was 
later identified by Leibniz as a separate concept related to conceivability. Since this 
outcome is maintained in the Théodicée and in the Monadologie, then even monads must 
be considered as conceivable unities.  
In Leibniz’s late thought this is also the case for the concept of unity in arithmetics: 
the Initia rerum mathematicarum metaphysica, being one of the most intriguing 
exposition of Leibniz’s foundational approach to mathematics, will show that numbers, 
i.e. unities conceived as a mathematical objects, are nothing else but non-contradictory 
and well-ordered unities, even if they do not belong to reality in the same way of the 
phenomenal unities. 
It follows that non-contradiction is not related directly and only to extension: if the non-
contradictory unity was conceived by Leibniz as a shaping tool, i.e. something that 
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generates extensional partitions between different entities, then avoiding contradiction 
would have put constraints to the type of unities that we are allowed to consider in the 
real world. This process would have lead us to admit infinitely small and homogeneous 
non-contradictory unities, similar to those of atoms, forcing us to treat them as imaginary 
tools or exposing them to Leibniz’s severe criticisms on similar entities. In other words, 
in this interpretation non-contradiction would be used in the classical Scholastic fashion 
of a quality pertaining extended bodies, that is the negation of penetrations' dimension, 
but Leibniz’s approach is different because, being possible, everything in the real world 
is non-contradictory, regardless of the arbitrary shape considered: the ontological value 
of the principle grants the propriety of a body of being coherent within itself and with the 
rest of the world, thus granting for it the possibility of occupying a space, but the logical 
and immaterial structure of the principle leaves the problem of determining what is that 
makes that body occupy that space to the realm of physics. 
Leibniz’s arbitrary and yet non-contradictory unity is perhaps non-intuitive, compared 
with our belief in a world composed by separated entities, but it is consistent with his 
repudiation of the void and with his late remarks on the phenomenal appearance of the 
actual world. This “unshaped coherence” is the great potential hidden in the principle of 
contradiction that Leibniz already saw at the beginning of the 1670s and that he finally 
developed at the end of his life, as a bridge between reality and mathematics. Following 
this approach, numbers would be defined as non-contradictory and unshaped unities, 
connected, through well-ordered and well-founded relations, whereas geometry would be 
conceived as a middle ground, taking the propriety of having a shape or extension and at 
the same time following the rigid well-ordered and well-founded construction of 
arithmetics. In this context, the idea that the whole is necessarily bigger than its parts, 
founded again on the principle of contradiction, becomes the cornerstone for every 
possible coherence, both in arithmetical and geometrical terms. The fact that the finitist 
approach to arithmetics is stronger in Leibniz at the end of his life, after the introduction 
of the concept of monad, is not a mere coincidence then, because it shows Leibniz’s 
purpose of identifying a non-extensional ground where contradiction is still valid, making 
it consistent with the assumption that the few things that can be safely conceived as 
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necessary belongs to mathematics and with the indication of the principle of contradiction 
among the two great principles introduced in the Monadologie172. 
As a final remark, we could now re-think Leibniz’s rationalism in the light of the 
principle of contradiction: if it is true that it has a central role in the ontological 
development of Leibniz’s concept of unity, then perhaps it is not a mere coincidence that 
the evolution of the principle of sufficient reason from the form “nothing happens without 
a reason” to the form “nothing happens without a reason for it to be so and not otherwise” 
takes place at the same time as the adoption of contradiction. In this subtle change an 
important evolution of Leibniz’s philosophy is hidden, because, other than its usual 
extensional feature derived from Hobbes’ influence, the principle of sufficient reason 
gains through the principle of contradiction an intensional meaning, more akin to 
Leibniz’s metaphysics of that time173. The perfected principle in fact entails two different 
meanings: on one hand, everything that happens has a reason, meaning that there is a 
specific chain of causes that leads to that event, hence the extensional meaning. On the 
other hand though, from the fact that there is always a reason why something is so and 
not otherwise it follows that something is always as it is and not otherwise. This last 
meaning perhaps is derived from the coeval adoption of principle of contradiction in 
modal logic, because the requisites for not being otherwise are not only the determined 
causes that precede the analysed event in time: that specific event must also be non-
contradictory in itself or Leibniz’s whole determinism would be at stake. If we admit for 
example that something is coloured in a certain way and at the same time and in the same 
regard it is not coloured in that certain way, then we admit the possibility of an incoherent 
and instant transition that would surpass and rewrite the chain of causes previously 
considered174. Having however added the principle of contradiction, Leibniz’s 
determinism is saved, because a contradiction won’t ever arise, not only in the series 
rerum, but also in the single event considered as a whole and in every possible and infinite 
                                                          
172 See note 157 of this chapter.  
173 An account of the development of Leibniz’s idea of sufficient reason can be found in Piro (2002) and 
Dascal (2008). 
174 In other words, taking the opposite route previously outlined, we could say that if something exists as it 
is and not otherwise, then it must be possible for it to be so and not otherwise, i.e. non-contradictory. In this 
case the principle is important not only for the coherence of something with itself, but also for the coherence 
of something against the possibility for it of being something completely different. It highlights one of the 
most important feature of Leibniz’s principle: it tells us something not only about one thing, but also about 
all the other possible things in this world, i.e. that they are not that thing. 
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partition of that same event. Again, starting from the 1670s, the concepts of unity, identity 
and contradiction take a leading role, rewriting some fundamental parts of Leibniz’s 
rationalism, until we witness a definite inversion in the priority of the principles, between 
contradiction and sufficient reason, as Leibniz states in the margin of the work against 
the Socinian Christoph Stegmann: 
 
Aliquoties notavi bina summa esse principia omnis cognitionis nostrae a 
prioribus rerum deductae: principium contradictionis, ne nobiscum ipsis 
pugnemus, et principium rationis, seu ne quid unquam sine ratione sufficiente 
evenire judicemus. Ex principio contradictionis oritur (Jolley, 179).  
 
In conclusion, giving an exhaustive account of Leibniz’s idea of contradiction is not the 
purpose of this chapter, if only because the variety of topics involved and the amount of 
Leibniz’s writings considered in time require a wider and more appropriate space, but 
these few remarks should be sufficient to recognise at least a missing link in the 
interpretations of Leibniz’s philosophy. If the principle of contradiction is so important 
in all these fields as it seems to be, underestimating Leibniz's claim that it is also the 
foundation of the whole of mathematics would be inappropriate. However, finding in 
Leibniz a specific theory that derives mathematics from contradiction is not easy. In the 
next chapter I will argue that the closest idea found in Leibniz's writings is his 
demonstration of the principle by which the whole is greater than its parts and its use as 
a tool in the confrontation and superposition of mathematical objects. 
After 1671, Leibniz develops his own take on Weigel's syncretism. While in the 
adoption and connection of these principles the relationship with Weigel had a 
fundamental role, this passionate desire of reducing logical and metaphysical statements 
to simpler and simpler terms is a distinctive feature of Leibniz's rationalism that he was 
able to develop with a proficiency and effectiveness that was unknown to Weigel. 
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2.2 Leibniz's Attempt to Define Numbers 
 
A Tentative Explanation of Leibniz's Foundational Approach In this chapter I will try to 
give an adequate account of Leibniz's foundation of mathematics based on the Initia 
rerum mathematicarum metaphysica, a work written after 1714 that represents in my 
opinion Leibniz's most important attempt in defining mathematical objects. This chapter 
then has two main objectives: (1) trying to explain Leibniz's belief in the possibility of 
founding the whole of mathematics on the principle of contradiction and (2) highlighting 
the importance of the concept of homogeneity in every part of Leibniz's philosophy of 
mathematics. 
The first objective is not directly connected with Weigel's influence after 1671, but it 
could be seen as the final outcome of Leibniz's adoption of the universal principles before 
Paris, re-elaborated together with a growing focus on the principle of contradiction, as 
shown in the previous chapter. This objective is the most challenging, because apparently 
in the Initia rerum, while containing many statements connected with the philosophy of 
mathematics, there is no explicit mention of the principle of contradiction. 
The second goal is that of revaluating the concept of homogeneity and free it from its 
necessary connection with the concept of situs: while situational analysis seems to 
describe a wider range of geometrical objects, I will argue that from the point of view of 
defining objects, homogeneity allows both a more precise definition and its possibility of 
being used outside the geometrical framework. Homogeneity will highlight some of the 
most important concepts related to Weigel and his influence on Leibniz's philosophy of 
mathematics, such those of quantity, quality, equality, ratio, and proportion. 
In order to evaluate the final outcome of Weigel's influence then an explanation of 
these concepts is much needed. For these reasons, this chapter should be seen as a purely 
theoretical premise, without any presumption of being an exhaustive historical 
reconstruction175: Leibniz's position on these topics evolves in time and even in the last 
writings some inconsistencies emerge, as it will be shown for the Initia rerum. However, 
I will take this work as the final outcome of a general attitude towards mathematics that 
involves the use of the concepts above mentioned. 
                                                          
175 For an adequate reconstruction of the evolution of Leibniz's analysis situs see De Risi (2007).  
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Combining the two objectives, a contradiction emerges: if our aim is that of understanding 
the difference between arithmetic and geometry, in order to prove that homogeneity is 
independent from geometry, we have to deal in the Initia rerum with a definition of 
number given by Leibniz in a context heavily contaminated by the use of geometry and 
by its terminology, so much that it appears as if the foundations of arithmetic itself is 
based completely on geometry. As it will be shown in detail in the next section in fact, 
Leibniz defines number as “id quod homogeneum est Unitati, seu quod se habet ad 
Unitatem, ut recta ad rectam”176. This assumption is somehow contradictory if confronted 
with what Leibniz said in the letter to Clarke dated 1715, where geometry and arithmetics 
stood on the same ground with regards to the principle of contradiction, because in this 
definition the reference to straight lines could be interpreted as a necessary reference to 
geometry. Judging by Leibniz's claim in the letter to Clarke instead, logic seems to have 
a place that is somehow above arithmetic and geometry from a metaphysical point of 
view. The dependence from straight lines found in the Initia rerum could invalidate these 
relationships. However, since the Initia rerum were written by Leibniz after 1714, we 
should find at least a kind of consistency with the idea expressed in the letter to Clarke in 
the same years. In the Initia rerum, the closest correspondence with this claim is the 
following: 
 
Notandum est etiam, totam doctrinam Algebraicam esse applicationem ad 
quantitates Artis Combinatoriae, seu doctrinae de Formis abstractae animo, 
quae est Characteristica in universum, et ad Metaphysicam pertinet (GM VII, 
24). 
 
It is no coincidence that this statement appears just after Leibniz’s definition of number. 
What emerges from this passage is that algebra derives from an application of something, 
which is the science of abstracted forms that belongs to metaphysics, to something else, 
which is described as quantity. In this sense, we are not far from the relationships between 
the different areas of mathematics that we would expect from Leibniz, given their origin 
from Weigel's philosophy sketched in the previous part: unities considered without 
quantity in their coexistence define logic and metaphysics, quantity considered per se 
                                                          
176 GM (VII, 24). 
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defines arithmetics and quantity applied to extension defines geometry. Our first task then 
would be that of understanding the true role of geometry in Leibniz’s foundations of 
arithmetics and why he describes this process as a metaphysical foundation. What I would 
like to suggest on this topic is that Leibniz saw the Initia rerum as a last effort on the 
realisation of a Mathesis Universalis, the dream of a superior science that describes itself 
as an ideal bridge between geometry and arithmetic. Being an application of the universal 
characteristic to something else, there is no identification between Characteristica 
Universalis and Mathesis Universalis, since the former has a wider range of use in 
Leibniz’s view177. As such, Mathesis Universalis is not a purely formal theory, however 
it contains, as it will be shown, a decisive implementation of formal properties. A possible 
confirmation of this interpretation is contained in the Matheseos Universalis Pars Prior, 
found in the seventh volume of Gerhardt’s Mathematische Schriften:  
 
Hinc etiam prodit ignorata hactenus vel neglecta sub-ordinatio Algebrae ad 
artem Combinatoriam, seu Algebrae Speciosae as Speciosam generalem, seu 
scientiae de formulis quantitatem significantibus ad doctrinam de formulis, 
seu ordinis, similitudinis, relationis etc. expressionibus in universum, vel 
scientiae generalis de quantitate ad scientiam generalem de qualitate, ut adeo 
speciosa nostra Mathematica nihil aliud sit quam specimen illustre Artis 
Combinatoriae (GM VII, 61). 
 
Since this passage revolves around the idea of the application of quality to quantity and 
the subordination of algebra to the science of forms, we can safely assume that the Initia 
rerum are Leibniz’s last attempt on the foundational theory of mathematics sketched here, 
following the idea of a Mathesis Universalis, because the concept involved are the same. 
This last work on the metaphysical origin of mathematics is therefore an ideal starting 
point in order to understand Leibniz’s mature theory: here, concepts like quality, quantity, 
                                                          
177 That of Crapulli (1969) is still an excellent book on the origin of the term, especially because it highlights 
the importance not only of the words used, but also of the amount of work done around Proclus’ 
commentary on Euclid’s Elements. It shows that a reconstruction of the influence of this term in Leibniz 
can’t be focused only on the obvious reference to Descartes’ Regulae ad directionem ingenii: the debate on 
a Mathesis universalis was advanced and widely known, so much that a reference to Proclus’ commentary 
is found in Suárez, as shown in the previous part. 
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order, similarity and relation are in fact thoroughly defined. Therefore, it’s now time to 
move to a detailed analysis of these concepts and their relation. 
 
Leibniz’s Definition of Number In the Initia rerum, before the definition of number, 
Leibniz introduces several concepts that will be fundamental for his main aim. However, 
following Leibniz’s approach, undoubtedly rigorous, is difficult, because it requires a 
deep knowledge of all the concepts involved and their relation. Therefore, in this 
exposition of Leibniz’s theory, I will start from the definition of number and then 
gradually introduce the other concepts involved, following a logical scheme, more than 
the order in which they are presented. 
Leibniz’s definition of number, quoted in the previous section, is here presented in its 
entirety: 
 
Numerum in genere integrum, fractum, rationalem, surdum, odinalium, 
trascendentem generali notione definiri posse, ut sit id quod homogeneum est 
Unitati, seu quod se habet ad Unitatem, ut recta ad rectam. Manifestum est 
etiam, si Ratio a ad b consideretur ut numerus qui sit ad Unitatem, ut recta a 
ad rectam b, fore Rationem ipsam homogeneam Unitati; Unitatem autem 
repraesentare Rationem aequalitatis (GM VII, 24). 
 
Number then is defined as that which is homogenous to unity and it is immediately 
connected with the concept of homogeneity and with that of ratio, exemplified by the 
comparison between straight lines.  
As a preliminary remark, I would like to point out the basic consequence of this 
definition: every number is something which bears some kind of relation to unity. If every 
number must be defined through a confrontation with unity, unity becomes the 
cornerstone of Leibniz’s foundation of arithmetic. Other than unity however, this notion 
relies on a peculiar relation between unity and numbers and on a reference to geometrical 
objects that is worth analysing. From this definition two possible interpretations seem to 
arise, depending on how we decide to interpret that "ut", used in "ut recta ad rectam": if 
Leibniz meant a proper connection, then numbers are defined through geometrical 
entities, otherwise it is just the exemplification of a similar relationship. I will now try to 
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endorse the first possibility and show that ultimately both possibilities are not as distant 
as they seem at first glance.   
 
Homogeneity In the next section I will discuss the use of the term "recta" and the problems 
related to this choice, but for now, I would like to focus on the peculiar relation that a 
number must bear in order to be defined: homogeneity. This relation is essential to 
understand if the foundation is based on a purely geometrical definition or not. At first 
glance in fact, the definition of number seems to rely completely on the geometrical 
notion of a straight line, at least in its exemplification, but the relation of homogeneity 
adds a new level of complexity, which should not be underestimated. Leibniz defines 
homogeneity in this way: 
 
Homogenea sunt quibus dari possunt aequalia similia inter se. Sunto A et B, 
et possit sumi L aequale ipsi A, et M aequale ipsi B sic ut L et M sint similia, 
tunc A et B appellabuntur Homogenea. Hinc etiam dicere soleo, Homogenea 
esse quae per transformationem sibi reddi possunt similia, ut curva rectae. 
Nempe si A transformetur in aequale sibi L, potest fieri simile ipsi B vel ipsi 
M, in quod transformari ponitur B (GM VII, 19). 
 
Here, two definitions of homogeneity are hidden: the first one is what I would call the 
general definition of homogeneity, which involves the introduction of two new 
fundamental relations, equality and similarity, applied to four different entities ― A, B, 
L and M ― following a certain scheme or rule. Equality is applied between A and L, and 
between B and M, whereas similarity is applied between L and M. The other definition is 
what I would call the purely geometrical definition, which derives from the geometrical 
exemplification expressed by Leibniz between curves and straight lines. In this case, the 
scheme of the general definition is not completely respected, because the fourth entity, 
that is M, is taken as unnecessary. A bears the same equality relation to L, but in this case 
Leibniz admits the possibility of a direct connection between L and B through similarity. 
This is legitimate, given the geometrical exemplification, because the transformation 
happens in a geometrical context in which B could be already quantified and suitable for 
110 
 
the similarity relation178. I believe that this is a relevant distinction, because it means that 
in Leibniz’s geometrical example B and L are ontologically closer than the same entities 
described in the general definition. Understanding which homogeneity relation is applied 
to the definition of number is therefore necessary, because it will also show the 
ontological connection between the concept of number and pure geometry. 
If we now apply the general definition of homogeneity to the definition of number 
previously given and taken as if the straight lines are not used only as an exemplification, 
the result is the following: a number (B) is something homogeneous to unity (A), i.e. unity 
(A) is equal to a straight line (L), the given number (B) is equal to another straight line 
(M), while these straight lines (L and M) are similar to each other. It is possible to apply 
the general definition because in the quoted passage Leibniz openly uses four entities, 
two numbers and two straight lines. However, it doesn’t necessarily mean that in this case 
the purely geometrical definition can’t be applied: since the purely geometrical definition 
is a special case of the general one, it could still be that the straight line L, related to unity, 
is also similar to the given number B. Even if this new definition of number seems more 
detailed than the original one then, it is now evident that the definitions of equality and 
similarity are needed for a complete understanding of Leibniz's aim. 
Leibniz defines equality as the relation between things that have the same quantity. 
Quantity then is defined in this way: 
 
Quantitas seu Magnitudo est, quod in rebus sola compraesentia (seu 
perceptione simultanea) cognosci potest. Sic non potest cognosci, quid sit pes, 
quid ulna, nisi actu habeamus aliquid tanquam mensuram, quod deinde aliis 
applicari possit (GM VII, 18). 
 
Until now, we have considered Leibniz’s foundation of arithmetic without questioning its 
coherence, but after introducing this definition, it is possible to explain a passage of the 
original definition of number that could be considered incoherent at first glance: if 
Leibniz’s aim is that of defining a number and his first step in this direction is conceiving 
it as something equal to something else, that is to say, something that has the same 
                                                          
178 The connection between homogeneity and transformation in a geometrical sense and its role in Leibniz's 
calculus is analysed in Pasini (1993, 26-29).   
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quantity of something else, then a contradiction arises, because the concept of quantity, 
related to numbers, is contained in the definition of number itself. However, Leibniz’s 
definition of quantity is not that of a simple numerical description, but it is based on the 
idea of a simultaneous compresence. In this regard, stating something as "A measures 6 
meters" is completely meaningless, until A is introduced in a peculiar set of relations, in 
which an order between different objects is established. The introduction of similarity in 
a context where different things are compared is then necessary, otherwise equality would 
be a mere statement on the identity of two things, in the form of "A is B": 
 
Neque adeo pes ulla definitione satis explicari potest, nempe quae non rursus 
aliquid tale involvat. Nam etsi pedem dicamus esse duodecim pollicum, 
eadem est de pollice quaestio, nec majorem inde lucem acquirimus, nec dici 
potest, pollicis an pedis notio sit natura prior, cum in arbitrio existat utrum 
pro basi sumere velimus (GM VII, 19). 
 
The difference between a numerical definition of quantity and Leibniz’s definition is 
essential, because it shows that Leibniz had a significant idea of a foundation of arithmetic 
and not a mere exposition of the concept of number in geometrical terms: the problem of 
defining a number, without relying to a numerical reference or to the idea of counting, is 
in fact very frequent in writings concerning this topic, as it will be in the foundational 
attempts of the 20th century. This is remarkable per se, because it places Leibniz far ahead 
of his times. 
This passage also confirms that an adequate definition is the one that involves similar 
things, otherwise it would be completely arbitrary. Similarity is defined through quality, 
instead of quantity: 
 
Qualitas autem est, quod in rebus cognosci potest cum singulatim 
observantur, neque opus est compraesentia. Talia sunt attributa quae 
explicantur definitione aut per varias modificationes quas involvunt […] 
Similia sunt ejusdem qualitatis. Hinc si duo similia sunt diversa, non nisi per 
compraesentiam distingui possunt” (GM VII, 19). 
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Quality is then something that pertains to an object, without requiring compresence. It 
could be described as a set of properties that intrinsically pertain to something. In the case 
of the straight line for example a quality would be that of proceeding interminably in both 
directions, or the idea of a length with no width. These properties pertain to a straight line 
in a way that would make us unable to distinguish another straight line from the one 
considered, if they are taken as the only object existing in our space. It follows that these 
qualities are maintained for any given part of the object: 
 
Rectam esse inter sua extrema aequabilem. Neque enim aliquid assumitur, 
unde reddi possit ratio varietatis. Itaque oportet, ut unus locus puncti in ea 
moti ab altero discerni non possit seposito respectu ad extrema. Hinc et pars 
rectae recta est, itaque intus ubique sibi similis est, nec duae partes discerni 
possunt inter se, cum suis extremis discerni non possint (GM VII, 26). 
 
In other words, similar objects are those that cannot be distinguished if not considered in 
a reference system. It also follows that some properties instead derive from compresence: 
talking about the slope of a straight line for example has no meaning if only that line is 
conceived, without establishing the coordinate system. 
It is possible now to apply these distinctions again to the original definition of number, 
obtaining in this way the most detailed description of Leibniz’s original passage, 
considering the relations involved: a number is something that can be known through a 
relation of homogeneity to unity, that is to say, conceiving both unity and the given 
number as straight lines in a simultaneous compresence. These lines have the same 
intrinsic properties and they are co-present with each other. Having exposed every 
relation involved, it is finally evident that the homogeneity between a given number and 
unity is not the purely geometrical homogeneity, as it was defined before. If this was the 
case, "L" would be similar to "B": the straight line equal to unity would be similar to the 
number defined. However, if being similar means having the same quality, by no means 
the intrinsic properties of a straight line are the same of those of a mere number. In 
Leibniz’s terms, this would mean that a number and a straight line would be completely 
undistinguishable if taken as single entities, which is obviously not the case. It’s clear 
now that Leibniz’s foundation is not a purely geometrical foundation: even if we accept 
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that the geometrical exemplification in the definition is a fundamental exemplification, 
unity and the other numbers are treated as geometrical entities but they are not defined as 
geometrical entities. In other words, geometry is used as a tool, an extremely useful and 
powerful tool indeed, but it doesn’t express the essence of numbers: in Leibniz’s 
definition, unity and the other numbers stand untouched by the geometrical qualities, they 
are just assigned to objects having geometrical properties, through the quantitative 
relation. 
At first glance, the difference between a geometrical foundation and a foundation that 
uses geometry as a tool could be seen as a trivial distinction, but it bears an important 
consequence: ideally, equivalence and similarity can be used in the definition of number 
without a direct reference to geometry. It would be as admitting that quality and quantity 
can be found in non-geometrical contexts. According to Leibniz, this consequence seems 
at least legitimate: the exemplification used in the definition of quantity is consistent with 
this assumption, because it highlights how the notion of a measure is arbitrary, if taken 
alone, while the definition of quality relies on the idea of intrinsic proprieties, i.e. 
something legitimately conceivable in other contexts where other proprieties are given. 
Describing these new contexts as "every context in which the existence of qualities is 
admitted" is perhaps a metaphysical assumption too big to master, especially in Leibniz’s 
mature philosophy, where some important differences between what we would call reality 
and the realm of mathematics are stressed. However, if this extension is limited to 
mathematics, there are contexts other than geometry where the definition and 
identification of qualities is possible. A step in this direction is done by Leibniz in this 
passage of the Initia rerum, which is worth quoting in its entirety because it directly 
follows the quote on algebra as an application to quantity of the science of abstracted 
forms, discussed in the previous section: 
 
Productum multiplicatione a + b + c + etc. per l + m + n + etc. nihil aliud 
est quam summa omnium binionum ex diversi ordinis literis, et productum ex 
tribus ordinibus invicem ductis, a + b + c + etc.  in l + m + n + etc. in s + t 
+ v + etc. fore summam omnium ternionum ex diversi ordinis literis; et ex 
aliis operationibus aliae prodeunt formae. Hinc in calculo non tentum lex 
homogeneorum, sed et justitiae utiliter observatur, ut quae eodem modo se 
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habent in datis vel assumtis, etiam eodem modo se habeant in quaesitis vel 
provenientibus, et qua commode licet inter operandum eodem modo 
tractentur; et generaliter judicandum est, datis ordinate procedentibus etiam 
quaesita procedere ordinate (GM VII, 24-25). 
 
Here, the science of the abstracted forms of calculations is applied to similar relations, 
established between generic, yet distinct, numbers. A part from the law of justice, Leibniz 
admits that also the law of homogeneous entities is respected in this case, which means 
that quantity and quality are used in a non-geometrical context, hence the possibility of 
finding correspondences in similar relations.  
Finally, it is possible to understand why in several statements about the connection 
between logical-metaphysical principles and principles belonging to mathematics, 
Leibniz considers universal characteristics above arithmetic and geometry: in this 
framework, a general notion is applied to two specific field with a certain degree of 
autonomy. These fields share with their origin the concept of homogeneity: in defining 
objects there must be homogeneity between characters or letters – taken as non-
numerically-quantified entities –, homogeneity between numbers, and homogeneity 
between different geometrical objects. It follows that the real essence of Leibniz’s 
foundational method is the distinction between quantity and quality and the way in which 
these concepts are applied in order to achieve a set of coherently related entities. If this is 
possible in non-geometrical terms, as shown, it means that the choice of the straight lines 
in the definition of number is in a sense arbitrary. Numbers in fact could be homogenous 
within themselves, so that a relation with other homogeneous entities, such as straight 
lines, is not necessary. However, I believe that this interpretation does not fully grasp 
Leibniz's intent with regards to numbers because, if numbers are already homogenous 
between themselves before their definition, then Leibniz's use of homogeneity in the 
definition would seem unnecessary. 
There surely is a tension in the definition of number: homogeneity involves equality, 
equality involves quantity, quantity is given by compresence, but compresence is also the 
way in which the similar entities taken as equal to the original entities find which is 
greater than the other. It seems then that compresence is used both for defining quantity 
and for specifying quality, but it should be noted that the compresence used by Leibniz 
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in the definition of quantity previously given is different from that used among entities 
having the same qualities. As I've shown, Leibniz argues that compresence in quantity is 
arbitrary, while in its use among similar entities it states something that is not arbitrary. I 
will try and give an exemplification of this process and I will use line segments in order 
to simplify the reasoning: we want to define the numbers 3 and 7 by establishing their 
homogeneity with unity, that is 1. The first step is identifying something equal to unity, 
i.e. arbitrarily taking something, a line segment, and stating that unity is assigned to it by 
means of compresence. The length of this line segment is not important, otherwise we 
would define quantity with quantity. The next step is establishing equality between 3, 7 
and two line segments that are qualitatively similar to the line segment used for unity. 
Since these line segments are similar, by means of their compresence we can now see 
which one is greater than the other. Comparing the segments assigned to 3 and 7 to the 
one assigned to unity we discover that they are both greater than unity, but we also 
discover that the line segment related to 3 is greater than the one related to 7. We have 
now our ordo: 1, 7, 3. I have switched 7 and 3 with respect to the universally accepted 
idea so that I could show that order here is given only by the confrontation among similar 
entities. "3" and "7" at the beginning of our reasoning are mere names, they acquire their 
meaning only at a later time through homogeneity. This is the difference between the 
arbitrary compresence of equality used to assign line segments to names and the 
compresence applied to similar entities used in the confrontation between those line 
segments. It follows that conceiving from the beginning similarity between numbers 
would dismiss the complexity of Leibniz's idea of transformation that is found in the very 
definition of homogeneity and the arbitrary trait of equality defined without quality. 
Numbers are not immediately unitates, as Hobbes would say: they need to be defined 
through qualitatively similar objects in order to achieve that status. These objects however 
are not necessarily taken from geometry, if quality and quantity exist also outside 
geometry. 
A possible outcome then would be proving that the choice of geometrical entities for 
the exemplification in the definition of number is the best one, or at least one of the best, 
in respect to Leibniz’s foundational purpose. In order to show this possibility, a thorough 
analysis of the geometrical entities chosen by Leibniz is needed. 
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Straight Lines and Line Segments In Leibniz’s definition of number the qualitatively 
similar entities chosen to establish a relation between numbers and unity are straight lines. 
Until now, I deliberately postponed the analysis of these entities. However, the notion of 
a straight line poses a problem about its very nature: is Leibniz referring to the notion of 
a straight line as something that proceeds interminably in both directions, or is he referring 
to the notion of a line segment, i.e. something that is conceived as a finite part of a straight 
line? The origin of this problem lies in an incoherent use of this term by Leibniz in the 
Initia rerum: in the definition of number, Leibniz uses the word recta and, according to 
another passage179, he makes a distinction between a straight line, called recta as well, 
and a general line, called linea. From this passage it seems that Leibniz is referring to a 
straight line, but in a third passage180, very close to the one previously quoted, Leibniz 
writes about rectae that have some kind of finite quantity related to them, as in a 
comparison between line segments. It would be wise not to underestimate this problem, 
because straight lines and line segments could have, in Leibniz’s terms, different 
qualities, so that, ideally, one could be more adequate than the other as a geometrical tool 
used in the definition of number. 
In Leibniz’s definition of number, a specific term is used to define the relation between 
the given lines, that is Ratio181. Now, this term is also used in another section of the Initia 
rerum: 
 
Sed omnium Relationum simplicissima est, quae dicitur Ratio vel Proportio, 
eaque est Relatio duarum quantitatum homogenearum, quae ex ipsis solis 
oritur sine tertio homogeneo assumto. Veluti si sit y ad x ut numerus ad 
unitatem seu y = nx, quo casu x positis abscissis, y ordinatis, locus est recta, 
locus inquam seu Linea quam ordinatae terminantur (GM VII, 23). 
 
                                                          
179 “Recta, quae est linea intus sibi similis” (GM VII, 21), which can be adapted both to a straight line and 
a line segment. However: “Ex duobus punctis prosultat aliquid novi, nempe punctum quodvis sui ad ea 
situs unicum, horumque omnium locus, id est recta quae per duo puncta proposita transit” (GM VII, 21). 
The verb ‘transit’ used here suggests that Leibniz is conceiving here a straight line. 
180 “Sint datae duae rectae, quae inter se comparentur utcunque. Verb. Gr. detrahatur minor ex majore” 
(GM VII, 23). 
181 See Leibniz (GM VII, 24). 
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Leibniz uses here the equation of a straight line in the form y = nx, where the y-intercept 
is equal to 0, to describe the same relation used in the definition of number, that is Ratio. 
This is also the only passage in which a reference to the previously discussed definition 
of number is given, because “y is to x as any number is to unity”, in the same way in 
which a number is to unity as a straight line to a straight line. However, in this case, if we 
replace x and y with unity and a given number, then n, i.e. slope, would be equal to the 
ratio between these numbers. In other words, it would seem appropriate to identify 
numbers with line segments more than straight lines, because they are equivalent to 
scalars, that is to say, the line segments generated by the projection of a point belonging 
to a straight line to the x axis and the y axis. Yet, in the definition of number, Leibniz adds 
a new depth to this idea, because he writes that even the ratio itself is homogeneous to 
unity182. Being a quotient, even a ratio is a number and every number can be expressed 
as a ratio, but in this context a ratio is also the slope of a straight line with a y-intercept 
equal to 0. As much as every number can be seen as a ratio, every line segment can be 
seen as a straight line having a slope equal to that ratio and a y-intercept equal to 0. This 
interpretation is confirmed by Leibniz himself: "Ex his sequitur, lineas similes esse in 
ratione rectarum Homologarum"183. Line segments are indeed similar to each other. In 
the end, the incoherent use of the term recta to identify both straight lines and line 
segments hides Leibniz’s belief that they can be seen as having the same function. I 
believe that he was aware of this problem and I would like to suggest that perhaps Leibniz 
left this terminological incoherence because he didn’t want to openly admit that a finite 
geometrical entity can be expressed through an infinite one, in the context in which the 
Initia rerum were meant to be published184. In the next chapter I will show the importance 
of the relationship between finite and the infinite in the development of Leibniz's 
foundational attempts. 
Putting aside the mere terminological problem however, considering line segments as 
slopes of straight lines having the y-intercept equal to 0 highlights some important 
features of Leibniz’s foundations of arithmetic. If the succession of different numbers is 
given through a description of the relation they have with unity and the other numbers, 
                                                          
182 “Manifestum est etiam, si Ratio a ad b consideretur ut numerus qui sit ad Unitatem, ut recta a ad rectam 
b, fore Rationem ipsam homogeneam Unitati” (GM VII, 24). 
183 GM (VII, 24). 
184 The Initia rerum were probably meant to be published in the Acta Eruditorum: as the opening suggests 
with Leibniz’s reference to Wolff, this work was not conceived by Leibniz only for a personal use.  
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comparing line segments to see which one is greater than the other could lead to the false 
opinion that a comparison between numerical quantities is still involved, even if it is not 
the case. In the representation of every number as a straight line that differs only in having 
a different slope instead, it is clear that this is not the case: every number is, so to speak, 
a unity, because every infinite straight line is similar to that of unity, undistinguishable if 
not taken in a context in which the different slopes are perceivable, that is to say by means 
of compresence. At the same time, every number is unique, because it is defined through 
the infinite relations with the other numbers. The infinite relations are however expressed 
following a specific order that gives continuity to the definition. In this sense, any number 
can be conceived following this order step by step. This way of defining objects is no 
other than what Leibniz called Situs: 
 
Situs est coexistentiae modus. Itaque non tantum quantitatem, sed et 
qualitatem involvit (GM VII, 18). 
 
Situs quaedam coexistendi relatio est inter plura, eaque cognoscitur per alia 
coexistentia, intermedia, id est quae ad priora simpliciorem habent 
coexistendi relationem (GM VII, 25). 
 
In this case the situational analysis would be used so that order between qualitatively 
similar entities could be given. In geometrical terms then, homogeneity could be seen as 
a stricter way of determining situs, because it relies only on the comparison between 
similar entities.  
 
Contradiction and the Principle of the Whole Setting aside for now the problem of 
defining situs, from the geometrical representation of numbers through specific straight 
lines it also follows the most important consequence: the straight line that represents unity 
has the form y = x, that is identity: It means that every numerical identity ― 3 = 3, 8 = 8, 
and so on ― can be conceived as a point that belongs to the straight line which represents 
unity, or as the ratio of this line185. In Leibniz’s eyes this should have been considered a 
great achievement, and it is perhaps one of the most convincing explanation, at least in a 
                                                          
185 “Unitatem autem repraesentare Rationem aequalitatis” (GM VII, 24). 
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geometrical form, of the idea expressed in the correspondence with Clark about the 
possibility of deriving both arithmetic and geometry from identity, i.e. the principle of 
contradiction. Another proof of this theory rests in the analysis of the key aspects of 
Leibniz’s foundations of arithmetic: unity and coexistence are the cornerstones of 
Leibniz’s theory and they are both founded using the principle of identity or contradiction. 
As it is for unity in fact, coexistence is contradictory if it doesn’t follow a specific rule: 
the whole is greater than a part. Comparing similar coexisting objects in fact wouldn’t be 
enough to establish a precise order, if a principle of coherence is not given. By 
highlighting the role of comparison and coexistence we can finally grasp the importance 
of the principle of the whole, taken from Hobbes and Weigel in Leibniz's early years, and 
we can understand why Leibniz states many times that it is related with the foundation of 
mathematics. In the Initia rerum Leibniz gives a demonstration of this principle: 
 
Totum est majus parte […] Res etiam Syllogismo exponi potest, cujus Major 
proposition est definitio, Minor propositio est identica: 
Quicquid ipsius A parti aequale est, id ipso A minus est, ex definitione, 
B est aequale parti ipsius A, nempe sibi, ex hypothesi, 
ergo B est minus A. 
Unde videmus demonstrations ultimum resolve in duo indemonstrabilia: 
Definitiones seu ideas, et propositiones primitivas, nempe identicas, quails 
haec est B est B, unumquodque sibi ipsi aequale est, aliaeque hujusmodi 
infinitae (GM VII, 20). 
 
I believe that the most important part of the demonstration is the propositio identica, that 
is that "nempe sibi" in the minor proposition: B = B. At first glance this demonstration 
seems quite confusing, because here the first definition seems to already embed the whole 
principle. In Leibniz's demonstration, being smaller in general is defined as that which is 
equal to a part of A. B is a part of A, but this is not sufficient in order to prove that B is 
smaller than A: if that was the case the demonstration would be hidden in the definition 
given. However, the criteria for being smaller than A is not "being a part of A", but "being 
equal to a part of A". In fact, being a part of something is not the requisite needed in order 
to be smaller than that thing, since I could always conceive another entity that is smaller 
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than A, yet not being one of its parts. It follows that the requisite for the part B in order 
to be smaller is being equal to a part of A. Equality is not a property given in the first 
definition, but it follows naturally from the very existence of B, because everything that 
is, is also equal to itself. Since B is equal to itself, it is also equal to a part of A, thus B is 
smaller than A. 
The identity of something with itself is then the cornerstone of the demonstration by 
which the whole is greater than the part and it is the only notion needed. If the principle 
of the whole, as shown, is the principle that grants coherence in the confrontation of 
homogenous entities and this confrontation allows the definition of numbers and such, 
then I believe that the identity used in the demonstration is the closest exemplification of 
what Leibniz meant in the letter to Clarke about deriving the whole of mathematics from 
identity. In my opinion, it is also quite clear from the demonstration why identity is 
considered the positive expression of the principle of contradiction: being equal to oneself 
means showing from the very existence the fact of not being something else, in the 
ontological sense of the principle of contradiction debated in the previous part. The 
identity of something to itself shows an intrinsic consistency and coherence that, once 
compared with another entity, which is considered equal to the former and at the same 
time a part of something else, exhibits the impossibility of being something else than what 
it is. In the demonstration used by Leibniz then there is a fundamental, yet poorly 
explained, difference between B taken as equal to a part of A and B taken as a part of A.  
This is the reason why B = B is the most important part of Leibniz's proof, because it 
proves through the principle of contradiction the equality between the two definitions of 
B. 
Another way of explaining these relationships is that of geometrical terms: being equal 
to itself in fact could be conceived as the property of a line segment, contained in another 
line segment, of being equal to another line segment that is not contained in the greater 
line segment. Equality would be given by the superposition of the two segments. The line 
segment which is contained in the greater one would be B defined as a part of A, whereas 
the external line segment would be B defined as equal to that B taken as a part. This 
explanation is allowed, because in the Initia rerum equality has a precise definition, as 
shown. If being equal means having the same quantity it could be that through the 
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confrontation of homogenous line segments Leibniz wants to define, in a rigorous way, 
the concept of identity. 
Consistent with this idea, in the Demonstratio propositionum primarium, dated 1671, 
it is pretty clear that Leibniz was conceiving the proof already during that time as 
something that involved the confrontation with a third line segment equal to a part of 
another segment: 
 
Totum cde est maius parte de 
 
Definitio: Maius est cuius pars alteri toti aequalis est 
[…] Ex hac definitione maius minusque aestimant homines universi; duas 
enim res datas congruentes sibi aut saltem parallelas collocant, ut ab et cde, 
ita enim apparet cde esse maius, seu aliquid aequale ipsi ab nempe cd et 
aliquid praeterea de habere (AA VI-2, 482). 
 
a  b 
 
c  d  e 
 
After this passage, the demonstration is similar to that found in the Initia rerum. The 
reference is clearly to Hobbes' De corpore186, but, given the figure above, there is a 
significant use of line segments in order to explain the relation of equality. Identity, 
contradiction, equality and the principle of the whole are all related in Leibniz's mind and 
this outcome explains Leibniz's efforts throughout his life in all the fields in which these 
concepts are involved, from 1671 to 1716. It is clear that before leaving for Paris, Leibniz 
had not already developed a definitive conception of equality like that of the Initia rerum, 
but the basic idea was already there and it involved the distinction between quantity and 
quality. 
                                                          
186 "Totum esse majus sua parte hic demonstrabimus […] Definitur majus esse, cujus pars est aequalis alteri 
toti. Si jam ponatur totum aliquod A et pars ejus B: quoniam totum B est aequale sibi ipsi et pars totius A 
est ipsum B, erit pars ipsius A aequalis toti B; quare, per definitionem majoris, A est majus quam B; quod 
erat probandum" (Hobbes 1999, 93.94).  
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The evolution of Leibniz's philosophy of mathematics, consistent with the evolution of 
the principle of contradiction examined in the previous chapter, corresponds to his 
acknowledgment of contradiction as a tool that enrich the concept of identity through the 
idea that an identity of something with itself expresses information also about what that 
thing is not. 
One of the most important examples of Leibniz's efforts in connecting identity, 
contradiction, the principle of the whole and concepts taken from his analysis situs is a 
letter to Conring, dated March 1678. The three different drafts of the same part are 
testament of Leibniz's struggle. In the first formulation, written in the margin of the draft 
and then cancelled, is found identity, equality and the principle of the whole:  
 
Axiomata mihi videntur propositiones quae vel non possunt vel quas non 
necesse est demonstrari. Demonstrari non possunt illae, quae sunt identicae, 
verbi gratia: A est A, unumquodque sibi ipsi aequale est, et similes infinitae 
(tot enim dantur quot termini) quas qui negat eo ipso frustra ratiocinari sese 
ac disputare fatetur, sublata enim erit inquisitio veritatis si idem verum et 
falsum esse possit. Demonstrari necesse non est alias quae ab auditoribus 
omnibus sine difficultate admittuntur, ut totum esse majus parte; quae etsi 
formaliter identicae non sint, facile tamen ad identicas reduci id est 
demonstrari possunt (AA II-2, 599). 
 
Then, in the following draft, we find identity, the principle of contradiction, equality and 
similarity, but the principle by which the whole is greater than its part is missing: 
 
Res ergo omnis redit ad definitiones et axiomata. Ex axiomatibus autem ego 
illa tantum per se nota, seu indemonstrabilia esse arbitror, quae sunt identica, 
verbi gratia A est A vel A non est non A vel unaquaque res talis est qualis est, 
unaquaque res sibi ipsi similis, sibi ipsi aequalis est. Reliqua omnia ope 
definitionum ad identica reduci id est demonstrari possunt. Idque Scholastici 
omnes confirmant, qui axiomatum veritatem patere ajunt intellectis terminis; 
id est posse ipsa facili negotio nec longa definitionum serie demonstrari, sive 
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ad identica reduci; sive quod idem est semper ostendi posse, quod contrarium 
implicet contradictionem (AA II-2, 599). 
 
Finally, the final draft revolves around contradiction and identity only: 
 
Necessario inquam, id est ut contrarium implicet contradictionem, qui est 
verus atque unicus character impossibilitatis. Porro ut impossibili respondet 
necessarium, ita propositioni contradictionem implicanti respondet identica ; 
nam ut primum impossibile in propositionibus est haec : A non est A, ita 
primum necessarium in propositionibus est haec: A est A (AA II-2, 602). 
 
From the impossibility of contradiction then, identity follows directly. Many other 
passages187 in Leibniz's writings are dedicated to establishing the right connection 
between these concept and the Initia rerum could be seen as the final effort in this 
direction.  
 
Analysis Situs and Homogeneity The fact that the definition of identity needs equality, 
plus the fact that Leibniz seems at times to derive the equality between the part and its 
equal from the superposition between line segments could suggest that in the end the 
concept of identity is founded on the concept of situs, because situs is a mode of 
                                                          
187 I will show here some examples of the connections between these concepts from an historical 
perspective. In 1679, in the Calculus ratiocinator, similarity and homogeneity are predicated about the 
whole and the part; "id quo plura homogenea sunt, seu similia et cujus modificatione ipsa differunt, v.g. 
spatium figuris, materia corporibus, tempus horis, motus suis partibus. Pars et totum similia sunt. Omnes 
partes simul non differunt a toto" (AA VI-4A, 278). Again in a coeval writing we read: "Basis 
Homogeneorum est, quod in toto et partibus per omnia simile est", adding that "Talis basis homogeneorum 
est etiam materia corporum communis", a claim close to Leibniz's reflections around 1671. (AA VI-4A, 
310). In 1680 we find the definition of number, connected with homogeneity and ratio: "Numerus est totum, 
quod resolvi potest in partes unitatis. Itaque ipsa unitas est Numerus, et pars unitatis etiam est Numerus. 
Eodem res redit si dicamus Numerum esse Homogeneum Unitati […] Huc Numerum habens, rationem 
habens. Ratio est eadem, cum est similitudo in magnitudinum comparatione. Numerus est Homogeneum 
unitatis" (AA VI-4A, 390). In the 1680 Specimen ratiocinationum mathematicarum, equality is defined 
through homogeneity, just after the introduction of the principle of the whole: "Totum est majus sua parte. 
Corollar. Duo homogenea quorum unum altero nec majus nec minus est, aequalia sunt" (AA VI-4A, 418).    
In the draft of a letter to Arnauld, dated 1687, whole and part are connected to homogeneity: "qu’on n’a 
pas communément une notion assez distincte du tout et de la partie, qui dans le fonds n’est autre chose 
qu’un réquisit immédiat du tout, et en quelque façon homogène" (AA II-2, 251). Interestingly enough, this 
remark is written in the context of a reflection on the difference between substance and matter. Being a 
primary requisite, it shows its application in any sort of field. Other relevant examples are found in AA 
(VI-4A, 381, 383, 392, 421), AA (VI-4C, 1987) and E (176). 
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coexistence. I believe however that in the Initia rerum this is not the case: while situs 
seems to be determined by a general relation of coexistence, homogeneity seems to be a 
form of coexistence that differs from that of situs because it is rigorously defined between 
objects that share the same qualities. There is a fundamental difference between the 
description of geometrical space through situational analysis and the definition founded 
in homogeneity: if two things cannot be superpositioned, then they do not possess the 
same situs, but it does not follow that they cannot be described in the same environment 
through the concept of situs, even if they are heterogeneous between themselves. The 
equality between line segments in the demonstration of the principle by which the whole 
is greater than its part instead is based on the superposition of two similarly described 
entities, that is two homogenous line segments. It follows that from a descriptional point 
of view, situs embeds a wider range of possibilities, whereas from a foundational point 
of view homogeneity is the most important concept. 
In the Initia rerum in fact there is a clear connection between homogeneity and the 
concepts of whole and part: "Quod inest homogeneum, Pars appellatur, et cui inest 
appellatur Totum, seu pars est ingrediens homogeneum"188. The same difference between 
a rigorous approach found in homogeneity and a generic approach is in fact translated in 
the very act of confronting entities: "Aestimatio magnitudinum duplex est, imperfecta et 
perfecta ; imperfecta, cum aliquid majus minusve altero dicimus, quamvis non sint 
homogenea, nec habeant proportionem inter se"189. This passage suggest that proportion 
is the equivalent of the application of homogeneity. Later on, this suggestion is fully 
endorsed in a passage already quoted:  
 
Omnium Relationum simplicissima est, quae dicitur Ratio vel Proportio, 
eaque est Relatio duarum quantitatum homogenearum, quae ex ipsis solis 
oritur sine tertio homogeneo assumto (GM VII, 23). 
 
Once again we are back to the relations given by ratios and proportions, the ones used in 
the definition of number. There is undoubtedly a shift in the definition of homogeneity: 
at times it possesses the distinctive feature of bringing transformation in order to compare 
                                                          
188 GM (VII, 19).  
189 GM (VII, 22). 
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similar entities, but in this case being homogenous means being already capable of 
confrontation through similarity, without resorting to a third entity. This last definition of 
homogeneity is closer to the one generally accepted and it explains Leibniz's claims that 
a straight line is homogeneous with its part. This tension testifies Leibniz's efforts in 
connecting the finite with the infinite, a task that only Leibniz could do in those years. At 
the same time, it shows that Leibniz's definition of number is an original extension of a 
traditional one, because it is based on ratios and proportions, in the same fashion in which, 
as I will show in the next chapter, Euclid, Descartes and Weigel conceived it. 
From the analysis of Leibniz's foundation of arithmetics in the Initia rerum however, 
we gained a better understanding of those concepts that in the following historical 
reconstruction will be essential in order to testify Weigel's influence on Leibniz in this 
topic: homogeneity, quantity, quality, ratio and proportion. These concepts led Weigel to 
the definition of numbers through the superposition of line segments that Leibniz will 
adopt at a later time, with the precise purpose of perfecting it, introducing in this topic the 
science of the infinite. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 
 
2.3 Ratio, Homogeneity and Situs Between Weigel and Leibniz 
 
1663 – 1679: Weigel's Definitions of Ratio and Proportion Now that we possess some of 
the basic concepts of Leibniz's philosophy of mathematics, interpreting some of his 
passages from an historical perspective will be easier. 
In his excellent book on Leibniz's analysis situs190, De Risi identifies, among others, 
three decisive moments in the history of this concept: one of the first legitimate references 
found in Leibniz in 1671, the turning point in its development in 1679 and its final 
outcome connected with the Initia rerum at the end of Leibniz's life. It seems quite 
interesting that these moments correspond to those that define Leibniz's relationship with 
Weigel: 1671, as I've shown, represents the peak of Weigel's influence in the early years, 
1679 is the year of Leibniz's first letter to Weigel and, as I will show, the Initia rerum 
were conceived by Leibniz in the context of Weigel's school. Without overinterpreting 
this coincidence, it suggests a possible relationship that should not be underestimated. 
The first reference highlighted is Leibniz's 1671 preparatory work to the Elementa de 
Mente et Corpore: 
 
Geometria scribenda est sine motu, solo situ, vel loco seu distantia. Est enim 
recta situs puncti ad punctum. Caetera omnia rectarum compositiones. Hanc 
sequitur doctrina de productionibus vel linearum per motus, vel figurarum per 
sections. Ultima doctrina est productio motuum per motus. Ubi non de figura, 
sed vi et effectu (AA VI-2, 282). 
 
While this quote undoubtedly shows that Leibniz possessed a precise, even if not refined, 
concept of situs before his mathematical studies in Paris, it should be clear by now that 
this remark is not sufficient in order to argue a complete originality of this concept in his 
mathematics. Leibniz's reasoning in fact is very similar to that explained in the previous 
part, where a distinct difference between reality at rest and in motion was established in 
a geometrical description of the physical world. Combined however with what I presented 
in the previous chapter, this outcome shows another important consequence: if the world 
of geometry is the world at rest and it involves the notion of quality, the fact that Leibniz 
                                                          
190 De Risi (2007, 41-116). 
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introduces now the concept of situs, concept that relies on the distinction between quality 
and quantity, could not be a mere coincidence. It could be that at that time Leibniz already 
possessed the distinction between these two concepts, even more if we connect this 
statement with Leibniz's advancements in physics in those years. Primary matter in fact 
was conceived at rest with a specific property, that was homogeneity, another concept 
that later on will be defined by Leibniz through the distinction between quantity and 
quality. The last part of the previous quote seems to confirm this hypothesis, because on 
one hand the idea of motion as something that needs to be introduced at a later time 
remains also in Leibniz's mature writings on geometry191, and on the other hand that last 
motion explained through "vi et effectu" clearly reveals the physics of collisions endorsed 
by Leibniz before Paris. 
The possibility then that homogeneity, quality, quantity, similarity and situs were 
adopted by Leibniz thanks to Weigel's influence is perfectly reasonable and it could be 
confirmed by the analysis of many passages. If, given the explanation of Weigel's role in 
the studies on the philosophy of nature made in Jena, we tend to believe this was the case 
for homogeneity, quality and quantity, the concept of situs seems relatively new in the 
background of Weigel's influence, but it should be noted that it was instead extensively 
used. The concept of situs in fact is present in almost every work written by Weigel and, 
even if the terminology is not always rigorous192, it involves the same idea of coexistence 
that is found in Leibniz's works on geometry. As I will soon show, Weigel's Corporis 
pansophici pantologia contains several definitions of situs that were known for sure by 
Leibniz around 1683, since notes on that book belonging to that period were found. 
However, even if I recalled several times that this work was probably read by Leibniz in 
1670, the reference to Weigel's Analysis aristotelica is sufficient in order to establish a 
strong resemblance. 
First of all, there surely is a connection between these geometrical properties and 
Weigel's physics. The superposition between space and primary matter granted it, as 
stated in the Analysis aristotelica: 
 
                                                          
191 "Motus est mutation situs […] Via est locus continuus successivus rei mobilis" (GPVII, 20). "Est autem 
in percipiendi transitu quidam ordo, dum ab uno ad aliud per alia transitur. Atque hoc via dici potest […] 
ita via puncti erit linea" (GP VII, 26). 
192 Sometimes it is called Status, like in Weigel (1679, §21). 
128 
 
Et primo quidem, quoniam Materia sensibilis a Spatio, tanquam intelligibili 
materia, cui partes suas coextensas habet, omnes Magnitudinis species & 
differentias, puta Longitudines, Latitudines, Altitudines, Profunditates, Situs 
& ortas inde divisiones & fîgurationes, participat (Weigel 1658, 195). 
 
As much as space transmits geometrical properties to matter, conversely Weigel's 
philosophy of nature passed down to Leibniz, much more concerned about physical 
matters at that time, some fundamental concepts in geometry that he will re-elaborate 
at a later time. Another interesting use of the word situs in the Analysis aristotelica193 
connects this concept with the difference between quality and quantity:  
 
Corpora mundana sic in Spatio mundano hinc inde disseminata primo 
omnium aggreditur Physica Specialis, eorumque mundanas affetiones & 
proprietates, puta Situs & Motus, qualitates (Eclipses, figuras) quantitates 
(distantias, amplitudines, tempora) & c. pervestigat (Weigel 1658, 202). 
 
It is true that this distinction is made on the ground of physics, but given the previous 
quote we can safely assume that its origin is in the geometrical properties that space gives 
to matter. 
The most striking resemblance about the concept of situs however is found in the 
Physcae Pansophicae, a dissertation written by Johannes Wülfer in 1673, again under 
Weigel's tutoring in Jena194. The concept of situs is applied to bodies, but once again the 
context allows the connection with geometry, thanks to the theory of superposition 
between space and primary matter. In fact, after having introduced the geometrical 
principles, in the axiomata propria Wülfer introduces situs: "Corpora certum inter se 
habent Situm. Et hoc dicimus stare vel consistere, locari. Corpora variis modis situm 
mutant. Et hoc dicimus moveri". The result will be: "Motus est mutatio Situs"195, which 
is the same definition found in Leibniz's Initia rerum196. This was Wülfer's use of the 
                                                          
193 Actually, there are some other interesting uses. For example situs was used in measuraments: "Species 
Geodaesiae est Gnomonica h.e. Anchinoea determinandi distantias horarias in quovis subjecto magno, 
cujuscunque sit situs & figurae" (Weigel 1658, 240).  
194 See Herbst (2016, 364).  
195 Weigel-Wülfer (1673b, 76). 
196 GM (VII, 20). 
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"Situatio, quam juxta GEOMETRIAM, spatii scientiam, applicatione saltem immobilium ad 
mobilia definimus"197. 
Weigel's influence on these matters was quite predictable, given that in Leibniz's 
writings, analysis situs is often associated with the efforts in clarifying and demonstrating 
parts of Euclid's Elements. Weigel's Analysis aristotelica was conceived as an explanation 
of Aristotle's philosophy in the light of Euclid. For that time, thinking that Euclid came 
before Aristotle and that the Stagirite was greatly inspired by his work was common, 
mostly because there was a confusion between Euclid of Alexandria, the author of the 
Elements lived after Aristotle, and Euclid of Megara, a Socratic philosopher lived before 
Aristotle. Although being a clear mistake, it caused an interesting evolution in 
philosophy, especially among Weigel and some other authors already quoted, like Abdias 
Trew: it allowed the possibility of interpreting philosophy through mathematics. The 
Aristotle inspired by the Elements was the one that, while arguing in philosophy the 
necessity of universal principles, was referring to the geometrical properties found in 
Euclid's work as the best example of universal truths. This interpretation could be seen as 
another connection between the logical and universal principles found in Aristotle and 
the foundational attempts found in mathematics, because it inevitably led to Weigel's re-
evaluation of the reductio ad absurdum, seen as the application in mathematical terms of 
the principle of contradiction198. 
An interesting passage of Weigel's Analysis about geometry is the one that explains 
the nature of some of Euclid's postulates: 
 
                                                          
197 Weigel-Wülfer (1673b, 28). 
198 "Demonstratio totaliter, dixerim terminaliter spectata, non ostensiva, sed indirecta, per impossibile vel 
ad absurdum ducens dicitur; tum ipsa Hypothesis praedicato contradictoria sui destructiva vocatur, licet 
astructiva sit absurdi attributi per ostensivam demonstrationem  collecti. Vicissim si falsum ab Adversario 
positum fuerit Effatum, v.g. diametrum esse commensurabilem costae: Analyticus commensurabilitatem 
assumit esse, sed ex ea quippiam absurdi colligit ostensive, nempe parem numerum aequalem esse impari, 
lib. I. prior. 35. & consequenter diametrum non esse commensurabilem per impossibile demonstrat.  Ut 
igitur in ostensiva demonstratione Hypothesis semper est astructiva; ita in ea, quae ducit ad impossibile, 
destructiva dici potest terminaliter, esto quod astructiva sit absurdi consequentis. §6. Ex quo colligitur, non 
tantum ex falsis principiis, (puta suppositivis & hypotheticis) non ut ex causis, sed ut ex occasione data, 
verum demonstrari (h.e. veri demonstrationem saltem indirectam inchoari) atque ita quod res sit, ex eo quod 
non sit (h.e. quod alias absurdum accideret si non esset) per deductionem ad impossibile ostendi posse" 
(Weigel 1658, 100). The use of the word impossible and contradiction would be sufficient, but there is an 
even clearer remark: "Hypothesis destructiva […] per indirectum (adhibiro illo primo principio, quod 
impossibile sit idem simul esse & non esse)" (Weigel 1658, 86). 
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Posterioris Classis Postulata sunt illa geometrica, quae, licet de potentia, vel 
potius abstracte de esse nominali, loquantur quatenus ad ipsam adhibentur 
demonstratione, actualem tamen existentiam a parte rei semper includunt, 
atque ita semper positiva sunt (Weigel 1658, 99). 
 
Weigel then introduces the first three postulates of Euclid's Elements. He focuses his 
attention on the first one, specifically on the possibility of drawing a straight line that 
connects two points. With regards to these geometrical construction, Weigel derives then 
this interesting conclusion: 
 
Ducere enim lineas in demonstrationibus geometricis non est facere lineas, 
sed hic praesentes, & datis punctis natura jam interjectas, vel ad datam plagam 
actu semper excurrentes, saltem designare, & designate distincte concipere. 
Unde cum in demonstrando inter principia perfectiva nonnunqua allegamus 
Structuram, Constructionem, non cogitandum est, ipsam velut ex arbitrio 
nostro factam effatum non nisi contingenter probare, quin potius rei veritatem 
ab ipsa natura hoc ipso dependere sciendum est. Res enim geometricae […] 
non sunt a nobis, sed immobiles & ingenerabiles sunt (Weigel 1658, 99-100). 
 
Weigel's general dissatisfaction over considering postulates without offering an adequate 
demonstration, affected Leibniz since the very beginning of his studies. Besides, 
geometry defined at rest reminds to that stillness that was a peculiar trait of Leibniz's 
geometry in the 1669 letter to Thomasius. Particularly interesting is the fact that Weigel 
uses in this passage the word "interjectas" about the possibility of identifying a straight 
line, because it is the same term that Leibniz uses in his 1671 Specimen demonstrationum 
de natura rerum corporearum ex phaenomenis199, coeval with the demonstration of the 
principle by which the whole is bigger than its part that I highlighted in the previous 
chapter. Although then Leibniz himself admits in a famous passage200 that at that time he 
                                                          
199 AA (VI-2, 307). Again, this reference is present in De Risi (2007, 46). 
200 "Cela m’a encor empeché de lire avec soin les livres de Geometrie ; et j’ose bien avouer, que je n’ay pas 
encor pu obtenir de moy de lire Euclide autrement qu’on n’a coustume de lire les histoires. J’ay reconnu 
par l’experience que cette methode en general est bonne; mais j’ay bien reconnu neantmoins qu’il y a des 
auteurs qu’il en faut excepter. Comme sont parmy les anciens philosophes Platon et Aristote, et des nostres 
Galilée, et des Cartes" (AA II-1, 389). 
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had not already carefully read Euclid's Elements, it does not follow that he was not able 
to grasp through Weigel some of the notions contained in that work. This outcome was 
only natural, given the reference to Hobbes' principle of the whole that was elaborated 
from Euclid's Elements. 
Judging by the general context in which the concept of situs emerges, the reformation 
of Euclid's Elements, and the debate on the role of homogeneity, a closer connection with 
Weigel on the distinction between quality and quantity seems possible. The last obstacle 
is a letter, dated 1677, sent by Leibniz to Gallois: 
 
Après avoir bien cherché, j’ay trouvé que deux choses sont parfaitement 
semblables, lors qu’on ne les sçauroit discerner que per compraesentiam, par 
exemple deux cercles inegaux de même matiere ne se sçauroient discerner 
qu’en les voyant ensembles, car alors on voit bien que l’un est plus grand que 
l’autre […] Cette proposition est aussi importante en Metaphysique et même 
en Geometrie et en Analyse, que celle du tout plus grand que sa partie. Et 
neantmoins personne que je sçache l’a enoncée. On demontre par là aisement 
le theoreme des triangles semblables, qui semble si naturel, et qu’Euclide 
demonstre par tant de circuits (AA II-1, 568-569). 
 
This quote is not particularly relevant now for the theories displayed, because we are 
already accustomed to the use of coexistence, its connection with the principle of the 
whole, or the possibility of proving geometrical demonstration, but its importance derives 
from that claim – "Et neantmoins personne que je sçache l’a enoncée" – that seems to 
exclude any possibility for a prior influence. We could simply suppose that Leibniz were 
lying in that moment, but thankfully we don't need to resort to any conjecture, because it 
is Leibniz himself that, at a later time, will correct this statement in his Théodicée, by 
recognizing Weigel's influence. In a wider context, this reference, already given in the 
first part, is particularly meaningful: 
 
La consequence de la quantité à la qualité ne va pas tousjours bien, non plus 
que celle qu'on tire des egaux aux semblables. Car les egaux sont ceux dont 
la quantité est la même, et les semblables sont ceux qui ne different point 
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selon les qualités. Feu M. Sturmius […] il tâcha de donner des regles exactes 
et generales dans des matieres non mathematiques, encouragé à cela par feu 
M. Erhard Weigel […] Si similibus addas similia, tota sunt similia; mais il 
fallut tant de limitations pour excuser cette regle nouvelle, qu'il auroit eté 
mieux, à mon avis, de l'enoncer d'abord avec restriction, en disant, Si 
similibus similia addas similiter, tota sunt similia. Aussi les Geometres ont 
souvent coutume de demander non tantum similia, sed similiter posita (GP 
VI, 245). 
 
The reference to the help of Erhard Weigel and to a young Sturm date Leibniz's 
knowledge of Sturm's work to the early years. Unsurprisingly in fact, Sturm is quoted in 
Leibniz's 1666 Dissertatio de arte combinatoria201. Perhaps, the claims of originality 
contained in Leibniz's 1677 letter could be explained by the difference highlighted in the 
Théodicée, because Leibniz was developing a stricter definitional tool than that of Sturm. 
Nonetheless, the reference to themes belonging to the analysis situs already in 1671 is 
reasonably explained now by Leibniz's acquaintance with Surm's and Weigel's idea of 
similarity. 
The importance of the year 1669 in Weigel's reception and the connection between 
geometry and primary matter lead to what I believe is Weigel's most important work on 
the philosophy of mathematics, the Idea matheseos universae. This small essay was 
published in 1669 and it was already quoted about Leibniz's philosophy of nature, because 
it contained a definition of primary matter very similar to that of Leibniz, especially 
highlighting the idea of a continuous transformation that ultimately leads to homogeneity. 
It contains a tentative foundation of the concept of number that relies on the definition of 
quantity through similarity and homogeneity by means of comparison between entities, 
both geometrical and arithmetical. Since it is a work that extends the concept of quantity 
to every possible field, typical of Weigel's approach, it contains several definition of 
quantity. The first definition, formal quantity, already entails the terminology that we will 
find at a later time in Leibniz: "Est igitur Quantitas formaliter & abstracte spectata nihil 
aliud, quam determinata ratio qualitatis, aut purius, talitatis seu formalitatis"202. In this 
                                                          
201 AA (VI-1, 186). 
202 Weigel (1669, 3). 
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first definition, some of the concepts found in Leibniz's Initia rerum are already present: 
the need of using the concept of ratio in order to define entities, the specification that this 
ratio must be between qualitatively similar objects and a concept of quality that seems to 
embed the idea of intrinsic formal properties. The definition of the respective quantity 
connects the former definition with the idea of a comparison between something greater 
and something smaller and with the whole and the part: 
 
Respective definimus […] quantitatem, comparatione objecti cum sibi simili, 
prius tamen cognito, aut saltem supposito, quatenus illa comparatio in 
terminis generalibus subsistit, ut si, ad quaestionem quanta sit res? Dicamus 
eam esse majorem vel minorem alia quadam sibi simili, nobisque cognita […] 
ita τό finitum & τό infinitum, totum, pars, omne, quoddam, majus, minus 
termini quantitativi sunt (Weigel 1699, 12). 
 
The comparison happens between things that are similar between themselves, even in the 
infinite. Another definition given to the respective quantity is that which expresses 
"rationem aequalitatis aut inaequalitatis"203, so that another concept seen later in Leibniz 
is found. However, the most astonishing resemblance with Leibniz's theory is in the 
definition of the concept of ratio, which is worth quoting in its entirety: 
 
Ratio est quantitas primo respective concepta, h.e. valor unius termini in 
mensura alterius terminis similis & homogenei, priusque cogniti, vel saltem 
suppositi & assumpti. Ut si quaeratur, quam longa sit linea A  B ? 
Respondeaturque per linea  pedalem C  D tanquam per mensuram, 
dicaturque, linea  A B esse v.g. quadrupedalem. Ubi quantitas respective 
concepta est quadruplicitas, seu quadruplum, ratio nempe sive valor quem 
habet linea A B ad lineam C D. Proportio vero est quantitas bis respective 
concepta h.e. ratio per similem rationem, quam habent alii duo termini, 
expressa: Ut si ad quaestionem, quam longa sit linea A  B? 
supposita linea C  D tanquam ejus mensura, assumptisque simul 
duobus aliis terminis similiter se habentibus v.g. semuncia & drachma 
                                                          
203 Weigel (1669, 3). 
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respondeatur: lineam A B ad C D praecise tantam esse, quanta est semuncia 
ad drachmam (Weigel 1669, 14-15). 
 
This definition of quantity by means of comparison between homogeneous enetities is 
almost identical to that of Leibniz. It even embeds in the end the idea that four 
heterogeneous entities could be defined by establishing a proportion between pairs of two 
homogeneous entities, much like numbers and straight lines. Naturally, this was not a 
theory uniquely adopted by Weigel204, but the similarities and the context in which it was 
developed suggest that Weigel should be considered Leibniz's major influence in its 
adoption. Much like Leibniz distinguishes the arithmetical definition from the 
geometrical one, thanks to his abstract science of relations, so Weigel allows the 
independent arithmetical definition: 
 
Ratio differentialis sive Arithmetica est, quae similitudinem determinat per 
differentiam termini respective definiendi, quam habet ad terminum 
definientem, tanquam ad mensuram. Ita 6. arithmetice definiuntur per 2. si 
dicatur: Senarium esse 4. unitatibus majorem binario: ita 8. definiuntur per 8. 
si dicatur, nihilo majorem aut minorem esse octonarium illum, fors notum, 
hoc octonario forsan ignoto. (Nam & inter aequales intercedit arithmetica 
Ratio) (Weigel 1669, 14-15). 
 
The effort was that of defining by means of comparison, without resorting to 
quantification in the commonly accepted sense. If this is Weigel's general mathematical 
and metaphysical principle that governs all things, it is possible to understand now the 
extension of the concept of ratio and proportion to ethics and law found in his school. 
Being at the core of Weigel's metaphysics, it is highly improbable that before the Parisian 
stay Leibniz never came across this idea and the definition of all the properties that it 
involved. Above all, because the concept of homogeneity here defined through similarity 
was also used by Weigel in that physical account of the world that had such an important 
impact on the young Leibniz's philosophy. This common origin of Leibniz's and Weigel's 
                                                          
204 The most common references are Descartes' Regulae ad directionem ingenii (Descartes 1963, X, 11), 
Cavalieri's Geometria (Cavalieri 1653) and unity interpreted as the infinite number in Galileo (Galilei 1929, 
VIII, 69). However, particularly important for Weigel is Kepler's Chilias logarithmorum (Kepler 1624, 7). 
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theories will help us in understanding the development of their relationship in the 
following years. 
 
1679 – 1683: Leibniz's First Letter to Weigel In September 1679, Leibniz sends his first 
letter to Weigel. Since it is an important letter in order to understand the impact of Weigel 
on Leibniz's development of binary arithmetics, I will reserve its complete analysis to the 
next part of the present work. However, some interesting insights could be achieved also 
on the topic of this part. After a reference to his 1672 Accessio ad Arithmeticam 
Infinitorum205 in fact, in this letter Leibniz presents to Weigel some of his studies on 
arithmetic progressions. It is particularly interesting, not only because the numbers 
chosen for the progressions are the so called figurate numbers, taken from the 
Pythagorean tradition, but also because, just after having introduced the different series, 
Leibniz analyses the same numbers, taken however as fractions having one as a 
numerator. It was not something unique for Leibniz, given that the same argument is 
present in a fragment dated 1675206, or judging by Leibniz's 1672 Accessio, where this 
topic is clearly connected with Pascal, but now that I have established the relevance of 
the concept of ratio in Weigel's philosophy it could be hypothesized that Leibniz's choice 
of analysing the series as fractions depended also on Weigel's influence. In this regard, I 
will argue that the superior mathematical knowledge achieved in Paris set Leibniz on the 
project of extending to the infinite the usefulness of Weigel's concept of ratio. 
As a starting point, we could ask ourselves if Leibniz's ideas on the number series were 
not completely rejected by Weigel's school. Predictably, this is not the case, as one of 
Vinhold's Theses show207 and, above all, as Weigel's Analysis aristotelica show: 
 
Nam sicut Proportio duplex est, simplex nempe, quae est identitas duarum 
tantum rationum, qualis est, quam 2. habet ad 4. & 4. ad 8. (uti enim 
quaternarius binarii ; ita & octonarius quaternarii duplum est, adeoque eadem 
est utrobique ratio) & continuata, quae est identitas plurium rationum 
continua serie geometrice progredientium v.g. 2 ad 4. 4. ad 8. 8 ad 16. 16 ad 
                                                          
205 "Notavi nimirum primus atque etiam demonstravi theorema sequens quod nulli inter arithmetica 
hactenus inventa cedere visum est amicis" (AA II-1, 745). 
206 AA (VII-3, 676). 
207 "Facilius partier & jucundius est computare per fractos quam per integros" (Weigel-Vinhold 1671, 216). 
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32. & ita in inﬁnitum: [...] in se contineat ejusdem speciei proportiones [...] 
Et sicut in additionibus, unde syllogismus spectata hac analogia nomen est 
mutuatus, si plures fuerint addendi termini, una addito est & una summa, licet 
numeris in quotcunque classes distinctis plures summae particulares constitui 
possint, quae postea seorsim additae nihilominus eandem exhibeant summam 
communem, ita & hic (Weigel 1658, 149–150)208. 
  
Here, Weigel's concept of proportion is applied to a series of fractions, without rejecting 
the idea of the infinite. Certainly, Leibniz was aware of Weigel's interest in the concept 
of ratio and he presented accordingly in 1679 a reasoning that could have made manifest 
to his former teacher his improvements, and superiority, in mathematics: 
 
Nimirum summa hujus seriei infinitae 
1
3
+
1
6
+ 
1
10
+  
1
15
 etc. est finita nempe  
1
1
 quemadmodum facile si desideres demonstrare possum […] At summa 
seriei hujus infinitae 
1
2
 
1
3
 
1
4
 
1
5
 etc. Est 
1
0
 quae quantitas est infinita, major 
scilicet quovis numero assignabili, quemadmodum etiam demonstrare 
possum. Interim multo imo infinities minor est quam summa seriei hujus 
1
1
 
1
1
 
1
1
 
1
1
 etc. Vides itaque inter illud infinitum ordinarium, quod in omnium 
unitatum collectione consistit, et inter finitum, nempe unitatem, dari aliquid 
intermedium nempe 
1
0
 quod est summa fractionum omnium possibilium 
numericarum, unitatem pro numeratore habentium, simul sumtarum (AA II-
1B, 745). 
 
The result of the first series is a finite number, while the result of the last series is the 
regular infinite. Between the two however there is another series that is still infinite: this 
result is Leibniz's first attempt, with regards to the relationship with Weigel, in applying 
the concept of ratio without worrying about the impossibility of understanding the 
infinite. Weigel's answer however will be very disappointing: "Infinitum enim definiri 
contradictionem implicat, hinc ipsum medium vel quasi nempe 
1
0
 i.e. unum nihil, 
                                                          
208 This passage is already quoted in Bullynck (2013). 
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indefinitum est"209. Leibniz reaction to Weigel's answer, that was basically dismissing the 
problem, is annotating on this reply the demonstration that the series 
1
3
+
1
6
+  
1
10
+
1
15
 is 
equal to 1210. Unfortunately, there is no trace of the much more problematic 
demonstration, that is  
1
2
 
1
3
 
1
4
 
1
5
 is 
1
0
, even if Leibniz states in his previous letter that it can 
be demonstrated. I believe however that Leibniz was relying more on his intuition than 
on a rigorous demonstration for this series. Nevertheless, the exchange with Weigel was 
considered fruitful by Leibniz in this regard, as a letter to Clüver of the following year 
shows211. From that moment, Leibniz's consideration for Weigel diminishes from a 
theoretical point of view, although in those years we witness a renewed interest in sharing 
some projects for the advancement of the society of that time212. 
A part from the adoption of the concept of ratio in the early years, another reason why 
Leibniz's 1679 letter could be seen as a prosecution in the infinite of Weigel's aim is that 
a fundamental work, that is De supputatione multitudinis, was sent by Weigel to Leibniz 
before Leibniz's first letter. In this work Weigel offers a demonstration of the rules of 
proportions and defines once again ratio using the concept of homogeneity: "Arithmetica 
Ratio dicitur Valor duorum finitorum, eat. Homogeneorum inter se, nomine multitudinis 
puro definitus"213. 
The complete revaluation of Weigel's philosophy however happens shortly thereafter, 
around 1683, thanks to Leibniz's notes on several of Weigel's works. The most important 
one is the Corporis panophici pantologia, because, judging from the length of the notes, 
Leibniz's spent most of his time on the definitions of situs there exposed214. Many of these 
definitions would be sufficient to prove Leibniz's debt towards Weigel, but the 
geometrical one is particularly relevant. In the first section, Weigel analyses the classis 
situum purorum and with respect to the correlative situs he identifies four different 
categories: conjunction, disjunction, convergence and divergence.  In this framework, 
                                                          
209 AA (II-1, 762). 
210 Strictly speaking, Leibniz tries to demonstrate that  
1
1
 + 
1
3
+
1
6
+ 
1
10
+  
1
15
 is equal to 2. (AA II-1, 765). 
211 "Circa serierum summas multa inveni quae magni usus esse expertus sum" (AA II-1, 800). 
212 For Leibniz's hesitation see the letter to Christian Philip dated March 1681 (AA II-1, 814), while for the 
projects of reforming the calendar and founding a new school see the correspondence with Vincent Placcius 
and De Bauval (AA II-3, 375, 378) 
213 Weigel (1679, Exemplum I). 
214 "Relatio est modus respectivus quo unum ad alterum se refert. Status aut habitudo rei est modus 
terminativus quo quippiam quocunque modo constitutum est et se habet. Situs est modus terminativus, quo 
quodque certa ratione se sistit in consortio et complexu caeterorum omnium" (AA VI-4B, 1191). 
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Weigel introduces the concept of coincidentia as a type of situs. It could be partial 
coincidence or total coincidence, and the exemplification is the superposition of two 
triangles. The opposite type is disjunctio, that is distance, conceived as the study of the 
situational relation between points, points and lines or surfaces, lines and lines or surfaces, 
and surfaces and surfaces215. 
Once again the concepts of situation, homogeneity and ratio were all present in the 
work of Leibniz's former teacher. It could be that Leibniz was not completely aware of 
the debt he owed to Jena's cultural movement, but in time he eventually realised it. 
However, the challenging ideas expressed in Weigel's writings were not complemented 
by an appropriate mathematical knowledge. It is thanks to this tension that in the 
following years Weigel's legacy will become for Leibniz something that needed to be 
perfected.   
 
1683 – 1716: The Acknowledgment of Weigel's Importance After 1683, Leibniz's desire 
of a confrontation to prove Weigel his exceptional knowledge in mathematics weakens: 
while still finding in Leibniz's writings honest criticisms about Weigel's philosophy, 
especially on the demonstration of God's existence, Leibniz generally shows a benevolent 
attitude towards Weigel. After the disappointment of Weigel's 1679 reply a process of re-
evaluation of the role of his former teacher was taking place. The first hint in this direction 
was, as I have shown, Leibniz's effort in reading and annotating some works written by 
Weigel that he already read when he was younger. Later, in Leibniz's 1689 Phoranomus, 
Weigel is remembered as the professor that shared with Leibniz his philosophy of nature 
in the early years. Leibniz's need of rethinking Weigel's philosophy is evident in an 
unpublished manuscript, dated around the time of the Phoranomus and entitled Inventa 
Weigelii doctrinalia. It is a list of Weigel's achievements in every field of the human 
knowledge, from philosophy to ethics and education. Judging by the writing style, the 
manuscript was probably written for personal use and it shows a quite impressive 
knowledge of Weigel's accomplishments that is difficult to retrace judging only by 
Weigel's references in Leibniz's texts. The use of numbered lists is also quite revealing, 
because it suggests the idea of organizing something that was qualitatively relevant and 
                                                          
215 Weigel (1673c, 69). Even if it is extremely relevant, the passage is presented in the text in a schematic 
way that is difficult to report in its original state without causing confusion. 
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at the same time expressed in a confuse way, as Leibniz often remarks about Weigel in 
his correspondence. Predictably, in the list of the philosophical achievements the concept 
of ratio and proportion are present216. 
In 1690 the plan of perfecting Weigel consciously emerges in Leibniz's Animadversiones 
ad Weigelium: 
 
Scientia de quantitate in universum vel de aestimatione, ut vocat celeberrimus 
Weigelius, mihi pro dimida tantum parte tradita videtur. Exstat enim ea 
tantum pars quae finitas quantitates versat; sed restabat matheseos generalis 
pars sublimior, ipsa scilicet Scientia infiniti saepe ad finitas ipsas 
investigandas necessaria, quam fortasse primus analyticis praeceptis 
adornavi, novo etiam calculi genere proposito, quem nuncegregii viri passim 
adhibent (GRUA, 148). 
 
Although Leibniz believed that Weigel neglected the science of the infinite, he tried until 
the end of his life to introduce him to that science. In the same year of the 
Animadversiones in fact, Leibniz writes to Weigel, trying to stress the connection between 
his mathematics and the use of ratios that Weigel promoted217, with very little success. 
After the death of Weigel, Leibniz will eventually achieve this conciliation. In 1710 he 
published in the Miscellanea Berolinensia, the journal of the Berlin Academy, a Monitum 
De Characterinus Algebraicis, i.e. an essay on the mathematical symbols used at that 
time. In this essay he adopts from Weigel's Philosophia mathematica, published in 1693, 
the mathematical symbols for 'greater' and 'less'218. I believe that this is relevant for 
several reasons. Having explained the importance of the idea of comparison, connected 
with the principle by which the whole is greater than the part and with the concept of 
                                                          
216 LH 38 Bl., 178. 
217 "Quidem circulatione Harmonica hoc est tali ut distantiis a sole sumtis in progressione Arithmetica 
velocitates circulandi sint in progressione Harmonica (quod fit si velocitates sint distantiis reciproce 
proportionales), tunc planetam moveri secundum legem a Keplero ex observationibus ductam ut scilicet 
areae orbitae ex sole radiis eductis abscissae sint temporibus proportionales. Puto etiam Te specimina 
vidisse novae cujusdam analyseos a me inventae, cujus ope circa indivisibilia (hoc est infinite seu 
incomparabiliter parva) et infinita ratiocinor perinde ut in quantitatibus ordinariis. Eaque ratione lineas 
transcendentes (ut appello) quas Cartesius sua sua Geometria et Analysi excluserat, calculi legibus subjicio" 
(AA II-2, 347). 
218 GM (V, 158). This reference is also found in some histories of the mathematical notation, such as Cajori 
(1928, II, 484). 
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homogeneity, we can hardly believe that this was an accidental homage: we could say 
that from a certain perspective they are the most important mathematical symbols for 
Leibniz. Quite revealing in this regard is that the symbol for 'greater' is no other than a 
line segment parallel to a smaller line segment (    ) , while 'less' is represented 
conversely. It suggests the idea that determining what is greater or less involves the 
comparison between two line segments, that is the coexistence of two homogeneous 
entities, in the exact same way in which the demonstration of the principle of the whole 
was exemplified by Leibniz in 1671. 
Clearly, this may seem a simple conjecture, but the exam of these writings reveals a 
closer connection. In Weigel's Philosophia mathematica those symbols are introduced 
while defining two specific concepts: Totum and Pars219. On the other hand, the very 
structure of Leibniz's Monitum suggests that he was trying that completion of the finite 
with the infinite that Weigel's account needed. At first he introduces the common 
operations, like sum and such, then he defines the fundamental concepts of equality, 
greater and less and in the end he introduces proportionality, similarity and congruence220. 
These are the principles needed for the finite, but his exposition does not end there: "Quas 
exposuimus Notae, ad Analysin commune pertinent, seu ad scientiam Finiti, sed novae 
adjecta sunt Notae, per detectam nuper Scientiam infiniti, seu Analysin infinitesimalem". 
The ideal completion of the finite with the infinite suggests a possible connection that is 
confirmed by the following essay contained in the Miscellanea Berolinensia, written 
again by Leibniz, the Symbolismus memorabilis calculi Algebraici & Infinitesimalis in 
comparatione potentiarum & differentiam ; & de Lege Homogeneorum Trascendentali. 
As the title suggests, this comparison will lead Leibniz to a further adoption of 
homogeneity221, since this is indeed the text in which Leibniz introduces the famous 
transcendental law of homogeneity. The concept originally taken from Weigel in 1710 
was adapting to both the infinitesimal calculus and the analysis situs from a foundational 
perspective. 
It seems reasonable then that after four years, an important work such as the Initia 
rerum was conceived in the same background. It is widely known that the Initia were 
written in response to Wolff's Elementa matheseos universae, published in 1713. 
                                                          
219 Weigel (1963, 135). 
220 GM (V, 158-159). 
221 GM (V, 165). 
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However, Wolff was acquainted with Jena's University: although Weigel was already 
passed away, he was considered a "Schüler im indirekten Sinne"222, because in 1702 he 
studied in Jena under Hamberger and Hebenstreit, Weigel's scholars. On a side note, the 
influence of Weigel could be the reason why Wolff's interpretation of Leibniz's 
philosophy relies heavily on the principle of contradiction. 
With regards to our purpose instead, this connection suggests that the Initia rerum 
were not written as an immediate reaction to an isolated read. It could be that Leibniz 
during that time was in contact once again with Weigel's school. Given that in 1710 
Leibniz publishes the Théodicée, where Weigel and Sturm are quoted, while adopting 
Weigel's mathematical notation, a connection with Georg Albrecht Hamberger, Weigel's 
and Sturm's scholar and Wolff's teacher, seems reasonable. 
In conclusion, there is a precise path that from an historical point of view leads to those 
general ideas about Leibniz's philosophy of mathematics that I analysed in the previous 
chapter through the Initia rerum mathematicarum metaphysica. Since the beginning and 
throughout his life, Leibniz had the chance of sharing his ideas with Weigel, even after 
the death of his teacher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
222 Herbst (2016, 365).  
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PART III: Binary Arithmetics 
 
3.1 A Tentative Reconstruction of Weigel's Influence 
 
Preliminary Remarks In this part I will argue that Weigel’s De supputatione multitudinis 
a nullitate per unitates finitas in infinitum collineantis ad deum is one of the most 
important works that influenced Leibniz’s development of binary arithmetics. This work, 
published in 1679, the same year of Leibniz’s De progressione dyadica, contains some 
fundamental ideas adopted by Leibniz both in mathematics and metaphysics. The 
controversial theories expressed in these writings will also help in understanding why 
Leibniz tried to hide Weigel’s influence between 1671 and 1710. The origin of binary 
arithmetics is a quite independent topic from the ones analysed in the previous parts, 
mainly for two reasons: the first one is that philosophy of mathematics, as it will be 
described here, does not concern the use of metaphysical concepts, like those of 
homogeneity and quality, in order to achieve a better insight on the foundation of 
mathematics, but it concerns the application of mathematics to metaphysical concepts, 
for example by describing real entities through the use of numbers. The second one is 
that, given that past interpretations tend to dismiss Weigel's role on this topic, the analysis 
will be focused more on the possibility of the transmission of Weigel's ideas to Leibniz, 
than on their affinity, which is evident per se. Hence, the problem has to be analysed also 
from the point of view of the history of science, especially evaluating past interpretations 
of Weigel's influence on Leibniz with regards to binary arithmetics. 
In recent years, Leibniz’s previously unpublished writings have cast a new light on his 
relationship with Weigel, from a mere influence during the early years to a confrontation 
that lasted at least until Weigel’s death in 1699 and beyond. Some interpreters focused on 
Weigel’s influence in specific topics, such as the endorsement of Aristotelian ideas, the 
mathematization of reality or logical reasoning, but a complete reconstruction of the 
relationship and confrontation between Weigel and Leibniz is still missing: this fact led 
to the underestimation of Weigel's importance in the topic of binary arithmetics. 
Moreover, the idea of dismissing Weigel’s importance at a later time in Leibniz's life 
is perhaps influenced by Leibniz himself, who in a letter to Christian Philipp dated March 
1681 shares this opinion on him: 
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Mons. Weigelius a beaucoup d’esprit sans doute ; mais souvent il est peu 
intelligible, et il semble qu’il n’a pas tousjours des pensées bien nettes. Je 
voudrois qu’il s’appliquât plus tost à nous donner quantité de belles 
observations, qu’il a pû faire en practiquant les mecaniques, que de s’amuser 
à des raisonnemens generaux, où il me semble qu’il se perd quelques fois. 
Non obstant tout cela je ne laisse pas de l’estimer beaucoup ; et de 
reconnoistre qu’il se trouve beaucoup de bonnes pensées dans tous ses écrits 
(AA II-1, 815). 
 
This is a perfect example of Leibniz’s general and ambiguous attitude towards Weigel: 
on one hand he prises some of Weigel’s ideas and on the other hand he acts as if he is 
judging them from a distance, without recognising explicitly their direct influence on his 
philosophy. As Leibniz remarked, being a philosopher who establishes a perfect 
connection between metaphysics, ontology, physics and human knowledge, Weigel could 
appear indeed confusing, especially since his style somehow tries to express all these 
relationships at the same time, but this difficulty shouldn’t sway us from our purpose of 
identifying the exact extent of his influence in the development of the dyadic. 
I believe that the outcome of this confrontation could prove itself extremely useful for 
understanding some intricacies that were always related to binary arithmetics in Leibniz: 
its relation with the other parts of Leibniz’s philosophy and their development in time, or 
its enigmatic use both as a mathematical tool and a metaphysical tool. The outcome of 
this analysis will be that Leibniz has not developed binary arithmetics as a mere 
mathematical tool and then applied it to metaphysics only at a later time, because since 
the very beginning he was influenced by Weigel’s De supputatione. This work already 
embeds some of the most important features of Leibniz’s binary arithmetics, both from 
the mathematical and the metaphysical point of view. It also helps us in understanding 
why and how the topic of binary arithmetics could be related to the topic of analysis situs, 
which, as I previously argued, saw a fundamental evolution in the same year in which 
Leibniz developed his binary system.  
As a starting point then, after having analysed the status quaestionis on this topic, I 
will outline the correspondence between Weigel and Leibniz in 1679, in order to point 
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out the importance of Weigel’s De supputatione in the light of a Pythagorean influence 
and a possible connection between the ideas expressed in the letters and binary 
arithmetics. In the second chapter, I will offer a brief introduction on Leibniz’s binary 
arithmetics, focusing on some important concepts spread throughout his writings, and a 
thorough analysis of Weigel’s De supputatione. The exact correspondence between 
Leibniz’s and Weigel’s ideas will lead us to recognize Weigel as one of the main 
influences in Leibniz’s development of his arithmetics. Ultimately, the analysis of these 
topics will help us express a reasonable hypothesis on why Leibniz tried to hide Weigel’s 
influence during his life. 
 
Weigel's Reception in 1679 and the Debate on Leibniz's Originality The topic of a 
supposed influence of Weigel on Leibniz’s development of binary arithmetics is rather 
old and dates back to Couturat’s La logique de Leibniz. In this book Couturat argues with 
an impressive intuition, given the availability of primary sources at that time, that Leibniz 
was influenced by Weigel’s Tetractys, a work published in 1673 which explains a way of 
counting in a base-four system, instead of the usual base-ten one. Couturat’s reasoning is 
simple: since the first writing on binary arithmetics in Leibniz, De progressione dyadica, 
is dated 15 March 1679, it could be that Leibniz took the idea of changing the base and 
then applied it to his base-two system. This interpretation is justified by a kind of 
accusation formulated by Johann Bernoulli in a letter dated 11 April 1701 in which he 
outlines the similarities between the two systems, more than Couturat’s actual research 
on Weigel223. In a letter dated 20 April 1701, Leibniz replies that, even if the similarities 
could be perceived, he started his reflections on these topics many years before his 
confrontation with Weigel’s work. On a side note, he also adds that his system is much 
more useful than the one explained by Weigel, because there is no real reason for a human 
                                                          
223 In the Logique we read : “son Arithmétique dyadique ou sa numération binaire. Il importe de donner un 
peu plus de détails sur celle-ci. On a vu que Leibniz avait été amené à cette invention par la recherche d'une 
notation aussi claire et aussi adéquate que possible pour les nombres. Elle lui avait été probablement 
suggérée par la Tetractys de son ancien maître Weigel, publiée en 1673. Leibniz n'approuvait pas ce système 
de numération a base 4, qui n'avait aucune raison d'être“ and again in the related footnote: “Pourtant Leibniz 
prétendait plus tard avoir inventé sa Dyadique avant la Tetractys de Weigel. Peut-être sa mémoire le 
trompait-elle, ou s'exagérait-il son originalité; peut-être aussi l'idée première lui avait-elle été suggérée, non 
par le livre, mais par l'enseignement de son maitre : Lettre à Jean Bernoulli, 29 avril 1701 : ‘Molitus hoc 
sum ante multos annos, etiam antequam quicquam constaret de Tetracty illa nuper ressuscitata’ (Math, III, 
B, 2)“ (Couturat 1901, 473). As for Bernoulli and Leibniz’s correspondence on this topic see the 
forthcoming AA (III-8). 
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being to change his way of counting from a base-ten model to a base-four one, whereas 
the base-two model follows the idea of simplicity, since only the number 1 and the 
number 0 are used224. At the same time, Leibniz’s system shows in his opinion a better 
way to express some proprieties that pertain numbers in general and their progression. 
Despite Leibniz’s efforts in claiming the originality of his theory, it seems that the idea 
of a decisive influence by Weigel was shared between Bernoulli’s brothers, as a letter 
from Jakob Bernoulli dated 28 February 1705 shows: “De mysterio Arithmeticae Tuae 
Dyadicae (quam video esse supplementum Tetractys Weigelianae) nihil adhuc mihi 
innotuerat”225. 
The topic of understanding Weigel’s influence then seems to be reduced to whether 
believe or not in Leibniz when he says that he was not aware of Weigel’s writings at the 
time of the birth of binary arithmetics. Another take on this problem is that of Gaston 
Grua, who argues that Couturat mistook Weigel’s Aretologistica with the Tetractys: “La 
Tetractys classe les êtres par quatre. L’invention du calcul binaire le 15 mars 1679 ne lui 
doit rien, malgré COUT. Op. 278, qui a confundu cet ouvrage avec le premier exposé de 
la numération quaternaire, en 1687, en appendice à l’Aretologistica”226. Grua bases his 
assumptions on a passage from Leibniz’s Animadversiones ad Weigelium: 
 
Atque hoc nunc quidem ad Speculum Viennese breviter notare placuit; 
praesertim cum nondum antea mihi fuerit lectus hic liber, non magis quam 
alter Aretologisticus, qui longius etiam sese in res metaphysicas diffundit 
[…]. Quod tetractycam arithmeticen attinet, arbitror in praxi si quid 
mutandum esset potius duodecimalem vel sedecimalem fore adhibendam pro 
decimali; quo majoris enim numeri progressio adhibentur (dummodo tabulae 
Pythagoricae fundamentales memoria teneantur) eo expeditior est calculus 
[…] puto non tantum tertactycam decimali esse praeferendam; sed et ipsi 
                                                          
224 Strictly speaking, in the dyadic 1 and 0 are digits and not numbers. Numbers are those composed by 
sequences of 0 and 1. However, I will keep using the word number because I believe that the fact that 1 and 
0 are also numbers is very relevant with regards to what Weigel and Leibniz were thinking. Those were not 
mere digits: 0 was the number generally associated with nothingness and 1 was the number used by Galilei 
in his reflection on the infinite number and by Weigel in his way of conceiving God and the world. The 
excitement that often shine through Leibniz while talking about binary arithmetics derives also from the 
fact that the digits used in the definition were those exact numbers.  
225 AA (III, 96). 
226 See GRUA (I, 330). 
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teractycae rursus praeferendam esse dyadicam, quae omnium perfectissima 
est (FOUCHER2, 164-166). 
 
Both Couturat’s and Grua’s theories are somehow defective for different reasons. We 
cannot prove with Couturat that Leibniz read the Tetractys before 1679, because 
Leibniz’s first references to this work are notes taken in 1683, after the birth of the 
calculus227. On the other hand, Grua’s assumption that Weigel’s first writing on a base-
four model is the Aretologistica, dated 1687 i.e. after Leibniz’s De progressione dyadica, 
is based on a mistake228: around 1673 Weigel published not one, but two different works, 
one entitled Tetractyn tetracty pythagoreae correspondentem, and the other one entitled 
Tetractys Summum tum Arithmeticae tum Philosophiae discursivae Compendium. If it is 
true that the former work, the one that was probably verified by Grua, deals only with the 
general ideas related to the tetractys, the latter contains a base-four model very similar to 
that of the 1687’s Aretologistica229. 
The reconstruction of these interpretations however leads us to an important result: 
even if it is highly doubtful, we could still believe Leibniz when he declares to Bernoulli 
that he was not influenced by Weigel’s Tetractys, because we could still believe that he 
was referring only to the specific work entitled Tetractys and we could still assume that 
Leibniz’s notes on it dated 1683 correspond also to the first moment in which he actually 
read it, but the same thing cannot be said for the reference to Weigel in the 
Animadversiones ad Weigelium, because in this work Leibniz deals with Weigel’s base-
four system in general. The Animadversiones are in fact dated 1690 and at that time 
Leibniz already read the Tetractys and several other works by Weigel, included his De 
supputatione, as we will soon prove. In other words, it seems somehow suspicious that in 
the Animadversiones Leibniz, after so many reads on Weigel, feels the need of quoting 
                                                          
227 See AA (VI-4B, 1162). As shown, around 1683 Leibniz reads and annotates several writings published 
by Weigel in 1673: the Tetractys, summum tum arithmeticae tum philosophiae discursivae compendium 
artis magnae sciendi genuina radix and the Tetractyn Pythagoreae corrspondentem ut PRIMUM 
disceptationum suarum specimen ulteriori curiosorum industria exponit Societas Pythagorea, but also the 
Methodus discendi nov-antiqua, the Universi corporis Pansophici caput summum a rebus naturalibus 
moralibus et notionalibus denominativo simul et aestimativo gradu cognoscendis abstractum and the 
Corporis pansophici pantologia. At that time then, Leibniz read both writings on the tetractys. 
228 This mistake is also made in other reconstructions of the history of binary arithmetics, for example in 
Glaser (1981). Another take against Weigel’s influence on the birth of binary arithmetics is found in Knecht 
(1981, 28). 
229 See Weigel (1673a, 15-24). I'm not quoting here passages from this work because there is contained 
nothing more than the exemplification of the calculus. 
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the Aretologistica, an obscure and confusing work in German, published many years after 
the first writings on this topic, while he was perfectly aware of Weigel’s earlier and more 
important essays written in Latin. It is as if Leibniz wanted to divert the attention from 
the similarities between him and Weigel. I believe that this is a key factor in determining 
the extent of Weigel influence on this topic, because it suggests that perhaps there are 
more similarities than the ones generally recognised. The older interpretations are based 
in fact only on a supposed influence on the idea of changing the base system and on the 
operations derived from this change, but I would like to argue that Weigel’s influence is 
much deeper and it has its roots also in the metaphysical background related to binary 
arithmetics. 
The first step in this direction is the analysis of Leibniz's and Weigel’s correspondence. 
It seems that everything revolves around year 1679, the fated year of Leibniz’s De 
progressione dyadica, and it is not a coincidence that the first letter to Weigel was sent 
by Leibniz in the same year, in September. This letter starts with an extremely useful 
information for our purposes:  
 
Dissertationem tuam de supputatione legi non sine magna animi voluptate et 
quod eam mittere voluisti gratias ago. Quanquam enim nonnulla non satis 
assequerer, multa tamen notavi praeclara et profunda. Eaque occasione Tibi 
proponam observationem meam quae ad institutum tuum (tractas enim ut in 
titulo habes de supputatione multitudinis a nullitate per unitates finitas in 
infinitum collineantis ad Deum) pertinere nonnihil videtur (AA II-1, 745). 
 
From this passage we can infer that in September 1679 Leibniz already read Weigel’s De 
supputatione, but also that we don’t know the beginning of this correspondence, that is 
Weigel’s first letter, or something similar, in which he attached his work. Given that this 
work contains many similarities with Leibniz’s writings on binary arithmetics, 
determining if Leibniz received it before the 15th of March 1679 could also determine if 
Leibniz was directly influenced by Weigel on this topic in that year. Unfortunately, there 
is no way to retrieve this information, but further observations are needed. 
Weigel’s De supputatione could have been published before the 15th of March 1679, 
plus it wouldn’t be the first time in which Leibniz is aware of a work written by Weigel 
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before its actual publication, even more considering that at that time Weigel already had 
a high opinion of his disciple230. Also, Leibniz’s letter seems at least unusual: it starts 
with this reference to Weigel’s work but, given that few months before Leibniz already 
developed his binary arithmetics, one would think that the observations Leibniz wants to 
make are going to be a brief exposition of this theory, in order to celebrate the affinity 
with his teacher’s ideas. Surprisingly, there is no mention of his binary arithmetics in this 
letter, replaced instead with the exposition of peculiar proprieties pertaining some number 
series that I already analysed. Besides, this is not a letter with no philosophical or 
mathematical content, since, aside from the aforementioned number series, there are also 
references to Leibniz’s 1672 Accessio ad Arithmeticam Infinitorum and to his recently 
developed characteristica geometrica231. 
By no means the observation on number series is not consistent with the topics of the 
De supputatione, as Leibniz himself writes, because the number series chosen are built 
through a continuous addition of unities in order to generate the series of natural numbers, 
the series of triangular numbers and the series of pyramidal numbers. These series are 
similar to the Pythagorean ideas expressed in Weigel’s De supputatione, because they 
suggest the possibility of expressing geometrical dimensions through the repetition of a 
simple unity. However, if this was Leibniz’s aim, the absence of a theory, such that of 
binary arithmetics, representing so well the idea of a constitution of the world through 
unity and zero could not be a mere coincidence. 
The analysis of the confrontation between Weigel and Leibniz then suggests that a 
study on the ideas and terminology used in their 1679’s writings is needed in order to 
compensate for the lack of information on the reception of Weigel’s De supputatione.  
 
 
 
                                                          
230 I'm referring here to the already quoted letter to Hermann Conring, dated 1670 (AA II-1, 70). As I 
already argued. the reference is probably to Weigel’s Universi corporis pansophici caput summum, a work 
that will be published three years after this letter. It is particularly relevant for two reasons: it is a work in 
which some important ideas related to the Tetractys are already present and it is one of the work analysed 
by Leibniz in 1683, casting a lot of doubts on the hypothesis that those notes could testify that those works, 
Tetractys included, were read by Leibniz for the first time in 1683. About Weigel’s appreciation for Leibniz, 
the very last sentence of Weigel’s Corollaria in his Pendulum ex tetracy deductum...sistit already 
highlighted is a sufficient proof. (Weigel 1674, Corollaria, 8) 
231 AA (II-1B, 745n, 747n). 
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3.2 The Role of Weigel's De supputatione and Leibniz's Theological Concerns 
 
De organo sive arte magna cogitandi in the light of Weigel’s De supputatione Retracing 
the influences of other authors in Leibniz’s four-page manuscript De progressione 
dyadica is not an easy task: Leibniz presents here nothing more than the operations needed 
in his binary calculus (addition, subtraction and the like) and the hypothesis for a machine 
built on these principles. Perhaps, the only hint we could find in this work is a reference 
to the multiplication table, called table of Pythagoras, that here is quoted two times232. It 
tells us that one of the main topics involved in the development of the calculus is the 
possibility of simplifying operations or completely avoiding the use of such tables. This 
topic is consistent with what Leibniz writes in the Animadversiones ad Weigelium, in 
which he points out, quoting again the table of Pythagoras, how the use of Weigel’s four-
base model does not help much in this effort, as I've already shown. 
Thankfully, Leibniz’s De organo sive arte magna cogitandi, written around the same 
time of his progressione dyadica, gives us a better understanding of Weigel’s influence. 
In this work Leibniz associates for the first time his binary calculus to the metaphysical 
relationship between unity and nothingness:  
 
Fieri potest, ut non nisi unicum sit quod per se concipitur, nimirum Deus ipse, 
et praeterea nihilum seu privatio, quod admirabili similitudine declarabo. 
Numeros vulgo explicamus per progressionem decadicam, ita ut cum ad 
decem pervenimus, rursus ab unitate incipiamus, quam commode id factum 
sit nunc non disputo; illud interea ostendam, potuisse ejus loco adhiberi 
progressionem dyadicam, ut statim ubi ad binarium pervenimus rursus ab 
unitate incipiamus […] Immensos hujus progressionis usus nunc non attingo: 
illud suffecerit annotare quam mirabili ratione hoc modo omnes numeri per 
unitatem et nihilum exprimantur (AA VI-4A, 158). 
 
This relationship, displayed at such an early stage in the history of binary arithmetics, 
proves that since its beginning Leibniz develops the mathematical achievements together 
with the metaphysical ones. Following the platonic tradition, Leibniz conceives 
                                                          
232 See LH 35, 3b 2 Bl., 1, 3. 
150 
 
nothingness as non-existence, as a tool that helps shaping the world, but what he adds is 
that the role of nothingness resembles the role of the mathematical zero, whereas the role 
of existence, both God and creature's kind of existence, resembles the role of the 
mathematical unity. It follows that binary arithmetics is also somehow connected to the 
idea of an essential limitation pertaining creatures233, to the problem of differentiating the 
unity expressed by God from that of such creatures and to the true nature of nothingness, 
both as an absolute concept and as something that can be conceived only together with 
something else. 
After this work, evidences of this reasoning are spread all over Leibniz's production 
about binary arithmetics. In the 1695 Dialogue effectif sur la liberté de l’homme et 
l’origine du mal, after having introduced the concept of nothingness, to the question on 
how nothingness is capable of entering in the composition of things, Leibniz replies: 
"vous savez pourtant comment dans l’Arithmétique les zero joints aux unités, font des 
nombres differens comme 10, 100, 1000 […] et il e nest de même de toutes les autres 
choses, car ells sont bornées ou imparfaites par le principe de la Negation ou du Neant 
qu’elles renferment”234. Here we have both the use of unities and zero in a composition 
and the idea of a priority of unity over zero, which resembles closely the priority of 
existence over non-existence. Three years after this dialogue, in a letter to Schulenburg 
dated 29 March 1698, the bond with essential limitation is even stronger:  
 
Nimirum fines seu limites sunt de Essentia Creaturarum, limites autem sunt 
aliquid privativum, consistuntque in negatione progressus ulterioris. Interim 
fatendum est, creaturam, postquam jam valorem a Deo nacta est, qualisque in 
sensus incurrit, aliquid etiam positivum continere, seu aliquid habere ultra 
fines neque adeo in meros limites seu indivisibilia posse resolve […] Atque 
haec est origo rerum ex Deo et nihilo, positivo et privativo, perfectione et 
imperfectione, valore et limitibus, activo et passivo, forma (id est entelechia, 
nisu, vigore) et materia seu mole, per se torpente nisi quod resistentiam habet. 
Illustravi ista nonnihil origine numerorum ex 0 et 1 a me observata, quae 
                                                          
233 On this topic see Fichant (1998, 85-119) and Mormino (2005, 115-140). 
234 GRUA (364). 
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pulcherrimum est emblema perpetuae rerum creationis ex nihilo, 
dependentiaeque a Deo (AA II-3B, 426-427). 
 
The same reasoning is also present in the famous Explication de l’arithmetique binaire, 
written in 1703, were Leibniz adds that 
 
Le calcul par deux, c'est à-dire par 0 et par 1, en récompense de sa longueur, 
est le plus fondamental pour la science, et donne de nouvelles découvertes, 
qui se trouvent utiles ensuite, même pour la pratique des nombres, et surtout 
pour la Géométrie, dont la raison est que les nombres étant reduits aux plus 
simples principes, comme 0 et 1, il paroit partout un ordre merveilleux (GM 
VII, 225). 
 
These quotes show that the metaphysical background of Leibniz’s binary arithmetics was 
consistent throughout his life. This is relevant, since the first work on this topic, De 
organo sive arte magna cogitandi, was written in 1679: it means that these metaphysical 
assumptions were maintained despite the well-known change in Leibniz’s philosophy 
happened in the 1680’s. The previously quoted letter to Schulenburg is perhaps the best 
evidence of this consistency, because the philosophical achievements of binary 
arithmetics are expressed together with Leibniz’s new discoveries on the nature of 
substances235. 
Regarding our purpose of determining a possible influence of Weigel’s De 
supputatione on Leibniz’s De organo, the reference to Leibniz’s writings after 1679 was 
needed in order to point out how the comparison with unity, God and nothingness was 
considered by Leibniz a distinctive feature of his base-two model, especially in the 
confrontation with Weigel’s. The same reasoning in fact is found in the Animadversiones 
ad Weigelium236, although here expressed in order to state the superiority of Leibniz’s 
system from that of Weigel. It is as if Leibniz himself wanted to divert the attention from 
the metaphysical background to the idea of changing the base of counting. In a way, he 
achieved this result, since both Couturat and Grua’s reconstruction of the birth of the 
                                                          
235 AA (II-3B, 427). 
236 FOUCHER2 (166). 
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binary calculus are based on the assumption that, if there was some kind of influence by 
Weigel, it had to be only in the mathematical aspect. This theory should be rejected 
judging by what I believe is, in reference to the confrontation between Weigel and Leibniz 
on this topic, the most important quote from Weigel’s De supputatione: 
 
Principium nempe finitatis, ipsiusque multitudinis & ordinis est, quod hinc, 
etiam in computatione primum, ubique praesupponitur. Estque conceptu suo 
vel purum, quod est NULLITAS, τό Nihil, purae computationis (Additionis , 
Subctrationis) principium; vel modale seu mensurativum, quod est τό Semel 
, aut simplum, modalis computationis (Multiplicationis, Divisionis) 
principium : Quatuor haec (principium, bina data, productum seu τό Facit) 
exacta proportione sui generis progrediuntur, dum in omni computo, sicut se 
principium ad datorum unum habet (Weigel 1679, part I, § 29)237. 
 
In order to understand this quote, a look at the very beginning of De supputatione is 
needed. Here, some universal rules are set:  
 
I. Omnia quae realiter (i.e. actu) sunt, singularia sunt. 
II. Omnes Actiones reales circa singularia sunt. 
III. Omia singularia finita Valorem in se complectuntur Pondere, Mensura, 
Numero, sed & Ordine, certum; inter se certa Ratione certaque Proportione 
definita sunt. 
IV. Omnes agendo circa res occupati Supputant (Weigel 1679, Praefatio). 
 
According to Weigel, everything in this world can be conceived as a unity. This 
possibility deprives every object of their specific proprieties, but at the same time it makes 
them homogeneous one another, that is suitable for a mathematical description, as it was 
shown in the application of the concept of ratio. The first quote then shows that every 
finite object conceived this way is a single entity composed of nothingness and unity. In 
Weigel’s philosophy in fact, the word Semel stands for unity or God, because it is a 
                                                          
237 I’m quoting this work by using the reference to its parts and chapters. Weigel’s De supputatione in fact 
was published with no page numbers until part III, making the reference to a specific page confusing for 
the reader. 
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reference to the most important operation related to divinity, that is multiplication. It is 
extremely relevant because, unlike a generic platonic reference to non-existence, these 
universal principles are associated with mathematical operations. The idea is that God 
represents pure unity, while creatures represent compositions of unity and nothingness, 
that is zero. The expression of God’s infinity is multiplication, because the multiplication 
1 x 1, while it could be executed indefinitely, still gives as a result the pure unity. God 
then embeds the whole world, that is the product of all its finite unities, from nothingness 
to pure infinity, as the complete title of De supputatione suggests. It follows that addition 
and subtraction are considered in a negative way, thus associated with nothingness: 
addition and subtraction force things to come into existence as separate things, because 
they free them from the logic of unities’ multiplications. Given these premises, Weigel 
adds a fundamental consequence: 
 
Sicut autem primum omnium Veritatum principium […] est Veritas infinita, 
DEUS; Objectivum autem NULLITAS qua puram; UNITAS finita (simplicissime 
punctum) qua modalem, finitorum rationem; ita TETRACTYS ab utroque 
principio, per quaternitates propotionum, illic purarum, hic modalium 
(Weigel 1679, part I, §27). 
 
The tetractys then was chosen by Weigel because it shares through proportions a 
relationship with both unity and nothingness. It is important to remember that, despite the 
impossibility of proving that Leibniz read the Tetractys at this stage, Weigel had already 
published this work in 1673. Therefore, in 1679’s De supputatione, while establishing a 
relation between the Pythagorean tetractys and the metaphysical concepts of unity and 
nothingness, Weigel establishes also a relationship between his base-four arithmetics and 
these philosophical ideas: “rationes numerorum & ordinum, earumque progressionem 
quadrordinalem (Tetractyn) secudum quam DEUS in gratiam humanae Mentis omnes 
Essentias tanta varietatis pulcritudine concinnavit, supputando penetremus”238. It follows 
that there is no way of understanding Weigel’s influence on Leibniz as a mere suggestion 
on changing numbering’s base model. Weigel was extremely close to binary arithmetics 
as it was conceived by Leibniz, because every element of it was already present in his 
                                                          
238 Weigel (1679, part III, § 20). 
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works, so much that Leibniz’s efforts could be seen as a prosecution of his teacher’s work, 
as Bernulli suggested. 
Leibniz’s image of the world’s creation through unity and nothingness and its 
mathematical expression then were already present in Weigel, but a possible criticism to 
this interpretation would be that of arguing for a simple Pythagorean influence, rather 
than a specific influence by Weigel’s Pythagoreanism. Even accepting this criticism, we 
could remark that before 1679 Leibniz quoted Pythagoras mainly in geometrical writings, 
for obvious reasons, and together with Plato in writings concerning metempsychosis, but 
only after April 1679 he is also credited for his metaphysical theories on numbers. The 
most famous quote is that of De numeris characteristicis ad linguam universalem 
constituendam, again in 1679: 
 
Vetus verbum est, Deum omnia pondere, mensura, numero fecisse. Sunt 
autem quae ponderari non possunt, scilicet quae vim ac potentiam nullam 
habent; sunt etiam quae carent partibus ac proinde mensuram non recipiunt. 
Sed nihil est quod numerum non patiatur. Itaque numerus quasi figura 
quaedam metaphysica est, et Arithmetica est quaedam Statica Universi, qua 
rerum gradus explorantur. Jam inde a Pythagora persuasi fuerunt homines, 
maxima in numeris mysteria latere. Et Pythagoram credibile est, ut alia multa, 
ita hanc quoque opinionem ex Oriente attulisse in Graeciam (AA VI-4A, 
263). 
 
Almost every information displayed here could be retraced in Weigel’s De supputatione, 
from the famous partition in “pondere, mensura, numero”239 to the less famous use of the 
metaphysical number, making him at least the major influence in the adoption of 
Pythagorean theories240. 
Particularly interesting is the way in which Leibniz defines arithmetics, related to the 
description of the world as a Statica Universi. This term suggests the idea that arithmetics 
could offer us a kind of static description of the world, but this idea is not consistent with 
the basic notion we have about arithmetics: if this description involves the use of 
                                                          
239 A part from the already quoted preface, see also Weigel (1679, part I, § 36 and part III, § 22). 
240 "Mirum non est, quod TETRACTYS a Pythagoraeis adeo celebrata" (Weigel 1679, part I, § 27). 
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arithmetical operations, it cannot be based solely on them, because the world is shaped in 
a different way than that of numbers. Both are well-ordered systems, but the relationship 
between things in our world need some kind of spatial reference that numbers per se don’t 
need. This order is expressed in Weigel by the notion of Status. Again, the reference to 
Weigel could help in explaining Leibniz’s theory. As we previously sketched, in Weigel’s 
philosophy every entity is conceived as a unity, making it suitable for mathematical 
operations. However, the existence of our world and the possibility of knowing it is not 
based solely on arithmetics, but on the study of the relational proprieties and positions of 
such unities: 
 
Cujus & totius, & cujusque partis, ut numeri partialis, unitates ORDINE certo, 
simul ac numerantur, etiam disponuntur a DEO, tum simul, & Ordo dicitur 
Status; tum secundum prius & posterius, & Ordo dicitur Motus (Weigel 1679, 
part II, §17). 
 
For Weigel, Status is the set of relationships between unities that give birth to the world 
in an instant, while Motus is the connection of these instantaneous descriptions of the 
world in time. In other words, they are Weigel’s equivalent of space and time, as he 
himself writes in his first reply to Leibniz’s 1679 letter: 
 
Spatium (sc. ubicativum, i.e. rerum juxta se mutuo simul existentium non-
repugnantia loco nihili,rerumque concepta) et Tempus in abstracto (tanquam 
Spatium quandicativum,i.e. rerum omnium, ut unius copiae, secundum prius 
et posterius existentium i.e. repetitarum, non-repugnantia loco nihili 
rerumque concepta) tanto magis analoga sunt inter se, quanto praecisius 
utrumque dicit potentiam perceptibilis positionis, illud simultaneae hoc 
successivae (AA II-1B, 762). 
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This reference could explain how binary arithmetics fits in Leibniz’s renewed interest in 
logic241 and analysis situs around 1679 that I analysed in the previous part. It surely shows 
Weigel's estrangement towards his theories on space in 1671. 
Another important resemblance between Weigel’s De supputatione and Leibniz’s De 
organo that points in this direction is found at the starting point of the reasoning that leads 
to the binary system in De organo: for a theory that claims the possibility of describing 
the whole world through a peculiar way of expressing numbers and their operations it 
seems unusual that the first step in this direction would be that of analysing the 
relationship between the world and the human mind. We would be inclined to think in 
fact that such description of the world would be a sort of objective description, since it’s 
based on purely mathematical assumptions. In this work however, before the introduction 
of the binary system, Leibniz reflects on the idea of conceivability: 
 
Maximum Menti Remedium est si inveniri possint cogitationes paucae, ex 
quibus exurgant ordine cogitationes aliae infinitae. Quemadmodum ex paucis 
numeris ab unitate usque ad denarium sumtis caeteri omnes numeri ordine 
derivari possunt. Quicquid cogitatur a nobis aut per se concipitur, aut alterius 
conceptum involvit. Quicquid in alterius conceptu involvitur id rursus vel per 
se concipitur vel alterius conceptum involvit […] Tametsi infinita sint quae 
concipiuntur, possibile tamen est pauca esse quae per se concipiuntur. Nam 
per paucorum combinationem infinita componi possunt (AA VI-4A, 157-
158). 
 
Many ideas expressed in this brief passage date back to the ideas found in Leibniz’s early 
years previously exposed, although here they will be later connected with the binary 
system. The first idea expressed is a minimalistic approach to universal principles: the 
relationship between the number of universal principles chosen and the number of things 
that they are able to explain should always aim for the smallest number of principles and 
                                                          
241 Leibniz kept the connection between logic and binary arithmetics also in later writings. For example in 
the Explication de l’arithmetique binaire, after introducing his calculus, we read: “Cependant je ne sçai s'il 
y a jamais eu dans l'écriture Chinoise un avantage approchant de celui qui doit être nécessairement dans 
une Caractéristique que je projette. C'est que tout raisonnement qu'on peut tirer des notions, pourroit être 
tiré de leurs Caractères par une manière de calcul, qui seroit un des plus importans mo yens d'aider l'esprit 
humain” (GM VII, 227). 
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the highest number of things explained by them, which is consistent with Leibniz's 
reductionism regarding the principle of contradiction. For the purpose of this part, it is 
sufficient to say that in De organo this minimalistic yet fertile approach is connected with 
numbers and their relationships. A passage of Weigel’s De supputatione outlines a similar 
approach on the universal principles that we already found in his Analysis aristotelica: 
 
Directorii vero f. Normae moralis, naturaliter & ordinarie ducentis, officio 
funguntur  Notitia primae nobiscum nata, quae dicuntur Axiomata (v.g. Semel 
unum est unum etiamsi sit infinitum : Finis rei [terminus & limes rei] nihil est 
prater cogitationem : Finitorum autem Bis unum sunt duo : Totum sua parte 
majus est) Weigel (1679, part I, § 11). 
 
For Weigel, the universal principles residing in the human mind are the ones that allow 
the foundation of arithmetics, such as the idea of multiplication, the idea of addition and 
the idea that the whole is bigger than its part. At first it wouldn’t seem as if Leibniz’s 
reasoning in De organo has any kind of reference to universal principles, but we should 
remember that for Leibniz, at least after 1672’s Confessio philosophi, conceivability 
involves non-contradiction, since in that work he establishes a bond between the concept 
of possibility and the act of conceiving, founding both on the principle of contradiction. 
If conceivability is presented through the principle of contradiction, then Leibniz’s 
reasoning is not that far from his mathematics as it may seem: we should be able to 
recognize by now that these principles are the ones that Leibniz uses in his foundation of 
arithmetics, but the novelty here resides on Leibniz's focus on the fact that they reside in 
the human mind, consistent with further developments that will lead to the Nouveaux 
essais. 
Weigel’s De supputatione starts in the same way of Leibniz’s De organo, establishing 
complete homogeneity between the world and the human mind: 
 
Unusquisque nostrum, etiamsi solus sit, simul ac de semetipso cogitat (dum 
secum habitat) Semetipsum illico familiariter agnoscit: idque (1) Ratione 
STATUS […] (2) Ratione MOTUS […] ex Identitate cogitationis suae 
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successivae clarissime deducit, se posterius in essendo praesentem, eundem 
esse qui, prius in essendo praesens, erat (Weigel 1679, partI, §1). 
 
Here Weigel argues, following probably Descartes’ method, that, even if we were 
completely deprived of our experiences, in our minds is contained everything we need 
not only to understand but also to express the whole world. The very simple act of 
perceiving unity and its constant perception in time give birth to the subjective 
representation of Status and Motus, that is space and time. This is possible because of the 
universal principles residing in human minds: 
 
Notitias illas, ut Mentis alias tenebricolae luculas (scintillulas) principia, 
rationes, & causas Mentaliter operandi primas; una cum immediatis 
experientiis, quisque nostrum simpliciter & indubie Semper novit, intime 
perspectas habet, intelligit, atque sapit (Weigel, 1679, part I, § 13). 
 
The idea of the spark recalls the platonic influence found in the Analysis aristotelica about 
reminiscence. Unity, addition, multiplication and the principle for which the whole is 
bigger than its part, that is Ordo, are the same elements that we already saw in the 
objective description of the world. Once corroborated by experiences, these principles 
show the homogeneity between men and the world: 
 
Axiomatum, ut generalium principiorum, suscitabula sunt Experientiae, tum 
immediata, Mentis ipsius per se v. g. Mentem hominis in Ubi per corpus suum 
& ipsius Mundi definito contineri […] tum mediata, Mentis per sensus, h.e. 
per oblationem ad adjuncto sibi corpore factam, obsevabiles, v.g. Res Mundi 
circa Nos vario Status & Motus variabilis ordine disponi (Weigel 1679, part 
I, §12). 
 
There are several similarities between these passages and Leibniz’s idea of truth 
expressed through relations, both in understanding truth for things that already exist, like 
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in 1677’s Dialogus, or in discovering new ones, as in the ars inveniendi242. The 
homogeneity between the universal principles instead will be crucial in Leibniz’s 
Nouveaux essais. 
As a final remark for this section, I would like to add that the first quote of Weigel’s 
De supputatione here presented could again suggest that Leibniz read this work around 
the time of his De organo: in Weigel, the two universal principles are introduced as “τό 
Nihil” and “τό Semel”. We could say that the use of the ancient Greek’s definite article is 
a distinctive trait of Weigel’s writing, used in every work ever published. He uses Latin 
in metaphysical essays, while adding German in order to express examples or specimina 
and Greek for the most important principles of his philosophy. The definite article is his 
way of promoting a concept to a universal principle, much like his use of italics or small 
capitals. This peculiar way of writing is not present in Leibniz in the years before 1679, 
but it suddenly appears for the first time in April and vanishes around the end of that 
summer243, that is the period of time between Leibniz’s De organo and his first letter to 
Weigel. Leibniz adopted this trait and I believe that this could be an interesting hint on 
the exact moment in which Leibniz received Weigel’s work, because it is based on a 
specific pattern, and not on a generic use of ancient Greek, very frequent in these kind of 
writings.  
 
Conclusion: God and Numbers After having analysed Weigel’s influence on binary 
arithmetics, the remaining task is understanding why Leibniz tried to hide it throughout 
his life. The obvious conclusion seems to be that Weigel’s theory was too similar to that 
of Leibniz and admitting its influence would have led to a charge of plagiarism, but I 
believe that in Leibniz’s attitude there is more than just fear. In 1679, after his stay in 
Paris, Leibniz achieved a superior mathematical knowledge, unknown to Weigel, that 
affects their different ways of conceiving arithmetics. While in Weigel’s De supputatione 
                                                          
242 Weigel has his own ars inveniendi, called at times deductio productionalis or inventio: “Exserit autem 
se computus per SCISCITATIONEM & INVENTIONEM […] qua ratio latens inter ipsas rationes illi conjugatas 
quaeritur & inventa producitur. Mανθάνω enim, latine sciscitare, non est receptas sententias discere, 
quaerentique verbaliter, i.e. interroganti, recitare […] sed ignotas Veritates cum judicio rimari, tandemque 
si Veritatum Autor annuat producere: non ex nihilo, sed ex datis positisque certis veritatibus & rationibus” 
(Weigel, 1679, part I, § 22). 
243 The first use is a “το non-fortunatum” in the Calculus consequentarum, written in April 1679 (AA VI-
4A, 223). Then we find it in De negatione (Summer 1679, AA VI-4A, 300) and in the Potest aliqua notio 
esse alia generalior ut tamen non sit simplicior (Spring - Summer 1679, AA VI-4A, 303). 
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the relationship between the finite and the infinite is standard ― God is the expression of 
the infinite, creatures are the expression of the finite ― Leibniz had to deal with his recent 
discoveries on the infinitesimal calculus. If both binary arithmetics and the infinitesimal 
calculus were to be applied to an indefinitely divisible world, the problem of dealing with 
infinity arises in a much more complicated way than that of Weigel, as suggested by 
Leibniz's development of Weigel's homogeneity in the previous part. In the same fashion, 
it could be that Leibniz believed that his binary arithmetic expressed a better image of the 
world than Weigel’s calculus. This belief probably explains why Leibniz’s first letter to 
Weigel, instead of reporting the analogies with his calculus, deals mainly with the 
problem of infinity. 
Having analysed Weigel’s influence however, a better understanding of Leibniz’s aim 
is possible. He believes that binary arithmetics is an appropriate expression of an infinite 
world because, as we saw in Weigel, its description is based on the study of relational 
proprieties, more than arithmetic operations. In this regard, the binary system is nothing 
more than a way of labelling things, much like names or characters. Its advantages are 
that instead of names, it uses only two digits, connected in a way that allows at the same 
time the possibility of naming things indefinitely and the creation of names that are 
always distinguishable between themselves. However, the fact that order is derived solely 
from the notion of Status is also the most important limit of Leibniz’s binary arithmetics: 
the arithmetical operations lose a distinctive role, meaning that a connection between the 
wonderful proprieties that Leibniz saw studying the binary series in artihmetics are not 
coherently related to the use of the binary system in metaphysics. This difference explains 
why Leibniz refers often to the idea of an analogy between binary aithmetics and the 
world, rather than an exact expression. Despite these difficulties, Leibniz was probably 
afraid that the reference to Weigel would have diverted the attention from what he 
believed was a better explanation of how binary calculus is useful in dealing with an 
infinite reality. 
Another reason why Leibniz was not inclined in recognising Weigel’s influence is the 
main metaphysical consequence of a purely mathematical description of the world: if 
unity is what describes the entire world, then the difference between God and creatures is 
at stake. If for Weigel the main difference is only that “infinitam dari Mentem, a qua 
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Mentes finitae Mensuram capiant”244, it follows that the universal principles are shared 
between God and his creations. The result is not only that God as the Computator acts in 
the same way of creatures, only with an infinite mind, but also that the finite is contained 
in the infinite through the use of multiplication: “ENS REALE vel infinitum est & PRIMUM, 
DEUS, in quo vivimus & movemur”245. Judging by this quote, it comes as no suprise that 
in the same year Weigel was forced to retract one of his works by the faculty of theology. 
Leibniz was interested in this topic and in Weigel’s demonstration of God’s existence246 
and maybe this awareness explains the need of expressing a criticism to Spinoza in 
Leibniz’s letter to Schulenburg about binary arithmetics247. 
Focusing on the demonstration of God's existence, Leibniz's interest on Weigel's 
version predictably dates back to the 1670's, the same period in which Leibniz was busy 
developing his modal demonstration. The interest continues also in 1679, since Leibniz 
was corresponding with Adolf Hansen about Weigel for more than a year248. As much as 
Leibniz was interested in the metaphysical implications of his binary arithmetics during 
the following years, so he was about Weigel's demonstration of God's existence, 
especially given the relation between God and creatures that it implied. The first sentence 
of Leibniz's Inventa Weigelii doctrinalia states: "Demonstratio Mathematica existentiae 
Dei supponit existentiam rerum non esse continuam, et ita esse perpetuam 
recreationem"249. Around the same time, in 1685, Leibniz writes to Ludwig von 
Seckendorff, mentioning Weigel, while commenting a work of Villiers250: 
 
                                                          
244 Weigel (1679, part I, § 10). 
245 Weigel (1679, part III, § 26). 
246 See Di Bella (2005°, 260-261). 
247 AA (II-3B, 427). 
248 Hansen wrote to Leibniz about Weigel for the first time in a letter dated Febrary 1678, without knowing 
that Leibniz had been one of his disciples: "Ie voudrois bien savoir si l'invention du charoit qui se peut 
changer en tente et en batteau n'est pas de MR Weichelius, qui est Professeur à Iena, j'en ai vû à Gotha de 
son invention, il est homme d'un grand genie, et peut être que vous ne serez pas faché d'entrer en commerce 
avec lui, il est fort curieux, et m'a montré souvent de tres bonnes choses" (AA I-1, 320). Then again in 
December 1678: "Ie vous prie de mander quelque chose de MR Weigelius, il a de tres-belles inventions et 
je suis faché de n'en avoir pas profité dans le temps que j'avois la commodoté de le voir tous les jours, il 
n'est pas envieux da sa science" (AA I-1, 389). In April 1679 Hansen mention Weigel's demonstration of 
God's existence: "I'ai relu toutes vos lettres avec la plus grande satisfaction du monde [...] Ie voudrois que 
vous m'apprissiez un peu, s'il vous plait, ce que c'est devenu la nouvelle demonstration de l'existence de 
Dieu de M. Weigelius, je n'en ai rien apris depuis long temps" (AA I-1, 457), before Leibniz's letter to 
Weigel. 
249 LH 38 Bl., 178. 
250 See Villiers (1685). 
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Aliqua video inspergi quae a Weigelii nostri placitis non abhorrent et a me 
aliquando expensa sunt. Putat enim nihil manere idem, sed omnia esse in 
perpetuo fluxu excepto Deo. Weigelii demonstrationem existentiae Dei, 
quam Germanica pariter ac latina lingua aliquot abhinc annis amicis 
communicavit, vidisse te arbitror. Mihi valde consideratu digna videtur, 
tametsi nonnulla supplenda videri monuerim, quorum adhuc 
demonstrationem desiderabam. Optima mihi haec videtur via si ostendi 
posset omnia accidentia nihil aliud esse quam modos substantiam 
concipiendi, ita enim demonstratum esset quod illi ponunt, substantias ipsas 
revera non durare, si rem ad summam ακριβειαν exigas, sed alias atque alias 
prioribus similes vel si mavis easdem a Deo continue creari, Deus autem 
necessario eximi deberet, alioqui si omnia continuo perirent, ne ipso quidem 
excepto, nihil esset quod ea restitueret, nam ubi semel nihil esset in toto 
universo, in aeternum nihil maneret (AA II-1, 874). 
 
It is clear that Leibniz was very intrigued by the idea of the continuous creation. If 
however that was conceived in mathematical terms, there was little room for a true 
differentiation between God and creatures. On a side note, the words "omnia esse in 
perpetuo fluxu excepto Deo" recall the distinctions found in primary matter in Leibniz's 
early years. There is a significant difference however: at that time something that was at 
rest, yet not identifiable with God existed, primary matter considered at rest or space, 
while here everything is in motion, except God. Although then we could find some 
connections there is an evolution both in Leibniz's conception of physics, as it is widely 
known, but also in Weigel's philosophy. A sort of mathematical relationship between 
entities and their creation in fact could be found also in the Analysis aristotelica251, but 
Weigel was not influenced at that time by the Pythagorean tradition as much as he will 
be after 1673. This is the reason why Weigel's influence on Leibniz should be taken into 
account in the early years, even if there are few direct references to the Pythagorean 
tradition, plus it explains convincingly what happens around 1679: when Weigel's 
                                                          
251 "Ex entis materiali […] fluunt Numeri, quibus, discretim spectando, quodvis est vel Ens h.e. unum 
seorsim: vel conjunctim Ens & Ens h. e. unum & unum (quod commoditatis gratia dicimus duo) vel Ens & 
Ens & Ens.h.e. unum & unum & unum (tria) vel Ens & Ens & Ens.& Ens. h. e. unum & unum & unum & 
unum (4.) & sic in infinitum" (Weigel 1658, 182). 
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philosophy witnessed a fundamental evolution, so did Leibniz's philosophy by accepting 
some Pythagorean elements in his binary arithmetics. 
Leibniz himself however explains clearly in the Théodicée his cautious approach. At 
first Leibniz reports Weigel's demonstration together with his critique on the composition 
of reality252. Leibniz admits a modified version of Weigel's argument by specifying that 
a degree of freedom is needed, otherwise creatures would lose their freedom: 
 
Cette action de Dieu est libre. Car si c'étoit une emanation necessaire, comme 
celle des proprietés du cercle, qui coulent de son essence, il faudroit dire que 
Dieu a produit d'abord la creature necessairement, ou bien, il faudroit faire 
voir comment en la creant une fois, il s'est impose la necessité de la conserver 
(GP VI, 343).  
 
Leibniz's cautiousness displayed here surely depends from the context in which the 
Théodicée is written, but it also hides an honest criticism on the continuum problem. I 
believe that the world conceived as a combination of independent unities leads necessarily 
to the idea of a world of points that derive time from a series of instants, as Leibniz 
remarks. This is probably the reason why Leibniz always writes about binary arithmetics 
without any references to the other developments of his philosophy of mathematics. If 
Weigel had no problem in extending his philosophy of homogeneity and ratio to this 
realm as well, Leibniz obviously had a better understanding of the problems related to 
infinity, even if the extension of homogeneity to the infinite was taken from Weigel 
                                                          
252 "Feu Monsieur Erhard Weigel, Mathématicien et Philosophe célèbre à Jéna, connu par son Analysis 
Euclidea, sa Philosophie mathématique […] communiquait à ses amis une certaine démonstration de 
l'existence de Dieu, qui revenait en effet à cette création continuée. Et comme il avait coutume de faire des 
parallèles entre compter et raisonner, témoin sa Morale Arithmétique raisonnée (rechenschaftliche 
Sittenlehre) il disait que le fondement de la démonstration était ce commencement de la table pythagorique, 
une fois un est un. Ces unités répétées étaient les moments de l'existence des choses, dont chacun dépendait 
de Dieu, qui ressuscite, pour ainsi dire, toutes les choses hors de lui, à chaque moment. Et comme elles 
tombent à chaque moment, il leur faut toujours quelqu'un qui les ressuscite, qui ne saurait être autre que 
Dieu. Mais on aurait besoin d'une preuve plus exacte pour appeler cela une démonstration. Il faudrait 
prouver que la créature sort toujours du néant, et y retombe d'abord ; et particulièrement il faut faire voir 
que le privilège de durer plus d'un moment par sa nature, est attaché au seul être nécessaire. Les difficultés 
sur la composition du Continuum entrent aussi dans cette matière. Car ce définie paraît résoudre le temps 
en moments : au lieu que d'autres regardent les moments et les points comme de simples modalités du 
continu, c'est-à-dire comme des extrémités des parties qu'on y peut assigner, et non pas comme des parties 
constitutives. Ce n'est pas le lieu ici d'entrer dans ce labyrinthe" (GP VI, 343). 
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himself. In this regard, it is relevant that the exemplification of necessity in the passage 
above rests on the emanation, term found in Weigel as I showed, of intrinsic properties 
of a circle, i.e. qualities: it is as if Leibniz is stating that he would follow Weigel in 
mathematics, while casting some doubts on the mathematization of metaphysics done 
through the concepts of unity and nothingness. 
It follows that this other side of Weigel's and Leibniz's philosophy of mathematics, 
probably because, resting on the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic 
infinite, conceives the mathematical operations as something that needs to be applied to 
numbers, had a different origin from that of the other mathematical concepts. It is no 
coincidence then that in Leibniz's 1679 letter to Weigel there is a reference to the Accessio 
ad Arithmeticam Infinitorum and to the infinite number. Clearly, Galilei's influence on 
Jena's cultural movement that I sketched in the first part of the present work is responsible 
for Weigel's and Leibniz's growing interest in the properties that one number could 
exhibit. The Accessio already in 1672 shows a reflection on Galileo's infinite number:  
 
Galilaeus in dial. Mechan. 1253. Infinitum Numerum comparat unitati […] 
Quid ergo? attributa aequalis, majoris, minoris, non habere locum in infinito. 
Et subjicit si ullus sit numerus infinitus, eum esse unitatem, in ea enim esse 
illud necessarium requisitum numeri omnium unitatum infiniti, ut tot sint in 
ea radices, quot quadrati et cubi […] Ego vero ajo: si ullus sit iste numerus 
infinitus, eum esse zero, seu Nullam, vel quod idem est dicere, Numerum 
istum infinitum esse nullum, seu = 0. […] Cum ergo in numero isto infinito 
tot sint Numeri pares, quot numeri pares et impares simul, seu quot numeri 
simpliciter, sequitur in Numero isto infinito fallere Axioma illud: totum esse 
majus parte at Axioma illud fallere impossibile est, seu quod idem est, 
Axioma illud nunquam, ac non nisi in Nullo seu Nihilo fallit, Ergo Numerus 
infinitus est impossibilis, non unum, non totum, sed Nihil. Ergo Numerus 
infinitus = 0 (AA II-1, 349). 
 
                                                          
253 The reference is to Galileo's Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche, intorno a due nuove scienze attenenti 
alla mecanica e i movimenti locali in Galilei (1929, VIII, 78-83). 
165 
 
The idea of an infinite number invalidates the principle by which the whole is greater than 
its part, that is the very foundation of Weigel's and Leibniz's mathematics of ratios. 
However, the reflections on its impossibility led Leibniz to his idea of nothingness. This 
could be the reason why in Leibniz's Accessio we find the studies on the number series 
that we will find in his 1679 letter to Weigel, because these two opposite solutions, while 
remaining opposite, were conceived at the same time254. Given that in the same year of 
the Accessio Weigel invented his base four calculus255, it is highly probable that they were 
both influenced by the Galilean tradition in Weigel's school. The application of the 
concept of infinite number to the concept of God and Weigel's idea of counting in a 
different base led then Leibniz to binary arithmetics, but the original sin of being born 
from an impossible concept always set binary arithmetics apart from Leibniz's other 
reflections on the philosophy of mathematics, even more so, since it entailed a dangerous 
idea of God.  
In conclusion, despite these possible explanations of his cautiousness, Leibniz was 
interested in Weigel’s philosophy throughout his whole life. It is now clear that since its 
beginnings Leibniz was influenced by Weigel on many of the topics highlighted: from 
the terminology adopted and the reference to the Pythagorean tradition to the use of a 
different base-model and its connection with unity and nothingness by means of 
arithmetical operations. In 1679 this confrontation gave birth to binary arithmetics.
                                                          
254 As it is known, in this regard the importance of Leibniz's studies on Pascal is also relevant, especially 
for the number series. See Pascal (1665). 
255 Although dated 1673 in fact, versions of Weigel's Tetractys are found already in 1672. 
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Conclusion 
 
The analysis of Weigel's influence on Leibniz proved that a new reconstruction of the 
evolution of Leibniz's mathematical knowledge during his life was much needed. Leibniz 
himself warns us that his knowledge before Paris was very derivative, but this remark is 
not decisive, if the theories encountered in Jena were not just a mere glimmer of those 
developed by the original authors, but syncretistic accounts that already contained a 
degree of rigour. Even before his stay in Paris in fact, Leibniz was able to grasp some 
fundamental concepts that will be essential in his later reflection on mathematics. Besides, 
once achieved a superior understanding on the same matter, instead of completely 
dismissing his past ideas, he firmly decided to make them suitable for his new 
mathematics. 
By no means Weigel played a secondary role in this quest, both in the adoption of 
those ideas before Paris and in reminding Leibniz throughout his life their metaphysical 
and mathematical relevance. During the early years, Weigel built that cultural 
environment where Leibniz found, among others, philosophers very dear to him, such as 
Gassendi and Hobbes, conceived in a syncretistic effort that was eliminating the evident 
contradiction posed by their combination with Scholastics' ideas. The result is a new take 
on Leibniz's peculiar attitude in those years: instead of reserving the original 
reformulation of these ideas to Leibniz's character only, a reasonable confrontation with 
the context in which Leibniz lived is now possible with new insights. It is indeed true that 
many other syncretists were quoted and read by Leibniz, but none of them were in that 
moment closer than Weigel and, above all, none of them tried as much as Weigel did the 
daring attempt of prioritising Hobbes over any other author, Descartes included, in every 
possible field, from logic to the philosophy of nature and ethics. This outcome is all the 
more important in the light of the authors chosen by Weigel among the ancient 
philosophers: in order to conciliate Aristotle with the moderns a stronger estrangement 
towards the Scholastics was needed and it caused the happiest of circumstances, that is 
the possibility of revaluating Aristotle's logic and his logical ontology while maintaining 
and highlighting the connections with Hobbes' logic. The fact that Weigel erroneously 
conceived Aristotle in the light of Euclid, resulted in a very useful mistake, because the 
rigorous mathematical demonstrations became the litmus test of any possible reasoning, 
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Scholastics' reasoning included. In this regard, Hobbes' constant reference to Euclid was 
cherished as a fitting alternative, while the Scholastics' principles were maintained only 
in their most general form. Nonetheless, while this estrangement towards Scholastics was 
valid on paper, it depended ultimately on Weigel's will, so much that many of their ideas 
were reintroduced by him in the form of Aristotle's original ideas. The complexity of 
these relationships fits nicely with the complexity of Leibniz's position in those years, 
explaining some contradictions that were considered particularly puzzling. 
On the other hand, Plato's reminiscence was endorsed by Weigel in a mathematical 
and foundational context in order to grant the homogeneity between God, reality and the 
human mind for those principles that were taken from Aristotle and Hobbes. Setting aside 
Leibniz's derivative knowledge in those years, Plato's Meno, quoted by Weigel, represents 
probably the original ancestor of Leibniz's idea of founding the whole of mathematics on 
a single principle. Not to mention the consequences of conceiving essences as numbers 
in the mind of God, an older version of Leibniz's idea of conceivability as a tool used to 
express sets of coherently related possibilities.   
Another relevant outcome of this research is on the ground of physics: the analysis of 
the dissertations written under Weigel's guidance showed the huge debt of Leibniz's 
Hypothesis physica nova to Jena's circle. Interpreting Leibniz's Hypothesis as nothing 
more than another dissertation of those years is surely inaccurate, but the reference to the 
same authors, the use of the same examples and the adoption of the same objectives is 
certainly surprising. Since Leibniz's Hypothesis was immediately praised by Weigel, an 
honour reserved for very few in his writings, we can safely assume that it was conceived 
with a much more important task in mind, consistent with the project of founding an 
academic society in Germany. It also follows however that the year 1671 represents the 
peak of Weigel's influence, meaning that it is no coincidence that in the same year we 
find one of the most relevant passages on Leibniz's conception of geometry. As it was 
shown, motion and rest could be interpreted as concepts that, while evolving in time 
during Leibniz's life, caused in that very moment the transition of the difference between 
quality and quantity from physics to mathematics. 
The importance of the concept of ratio emerges from this distinction, because a ratio 
is possible only between homogeneous entities and homogeneity is defined through 
quality and quantity. Leibniz's definition of number is based on these reflections and it 
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resembles closely that of Weigel. It cannot be argued either that these concepts have a 
secondary role in the philosophy of Leibniz's teacher, because it was widely known by 
Leibniz from the very beginning that Weigel's metaphysics was based on the application 
of ratios and proportions to every possible field of knowledge, as Leibniz himself admits 
and remarks. 
Given also Weigel's interest on numbers series expressed through ratios, Leibniz's 
1679 letter could be seen as an attempt to impress him by displaying his recent 
achievements in the mathematics of the infinite. This attempt was not particularly 
appreciated, or even understood by Weigel, but that did not stop Leibniz's growing 
interest in the works of his former professor. The more Leibniz was taking notes on 
Weigel's works about homogeneity, quality, ratios and situs, the more he was motivated 
in his foundational attempts, even if they were already reaching a degree of complexity 
that was unknown to Weigel. Following this path, Leibniz probably realised that the ideas 
imparted by Weigel in his early years had a significant impact on him and the thought of 
completing Weigel's philosophy of mathematics with his original contribution about the 
infinite began to cross his mind, until the definite acknowledgment around 1710. Even if 
already passed away, Weigel inspired Leibniz one last time in the form of a disciple of 
his school, Christian Wolff. This last exchange gave birth to one of the most interesting 
works on the philosophy of mathematics, the Initia rerum mathematicarum metaphysica.  
As much as the texts considered prove this reconstruction, Leibniz's attitude towards 
Weigel seems at times against a serious consideration of his influence. During his early 
years, Leibniz appreciation for his teacher is evident, for example in the 1669 letter to 
Thomasius, but after 1671 a series of sparse and convoluted references begin to replace 
Leibniz's initial enthusiasm, at least until 1680. Leibniz's apparently incoherent attitude 
is in part justified by the fact that some of the letters in the correspondence with Weigel 
are missing, judging by the reference to unknown topics in the letters already published. 
However, another possible conjecture is that Leibniz was afraid of being associated with 
Weigel on theological matters. This interpretation is consistent with Weigel's conflicts 
with the theological faculty of Jena, began even before Leibniz's arrival in that city in 
1663 and continued throughout his life. It is also consistent with Leibniz's concerns 
expressed in his Essais de Théodicée and with his cautiousness on the ground of the 
metaphysical interpretation of binary arithmetics. Besides, it is quite clear that Leibniz 
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was not very satisfied by the association with Weigel on these topics, done by Bernoulli. 
Binary arithmetics was the only topic in which Leibniz felt the need of openly defending 
himself, as if he was accused of plagiarism. He was probably concerned about the 
possibility for his contemporaries of understanding how the idea of counting in a base 
two model was innovative not only because of the change in the base system, but also 
because of the specific base system chosen. Yet, it does not seem that in other topics 
Leibniz is willing to admit Weigel's influence, hinting only to his correspondents to the 
great thoughts contained in his works. Particularly interesting in this regard is the fact that 
even while corresponding with Weigel himself, not only on their late academic projects, 
but specifically on mathematical problems, Leibniz never refers explicitly to the fact that 
in the same years he was extensively reading his works. 
Influenced by this attitude, together with the theoretical achievements summarised 
above, one would be inclined to think that Leibniz was trying to deceive his 
contemporaries, but this inclination is probably due to the specificity of this research. 
From a wider perspective, it is clear that Leibniz had nothing to fear from Weigel: even 
in the specific field of mathematics, Weigel's influence was related more to those concepts 
that were an ideal bridge between philosophy and mathematics, rather than those 
concerning purely mathematical discoveries, except for binary arithmetics. 
However, it is probably the ambiguous origin of these ideas that led Leibniz to his 
foundation of mathematics. The numerous claims on Weigel's confusion, always 
associated with prises, suggest that in Leibniz's mind Weigel's ideas did not need to be 
rejected, but perfected through a rationalist account. This is I believe one of the most 
stunning features of Leibniz's rationalism: the ability of discarding unnecessary results, 
combining the ones left and obtaining a completely new theory. As much as during his 
life Leibniz was extremely concerned by the political and theological consequences of 
his actions, in his private writings he exhibits a silent and steady intolerance for any 
superfluous reasoning. As much as he was interested in all sorts of topics with his widely 
known and impressive culture, he strictly admitted only the smallest number of universal 
principles in his thought, resorting to the introduction of a new one only when it was 
inevitable. Consequently, the process of creation becomes an art of combinations that 
goes beyond the limits of the former theories endorsed and cuts their unnecessary 
contradictions. 
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This attitude, that I would call a metaphysical minimalism or a methodological 
reductionism, is particularly evident in Leibniz's use of Weigel's ideas. In the early years, 
Leibniz immediately recognises the origin of Weigel's tendency in Hobbes' conatus and 
adopts it in its purest form, while modifying it for his needs. He is intrigued by Weigel's 
syncretistic project, but he allows only those principles that were necessary for the 
explanation of reality, i.e. the principle of sufficient reason and the principle by which the 
whole is greater than the part. Once endorsed the principle of contradiction in 1671, he 
seriously takes the project of his former teacher of deriving necessary truths from the 
smallest number of principles with an unprecedented rigour. Since the principle of 
contradiction is the very essence of necessity, he prioritizes it in the deduction of the other 
principles, by recognising its connection with identity and placing it at the core of the 
demonstration of the principle of the whole. Since the latter was the only principle needed 
for the foundation of geometry, this possibility was inherited by the principle of 
contradiction: what was a mere idea in Weigel's account became, thanks to Leibniz, a 
structured and complex theory of logic that had the capability of defining mathematical 
objects. As a result, the concepts of homogeneity, quality and quantity witness a 
continuous elaboration in rigorous definitions. In the same fashion, once Leibniz 
discovers a superior mathematics than that of Weigel he forces himself in finding a 
comprehensive theory that would bring homogeneity between the finite and the infinite. 
Finally, while developing binary arithmetics, he turns Weigel's base four model in a base 
two model, because Weigel's choice was an unnecessary homage to the Pythagorean 
tradition that was not appropriate with respect to the purpose of the calculus. Weigel's 
subtle mysticism was completely rejected. At the same time, because of his concerns on 
the possibility of harmonizing binary arithmetics with the rest of his mathematics, Leibniz 
carefully set dyadic apart from his consistent achievements in other fields, in the name of 
his rational coherence. 
It is in this struggle for the most rational theory that Leibniz emerges as a true and 
unique genius. In this light, Weigel's influence was the spark that led to one of the most 
interesting theories on the philosophy of mathematics. By means of transformation, 
Leibniz brought homogeneity to the heterogeneous framework of Weigel's philosophy.  
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primis, fundamentis demonstratur; omnis quoque generis experimenta hydraulico-
pneumatica recluduntur; & absoluta machinarum aquâ & aëre animandrarum ratio ac 
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